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BALANCING PUBLIC HEALTH AGAINST INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY:
THE ETHICS OF SMOKING REGULATIONS
Thaddeus Mason Pope*

ABSTRACT

Eleven years ago, philosopher Robert E. Goodin published No Smoking:
The Ethical Issues. Goodin argued that the liberty of smokers can be justifiably limited for two reasons: to prevent harm to third persons and to
prevent harm to smokers themselves under circumstances which make
their decision to smoke substantially non-autonomous. In this article
Thaddeus Pope reexamines the harm principle and the soft paternalism
principle in light of more recent legal developments, gives them additional content, and carefully demarcates the justificatory scope of each.
Pope also defines and defends a third liberty-limiting principle, hard paternalism, arguing that the liberty of smokers might be justifiably limited
even when their decision to smoke is substantially autonomous.
Table of Contents

I.

II.

Introduction ...........................................................
Regulation to Prevent Harm to Others: The "Harm
Principle" ......................
......................................
A. Defining "Harm to Others" ................................
B. Applying the Harm Principle ...............................
C. Limitations of the Harm Principle .........................
Regulation to Prevent Harm to Self: Soft Paternalism ........

420
433
433
435
445
454

* Law Clerk to the Honorable John L. Coffey, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit; Member of the California Bar; Graduate fellow at the Department of Philosophy and Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University. J.D. 1997, Georgetown University Law Center;
M.A. (bioethics) 1995, Georgetown University. I wish to express my appreciation to Tom L.
Beauchamp, Richard Daynard, Lawrence 0. Gostin, and Michael R. Taylor; and to Reina B. Pope
and Linda L.B. Pope who commented on earlier drafts of this article. I also thank Richard M.
Cooper and William B. Schultz for their edifying 1996 seminar on the FDA, which inspired more
than just this article. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the vigor of the political debate on this issue
and to emphasize that the contribution of this article to the literature is only a philosophical one. I
do not deliberately take sides on the ethical issues surrounding smoking. Rather, through precise
conceptual analysis, I make explicit just what those issues actually are.

UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH LAW REVIEW

A.
B.

III.

[Vol. 61:419

Defining "Soft Paternalism". ..............................
Applying the Soft Paternalism Liberty-Limiting
Principle ........................................................
1. Regulation to Protect the Uninformed ................
2. Regulation to Protect the Immature ...................
3. Regulation to Protect the Coerced ....................
C. Limitations of the Soft Paternalism Liberty-Limiting
Principle ........................................................
Regulation to Prevent Harm to Self: Hard Paternalism .......
A. Defining "Hard Paternalism". ..............................
B. Applying the Hard Paternalism Liberty-Limiting
Principle ........................................................
1. Overt Hard Paternalism: Laetrile and Outdoor
Smoking Bans ............................................
2. Masked Hard Paternalism: Feinberg and His Soft
Paternalistic Strategy ....................................
C. Limitations of the Hard Paternalism Liberty-Limiting
Principle ........................................................
C onclusion ............................................................

454
460
461
464
466
469
472
473
476
478
480
491
497

INTRODUCTION

In response to what is widely perceived as a public health crisis,'
federal, state, and municipal governments are poised to implement new
initiatives that would significantly regulate the manufacture, labeling, advertising, promotion, distribution, sale, and consumption of tobacco products. 2 Legal scholars have exhaustively discussed the various constitu1.
[T]obacco use is the single leading cause of preventable death in the United States. More
than 400,000 people die each year from tobacco-related illnesses, such as cancer, respiratory
illnesses, and heart disease, often suffering long and painful deaths. Tobacco alone kills more
people each year in the United States than acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), car
accidents, alcohol, homicides, illegal drugs, suicides, and fires, combined.
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398 (1996)(footnotes omitted), struck down,
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S.Ct. 1291 (2000) (holding that FDA lacks authority to regulate tobacco products). "Consequently, tobacco use has become one of the most serious
health problems facing the United States today." Id.; see also JACOB SULLUM, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD:
THE ANTISMOKING CRUSADE AND THE TYRANNY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 56 (1998) (collecting other dramatic statements of the crisis); J. Michael McGinnis & William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in
the 'United States, 270 JAMA 2207, 2208 (1993); R.T. Ravenholt, Tobacco's Impact on 20th Century
U.S. Mortality Patterns, 1 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 4, 14-15 (1992) ("Only the unquantifiable threat
of nuclear annihilation poses a greater threat to health and life.").
2. With the death of the national settlement in 1998 and the Supreme Court's striking down of
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tional, jurisdictional, and practical issues raised by these initiatives. 3 Less
discussed, but no less important, are the ethical issues at stake.
In particular, scholars have neglected a critical underlying issue of
political philosophy; namely, that of demarcating the limits to which
these initiatives can restrict the liberty of tobacco-consuming individuals.
A recent RAND Corp. study concluded:
Even today, when smoking in public places is highly regulated in many states, the
debate over the scope of that regulation is far from settled. The tension between individual liberties and governmental intervention to protect the public's health is at
issue. That the state has the power to regulate smoking to secure the public's
when, how, and under what
health is beyond question. The policy debate is about
4
circumstances the state should exercise that power.
the FDA regulations, no major federal initiatives remain. See Gordon Faircloth, States May Regulate
Tobacco in FDA's Absence, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2000, at B14; Robert S. Greenberger & Suein L.
Hwang, Court to Rule on FDA Role Over Tobacco, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1999, at A3; see also Michele Bloch et al., A Year of Living Dangerously, 113 PUB. HEALTH REP. 488 (1998) (reviewing federal action from 1997 to 1998). For the types and growth of state regulation, see, for example, Jan
K. Carney et al., No Butts About It: Public Smoking Ends in Vermont, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 860
(1997) (describing how states can successfully pass and implement no smoking legislation); Peter D.
Enrich & Patricia A. Davidson, Local and State Regulation of Tobacco: The Effects of the Proposed
National Settlement, 35 HARV. J. LEGis. 87 (1998); Wendy Koch, States Blaze Trailfor Anti-Smoking
Laws: Their Experiences Can Help Congress as it Plays Catch-Up, USA TODAY, June 16, 1998, at
5A; Clean Air Acts, HOTEL & MOTEL MANAGEMENT, Nov. 2, 1998, at 140 (listing recent and proposed smoking bans), and compare WILLARD GAYLIN & BRUCE JENNINGS, THE PERVERSION OF Au.
TONOMY: THE PROPER USES OF COERCION AND CONSTRAINTS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 196 (1996)

("[Miany states and local communities are examining coercive measures to reinforce standards of
social behavior.").
3. For constitutional issues, see, for example, Hearings on Tobacco Legislation: Is It Constitutional? Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1 (1998) (testimony of
Senator Orrin Hatch); George J. Annas, Cowboys, Camels, and the First Amendment-The FDA's Restrictions on Tobacco Advertising, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1779 (1996); Donald W. Garner & Richard
J. Whitney, Protecting Childrenfrom Joe Camel and His Friends: A New First Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis of Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 46 EMORY L.J. 479 (1997); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1143 (1999); Barbara A. Noah, Constitutional Qualms Concerning Government Restrictions on Tobacco Product Advertising, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 637 (1998).
For jurisdictional issues, see, for example, James T. O'Reilly, Tobacco and the Regulatory Earthquake: Why the FDA Will Prevail After the Smoke Clears, 24 N. KY. U. L. REV. 509 (1997); Symposium, Are the Risks Worth Regulating? Tobacco v. The FDA, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013 (especially contributions by Richard A. Merrill and Cass R. Sunstein). For practical issues, see, for example, John Slade
& Jack F. Henningfield, Tobacco Product Regulation: Context and Issues, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 43
(1998). Of course, regulation and legislation are not the only legal means to control public health
risks. Tort law, particularly now with the so-called "third wave of litigation," has been offered as an
effective form of public health law. See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation
and Public Health Policy Making: The Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 769
(1999); Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 897 (1998).
4.

PETER D. JACOBSON & JEFFREY WASSERMAN, TOBACCO CONTROL LAWS: IMPLEMENTATION
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The RAND researchers are right to identify this dearth of analysis. Professor Robert Rabin agrees: "[T]here is a real need for more systematic
thought about the underlying justifications for the smoking policy that is
developing piecemeal throughout the country."' 5 Of course, this problem
is not unique to anti-smoking legislation; surprisingly few books or articles address the fundamental rationales for public health interventions in
any context. 6 Medical ethicist Daniel Callahan believes that "the time has
AND ENFORCEMENT 3 (1997).

5.

Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on Smoking Regulation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 475, 496 (1991)

(book review); see also ROBERT E. GOODIN, No SMOKING: THE ETHICAL ISSUES vii, 137 (1989) (argu-

ing that applied ethics can been overly restricted in its substantive scope); Jeffrey Kahn, Bioethics
and Tobacco, BIOETHICS EXAMINER (University of Minnesota), Fall 1997, at 1 ("The ethics of public
health policy is an area that has received precious little attention from the bioethics community.");
SULLUM, supra note 1, at 42 (arguing that science "did not, by itself, indicate what the government
should do about smoking, if anything. That is why Americans are still arguing about what, exactly,
'appropriate remedial action' is"); cf GERALD DWORK1N. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY
162 (1988) (commenting that political issues regarding individual autonomy will be better addressed
when more detailed studies of these issues are completed).
6. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, PHI.OSOPHICAL ETHICS 388 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS) ("[W]e need to be able to specify as a matter of public policy what limits, if any,
will be placed on . . . high-risk behaviors.
... ); TOM CHRISTOFFEL, HEALTH AND THE LAW: A
HANDBOOK FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 224 (1982) ("[T]here is considerable controversy about when

and to what degree government intervention to protect health is warranted.
...); DOUGLAS N.
HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS 1 & 4 (1992) ("Moral rights have been all but ignored .. . by the state
in its war on drugs.
... Despite the growing attention contemporary philosophers purport to pay
to current moral and legal issues, almost all of their focus has been directed to a very few matters,
usually involving life and death."); NINA NIKKU. INFORMATIVE PATERNALISM: STUDIES IN THE ETHICS
OF PROMOTING AND PREDICTING HEALTH 22 (1997) ("[E]thics in the broad area of health promotion
has not been explored that thoroughly."); ALAN PETERSEN & DEBORAH LUPTON, THE NEW PUBLIC
HEALTH: HEALTH AND SELF IN THE AGE OF RISK ix (1996) ("Given the scope of the new public

health . . . there has been surprisingly little critical analysis of its underlying philosophies and its
practices."); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 180 (1982) ("Much

of the history of public health is a record of struggles over the limits of its mandate."); DONALD
VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS ON BENEVOLENCE 304 (1986) (not-

ing "the current absence of a perspicuous way of sorting the relevant questions and considerations"
regarding "the morality of limiting risks"); Dan Beauchamp, Books: Review/Commentary, 23 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 347, 349, 351 (1996) (reviewing GRIFFITH EDWARDS ET AL., ALCOHOL POLICY
AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (1994)) (criticizing the authors for ignoring "implications for ... restrictions

on individual liberties" and suggesting that controversial ethical issues were omitted to ensure the
authors' continued receipt of "official grants and research funds"); Philip Cole, The Moral Bases of
Public Health Interventions, 6 EPIDEMIOLOGY 78, 78 (1995) ("Little has been written of the need for
fundamental rationales for prevention programs."); Spyros Doxiadis, Conclusions, in ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN HEALTH PROMOTION 225, 225 (Spyros Doxiadis ed., 1987) ("[M]any of the problems have

become evident only in recent years and they have not therefore been adequately and extensively
discussed."); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Health Promotion as Public Policy: The Need for Moral
Groundings, 10 PREVENTIVE MED. 371, 376 (1981) [hereinafter Pellegrino, Health Promotion]
("There is yet no formally developed ethic of prevention and health promotion .... "); Edmund D.
Pellegrino, Autonomy and Coercion in Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, 5 THEORETICAL
MED. 83, 90 (1984) [hereinafter Pellegrino, Autonomy and Coercion] (underscoring "the need for a
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come for an extended and serious public and professional debate" regarding whether "the individual and social benefits of serious efforts to
change behavior warrant strong, even severe, intrusions upon personal
liberty." 7
Tobacco regulations, particularly those aimed at directly restricting
or prohibiting consumption under certain circumstances, 8 clearly interfere
with the liberty9 of tobacco-consuming individuals.' 0 The RAND study
continuing development of an ethics of preventive medicine"); Genevieve Pinet, Health Legislation,
Prevention and Ethics, in ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN HEALTH PROMOTION 83, 96 (Spyros Doxiadis ed.,
1987) ("[Tlhese ethical dilemmas require much study and discussion."); Daniel Wikler & Dan E.
Beauchamp, Lifestyles and Public Health, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1366, 1368 (Warren T.
Reich ed., 1995) (noting that government intervention in unhealthy lifestyles proceeds "from a rarely
examined and rarely defended set of moral premises"); Scot Yoder, Personal Responsibility for
Health: Discovery or Decision?, MED. HUMANITIES REP., Spring 1998, at 1, 1 ("[W]hat ... public or
private policies designed to influence or make people bear the burden for personal health-related behavior .. . should be implemented in a liberal society? Because lifestyle interventions almost inevitably infringe on individual autonomy, it is important that decisions regarding them not be arbitrary or
discriminatory."); cf Steven S. Coughlin et al., Ethics Instruction at Schools of Public Health in the
United States, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 768, 770 (1999) (reporting that ethics instruction in public
health schools is rare and inconsistent). But see DAN E. BEAUCHAMP & BONNIE STEINBOCK, NEW ETHICS FOR THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH ix (1999) ("The topics in this book differ from other bioethics readers
in that they raise fundamental political questions.").
7.

DANIEL CALLAHAN, FALSE HOPES: WHY AMERICA'S QUEST FOR PERFECT HEALTH IS A RECIPE

FOR FAILURE 194 (1998).
8. In the regularly used philosophical terms, restricting smoking when it harms only the
smoker herself is called "passive," "direct," and "negative" paternalism. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG,
HARM TO SELF 8-9 (1986) [hereinafter HARM TO SELF]; JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 14 (1983). It is
"passive" because the restriction requires that individuals refrain from behavior rather than actively
requiring behavior. It is "direct" because it entails intervention with the smokers themselves, the
same persons who stand to benefit from the intervention rather than with third parties such as tobacco manufacturers or distributors. It is "negative" because it restricts individuals' liberty in order
to protect them from harm rather than to secure them a benefit.
9. I follow Joel Feinberg and define "liberty" as having "permission to act in some particular
way." Joel Feinberg, Freedom and Liberty, in 3 ROUTLEDGE OF ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 753
(Edward Craig ed., 1998). "Liberty," therefore, refers to having no duty to act or having de jure
ability to do something. "Freedom," on the other hand, refers to having the ability to act or having
the de facto ability to do something. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 8-9 & n.4 (1984) [hereinafter HARM TO OTHERS]; HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 62-65; see also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &
JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 168 & 187 n.92 (4th ed. 1994) (drawing a
similar distinction between decisional and executional autonomy); Kent Greenawalt, Some Related
Limits of Law, in THE LIMrrS OF LAW 76, 87 n.1 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1974). For example, I may not be at liberty to drive faster than 65 miles per hour, but I am still typically free to do so. Similarly, when regulations restrict or prohibit smoking, smokers are still typically free to smoke but they do not have the liberty to do so. Failure to make the distinction impoverishes the analysis. See, e.g., Gerald Doppelt, The Moral Limits of Feinberg's Liberalism, 36
INQUIRY 255, 260-61 (1992) (using "liberty" to describe both concepts).
10. See John Duffy, History of Public Health, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2157, 2160
(Warren T. Reich ed., 1996) ("Public-health regulations by their nature are designed to restrict certain activities on the part of individuals."); see also David Hawks, The New Public Health: Nanny in
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concluded that "tobacco control reveals some of the most salient tensions
in American political theory: Under what circumstances can government
limit individual freedoms to protect citizens from the consequences of
their personal and lifestyle choices?"'" To state the question more directly, "Where does one draw the line between the power of the state to
protect public health and the right of the people to make life-style
' 12
choices?"
Perhaps the most thorough analysis of the normative issues surrounding tobacco regulation can be found in Robert E. Goodin's 1989
book, No Smoking: The Ethical Issues.13 There, Goodin recognizes that
"moral philosophy is an indispensable first step in that larger political
campaign."' 14 After all, "[e]ven though a law may be legally supportable
and even though it may be effective in reducing the toll of injuries, if it
offends other socially important interests, maybe it ought not to exist as a
law."' 5 Professors Christoffel and Teret argue similarly that "[t]he question of whether a law ought to be passed, notwithstanding its legality and
16
effectiveness, warrants reasoned exploration."'
a New Hat?, 92 ADDICTION 1175, 1175 (1997) (describing "nannyism" as "attempts to manipulate
life-style in the interest of better health").
11. JACOBSON & WASSERMAN, supra note 4, at 2; see also Peter D. Jacobson et al., Historical

Overview of Tobacco Legislation and Regulation, 53 J. Soc. ISSUES 75, 75-76 (1997) (describing the
primary "conundrum" surrounding tobacco regulation).
12. HOWARD M. LEICHTER, FREE TO BE FOOLISH: POLITICS AND HEALTH PROMOTION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 3 (1991). See also Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the
Public's Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 69
(1999) ("[M]any disputes in public health turn less on its goal .. .and more on the proper scope of
governmental intervention to achieve it."); HUSAK, supra note 6, at 73 (stressing the importance of
determining "whether and under what circumstances paternalism is ever justified").
13. GOODIN, supra note 5.
14. Id. at 137; cf BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 8 ("Moral analysis is part of
good policy formation .. ");Keith Butler, The Moral Status of Smoking, 19 Soc. THEORY & PRACTICE 1, 1 (1993) ("[T]he aim of this paper . .. is to provide a moral guide to the formation of a
public policy toward smoking behavior."); Arthur L. Caplan, When Liberty Meets Authority: Ethical
Aspects of the Laetrile Controversy, in POLITICS, SCIENCE, AND CANCER: THE LAETRILE PHENOMENON

133, 133 (Gerald E. Markle & James C. Peterson eds., 1980) ("Ethical language is often used to
stake out the limits or boundaries of policy argumentation ....");RALPH D. ELLIS. JUST RESULTS:
ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 7 (1998) ("[N]o policy belief can be logically justified
unless it is supported by ... at least one value belief .... ); GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 2, at

24 ("This work will give us better conceptual tools for principled political argument ....").
15. TOM CHRISTOFFEL & STEPHEN P. TERET, PROTECTING THE PUBLIC: LEGAL ISSUES IN INJURY
PREVENTION 213 (1993); see also Lawrence Gostin, The Legal Regulation of Smoking (and Smokers):
Public Health or Secular Morality?, in MORALITY AND HEALTH 331, 332 (Allan M. Brandt & Paul

Rozin eds., 1997) ("If behaviors are regulated in the absence of a well-targeted public health strategy, the consequences are that other powerful personal and social values are needlessly
undermined.").
16.

CHRISTOFFEL & TERET, supra note 15, at 216; see also Tom Christoffel & Sandra Stein,
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In this Article I undertake that exploration. I analyze what philosopher Gerald Dworkin calls "[olne of the central concerns of social and
political philosophy . ..the issue of what limits, if any, there are to the

right of the state to restrict the liberty of its citizens."1 7 As Dworkin explains, "[o]ne of the tasks of political philosophy is to develop and elaborate a theory to determine where these boundaries lie." 8 In this Article
I construct a normative framework by which lawmakers and others can
evaluate the liberty-limiting aspect of tobacco regulation.' 9 My frameUsing the Law to Protect Health: The Frustration Case of Smoking, MEDICOLEGAL NEWS, Winter
1979, at 5, 9 ("[Fjor an effective smoking and health social action . . .[i]deas could be critically
evaluated in terms of ... equity ....");Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 84 (comparing practical and
moral limits of the law and posing the following question: "Assuming that a rule can be well formulated to reach particular behavior ... is there still some reason why the behavior should be left free
of legal control?").
17. Gerald Dworkin, Liberty, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 303, 303 (Donald M. Borchert
ed., Supp. 1996); see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 63,64 (Penguin ed., 1974) (1859)
("[W]here to place the limit-how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence
and social control-is the principal question in human affairs.").
18. Dworkin, supra note 17, at 303; cf. HUSAK, supra note 6, at 81 ("What is required is a
principled assessment . .. [ofl whether and under what circumstances adults have or lack a moral
right ....");MILL, supra note 17, at 67 (establishing the "principle by which the propriety or impropriety of government interference is customarily tested"); Alan Dershowitz, Toward a Jurisprudence of "Harm" Prevention, in THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 135, 149 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1974) ("[T]he business of balancing the liberty of the individual against the risks a
free society must tolerate is very complex."). In this respect, philosophy is not unlike science which
Albert Einstein described as "nothing more than a refinement of every day thinking." Albert Einstein, Physics and Reality, in OUT OF MY LATER YEARS 59, 59 (1950) (emphasis added); see also
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 5 (1986)
("Most of these principles are already embedded in public morality and policies, but only in a vague
and imprecise form. The job of ethical theory is to lend precision without over simplification.").
19. I perform the distinctly philosophical task of identifying and articulating the normative issues at stake, clarifying those issues and drawing important distinctions, and applying logical analysis to the argumentation. See generally Tom L. Beauchamp, What Philosophers Can Offer, HASTINGS
CENT. REP, June 1982, at 13; Dan W. Brock, Truth or Consequences: The Role of Philosophers in
Policy-Making, 97 ETHICS 786 (1987); Paul T. Menzel, Public Philosophy: Distinction Without Authority, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 411 (1990); Richard W. Momeyer, Philosophers and the Public Policy
Process: Inside, Outside or Nowhere at All?, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 391 (1990); James Rachels, Can
Ethics Provide Answers?, in LIFE CHOICES: A HASTINGS CENTER INTRODUCTION TO BIOETHICS 3 (Joseph H. Howell & William F. Sale eds., 1995). It is interesting to note that my examination of legitimate liberty limiting principles parallels that of what constitutes a legitimate governmental interest in
constitutional analysis. The process of identifying whether a law is paternalistic is similar to the process of determining whether a law has a rational basis. Moreover, constitutional law is directly relevant because paternalistic legislation may lack a rational basis as required by the federal Due Process
Clause and analogous state constitutional provisions. Cf Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of
Law: Should Bare Assertions of "Public Morality" Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for
the Purposes of Equal Protection Review?, 87 GEo. L. 139 (1998) (discussing whether bare assertions of public morality can justify regulations); R. Randall Kelso, Considerations of Legislative Fit
Under Equal Protection, Substantive Due Process, and Free Speech Doctrine: Separating Questions
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work is simple and familiar, and it is based on the central philosophical 20
and public health 2t literature defining liberty-limiting principles.
In part because there are "incommensurable and unbridgeable differences between what individuals consider good for themselves, ' 22 American society places a high value on individual rights, autonomous decision
making, and the protection of the private sphere from government intrusion.2 3 Therefore, any interference with liberty is presumptively invalid
of Advancement, Relationship and Burden, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 1279, 1286-88 (1994) (outlining
"legislature fit" analysis).
20. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 5 (exploring autonomy); JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, separately published in four volumes as: HARM TO OTHERS (1984);
OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985) [hereinafter OFFENSE TO OTHERS]; HARM TO SELF (1986); and HARMLESS
WRONGDOING (1988) [hereinafter HARMLESS WRONGDOING]; GOODIN, supra note 5 (discussing the
ethical issues surrounding tobacco regulations); HUSAK, supra note 6 (discussing the ethical issues
surrounding narcotics regulations); KLEINIG, supra note 8 (discussing paternalism generally); VANDEVEER, supra note 6 (discussing paternalism generally); Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107 (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 1971) (exploring the legitimacy of paternalistic
interferences with individual behavior).
21. See generally DAN E. BEAUCHAMP, THE HEALTH OF THE REPUBLIC: EPIDEMICS, MEDICINE,
AND MORALISM As CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY 69-100 (1988); ROBERT L. RABIN & STEPHEN D.

SUGARMAN, SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS. AND CULTURE 15 (1993) ("[O]ur primary intention has
been to examine the norms underlying the wide array of impulses to regulate."); Rabin, supra note
5, at 477 (asking "what is the range of justifications for restricting the sale and use of tobacco?"
and discussing "the appropriate role of the state in imposing restrictions on individual autonomy");
Nigel C. Unwin, Cycle Helmets-When is Legislation Justified?, 22 J. MED. ETHICS 41, 41 (1996)
("The aim [of this paper] . . . is to suggest a set of criteria on which the debate between opponents
and proponents of mandatory cycle helmets should focus ... I identify criteria by following a broad
framework, or 'ethical map.' ").
22. ARTHUR L. CAPLAN, IF I WERE A RICH MAN. COULD I BUY A PANCREAS? 257 (1992); cf
CARL G. JUNG. MODERN MAN IN SEARCH OF A SOUL 60 (W.S. Dell & Cary F Baynes trans., 1970)
(1933) ("The shoe that fits one person pinches another; there is no recipe for living that suits all
cases."); Dan W. Brock, Paternalism and Autonomy, 98 ETHICS 550, 561 (1988) ("One foundation
for personal sovereignty ... is a deep skepticism about whether there is any objective correct view
of the good for persons. . ... ); Gillian Brock, Paternalism and the (Overly?) Caring Life, 6 Bus.
ETHICS Q. 533, 533-42 (illustrating that one problem with paternalism is the lack of consensus as to
an objective correct view of the good life); Richard M. Gilbert, Ethical Considerations in the Prevention of Smoking in Adults and Children, MEDICOLEGAL NEWS, June 1980, at 4, 4 ("[G]ood health
should not necessarily be the preeminent objective of our social and political policymaking."); Richard Klein, Light Up and Live, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1998, at A20 ("There are those for whom longevity is not the highest value in life .... ").
23. See generally Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-13 (Douglas, J., concurring) (acknowledging a right to privacy encompassing "autonomous control over the development and expression of
one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality, . . . freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's
life, . . . freedom to care for one's health and person"); CHARLES FRIED. CONTRACT AS PROMISE
(1981) (describing contracts as autonomous because they are self-imposed obligations); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962) (describing the role of the market in a free society);
HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 9 ("[Mlost writers on our subject have endorsed a kind of 'presumption in favor of liberty.' "); HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 9, 14, 207, 211-12; GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 2, at 54 & 58 (stating that autonomy "has been elevated to first place among the
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and must be justified. 24 I will define and apply three "liberty limiting
principles" 2 5 or reasons that can have "decisive weight ' 26 when balanced
against the case for liberty. These liberty limiting principles, which may
justify the public health regulation of tobacco, are: (1) the harm princithings we value and want to protect [and] ceased to be one value among many and has assumed
pride of place as the moral touchstone of our personal lives and our social institutions"); FRIEDRICH
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); MILL, supra note 17; JOHN STUART MILL, ON SOCIAL FREEDOM: THE NECESSARY LIMITS OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM ARISING OUT OF THE CONDITIONS OF OUR SO-

CIAL LIFE 33 (Dorothy Fosdick ed., 1941) (1907); Thomas Morawetz, Liberalism and the New Skeptics, in IN HARM'S WAY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOEL FEINBERG 122, 122 (Jules L. Coleman & Allen
Buchanan eds., 1994) ("The concept of autonomy is the bulwark of liberal theory in politics and
law."); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (proposing that only a minimal state
with very limited powers is justified); Peter L. Berger, Furtive Smokers-and What They Tell Us
About America, COMMENTARY, June 1994, at 21, 26 ("[A] strong tradition of individual autonomy
has existed in America, expressed in folklore literature, in everyday patterns of interaction ('it's a
free country!'), and of course in political institutions and law."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses
of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 876 (1994) (listing areas in which autonomy has been a subject
of substantial discussion); Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Health Information in
the Emerging Health Care System, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 2 (1995) (listing polls illustrating Americans' concern with honoring autonomy).
The concept of liberty or autonomy is sometimes also expressed as "decisional privacy" or
"expressive privacy." See JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS. AND THE
RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 77-79 (1997). See generally Anita L. Allen, Privacy in Health Care, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2064, 2065-67 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1996); Judith Wagner DeCew, Defending the "Private" in Constitutional Privacy, 21 J. VALUE INQUIRY 171 (1987) (discussing two
distinct interests in privacy).
24. See JOHN KULTGEN, AUTONOMY AND INTERVENTION: PARENTALISM IN THE CARING LIFE 176
(1995) ("Since liberty is a central good, there is a moral presumption against all liberty-limiting
measures."); Tziporah Kasachkoff, Paternalism and Drug Abuse, 58 MT. SINAI J. MED. 412, 412
(1991) ("[S]ince we value the right of individuals to lead their own lives . . . any interference with
another's life . . . demands some justification."); see also NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 80 (June 1997) [hereinafter 1997
NBAC REPORT] ("In the United States, governmental policies that prohibit or regulate human actions
require justification because of a general presumption against governmental interference in individual
activities."); id. at 75, 91-92; Robert C. L. Moffat, Cloning Freedom: Criminalizationor Empowerment in Reproductive Policy?, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 586 (1998) (noting the uneasy case for
criminalizing human cloning); David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatives, and Paternalism,74 VA. L.
REV. 519, 544 ("[Alntipatemalism is the presumption, at least when it comes to action on behalf of
the state, and . . . the paternalist therefore always has the burden of persuasion."); Wikler &
Beauchamp, supra note 6, at 1366 ("[E]ach encroachment on individual autonomy is commonly regarded as standing in need of justification, especially in the United States, which has a cultural history marked by an ideology of individualism.").
25. 1 borrow this term from Feinberg. See HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 9-10; HARMLESS
WRONGDOING, supra note 20, at ix; cf. JONATHAN SCHONSHECK, ON CRIMINALIZATION: AN ESSAY IN

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 65-66, 101, 303 (1994) (renaming Feinberg's principles
"Principles of State Authority" to distinguish his use of those principles in a novel methodology
called "filtering").
26. Liberty limiting principles are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for moral justifiability. Rather, as Feinberg stresses, they are merely "relevant reasons." See HARM TO OTHERS, supra
note 9, at 10; HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 20, at 321.
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ple, (2) the soft paternalism principle, and (3) the hard paternalism
27
principle.
The first of these, the "harm principle," seeks to prevent individuals
from causing harm to others. This liberty-limiting principle is recognized
as the most morally legitimate because preventing or reducing harm to
others is a traditional exercise of the state's police power, a classic and
core function of government. 28 Without state regulation of such conduct,
27. The harm and soft-paternalism principles are traditionally defended as liberty-limiting principles in the context of public health. See Dan E. Beauchamp, Public Health: Philosophy of Public
Health, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2161, 2164 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1996) [hereinafter

Beauchamp, Philosophy of Public Health]; Dan E. Beauchamp, Public Health and Individual Liberty,
1 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 121, 124 (1980) [hereinafter Beauchamp, Health and Liberty]; see also infra notes 244 & 253; cf. William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1203, 1243-45 (1998) (listing six liberty-limiting principles). Very few, however, defend hard
paternalism as a liberty-limiting principle.
Although the harm principle, soft paternalism, and hard paternalism are the liberty-limiting principles most germane to the regulation of smoking, they are not the only liberty-limiting principles.
Philosophers and other theorists have developed others. See, e.g., Heta Hiyry, Paternalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHICS 449, 450 (Ruth Chadwick ed., 1998) (listing six liberty-limiting principles); HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at xvi-xvii (listing ten liberty-limiting principles). Most notable
among these others is legal moralism, by which a subject's liberty is limited not for her own physical good but for her moral good or for morality in general. See HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note

20, at 3-17. I do not discuss the applicability of legal moralism in this Article. That it is not relevant, however, is much disputed. See, e.g., CASSANDRA TATE, CIGARETTE WARS: THE TRIUMPH OF THE

LrrrILE WHITE SLAVER 8 (1999) ("[T]he current campaign against smoking, while ostensibly more
concerned with public health than private rectitude, remains entangled in moralism."); Dan E.
Beauchamp, Alcohol and Tobacco as Public Health Challenges in a Democracy, 85 BRITISH J. ADDICTION 251, 252 (1990) [hereinafter Beauchamp, Public Health Challenges] (arguing that "the modem campaign against smoking is taking on the shape of a moral crusade" and that this is an ineffective way to deal with the public health challenge); Joseph R. Gusfield, The Social Symbolism of
Smoking and Health, in SMOKING: WHO HAS THE RIGHT? 241, 252, 262 (Jeffrey A. Schaler & Magda

E. Schaler eds., 1998). Also notable among the other liberty-limiting principles is Dan Beauchamp's
justification of public health interventions for the "common good" rather than for the good of a particular individual. See Dan Beauchamp, Life-style, Public Health and Paternalism, in ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN HEALTH PROMOTION 69, 75-76 (Spyros Doxiadis ed., 1987); BEAUCHAMP & STEINBOCK, supra
note 6, at 99; see also Ronald M. Dworkin, Introduction to THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 10 (R.M.

Dworkin ed., 1977). Although Beauchamp offers his argument as a way around the quagmires of
hard paternalism, it is unclear that Beauchamp's "common good" argument is really distinct either
from hard paternalism, see VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 340-41; Tom L. Beauchamp, The Regulation of Hazards and Hazardous Behaviors, 6 HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 242, 250 (1978) [hereinafter Beauchamp, The Regulation of Hazards], or from legal moralism, see HARMLESS WRONGDOING,

supra note 20, at 35-36. But cf. Pellegrino, Autonomy and Coercion, supra note 6, at 86 (drawing a
distinction between measures for good of the community and for the good of the individual). Finally,
in addition to beneficence, morality, and the common good, some propose that justice is a libertylimiting principle. See infra note 102.
28.
[Tihe liberty secured by the Constitution ... does not import an absolute right in each person
to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other
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life would surely be, as Hobbes warned, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
29
and short."
The other two liberty-limiting principles, soft paternalism and hard
paternalism, are aimed at preventing individuals from harming themselves
and are, therefore, more controversial bases for regulation.30 Such regulation is especially controversial where the behavior does not even incidentally affect others. This is "pure" paternalism, and it holds that an individual's behavior can be regulated for the sole good of that individual.3"
Ethically speaking, pure paternalistic intervention is most justifiedand as a practical matter, is most often justified-on the basis that the individual lacks the requisite decision-making capacity. This type of pure
paternalism has been described as "soft"3 2 or "weak" 33 because it justifies intervention where the individual has assumed a risk without adequate information, without sufficient maturity, or without adequate freebasis organized society could not exist with safety to its members.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905); see also MICHAEL D. BAYLES. PRINCIPLES OF
LEGISLATION: THE USES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 95-118 (1978) (considering the two purposes of political authority, namely, protecting people from harm by others and ensuring the government's existence); HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 187 ("[Tlhe harm-to-others principle is.virtually beyond
controversy."); LEICHTER, supra note 12, at 13 ("To the extent that such activities are 'otherregarding,' to use a phrase introduced by John Stuart Mill, or produce negative 'externalities,' a concept derived from economics, they arouse deep political concerns."); RABIN & SUGARMAN, supra
note 21, at 13 ("Once the rationale for regulatory action is located in the domain of general public
health and welfare legislation, it takes on the coloration of a traditional exercise of the state's police
power. Those who engage in activities imposing health and safety risks on the public have routinely
been subjected to governmental control through regulatory standards backed up by criminal or other
sanctions."); Rabin, supra note 5, at 485 (considering the harm-to-others justification for tobacco
regulation).
29. THOMAS HOBBES. LEVIATHAN 186 (Penguin ed. 1985) (1651).
30. See HUSAK, supra note 6, at 64 ("A more controversial rationale in favor of criminalization is that . . . it is harmful to users themselves.").
31. See Dworkin, supra note 20, at Ill. Feinberg calls this "unmixed" or "direct" paternalism. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 8-9. In order to maintain conceptual clarity and to precisely focus on the core ethical issues of paternalism, I will discuss only "pure" or "unmixed" paternalism.
In discussing paternalistic liberty limiting principles in sections II and 1I1, although in reality the
harm principle would also apply, in order to examine each liberty limiting principle independently, I
will presume that there are no negative externalities, that there are no harms or risks to third parties,
that there is no justification for the regulation independent of the good of the individual with whose
liberty the regulation interferes. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 124; HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 12-13.
33. See, e.g., HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 12 n.16; JAMES F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE 17 (1982); VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 81-87; Tom L.
Beauchamp, Paternalism, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1914, 1915 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1996)
("[T]he terms 'weak' and 'strong' seem to have more deeply influenced the bioethics literature and
will be used here."); Hiyry, supra note 27, at 453-54 (uniquely employing the terms 'hard' and
'soft' to draw a second distinction to distinguish conduct that constitutes a mere prima facie interference with autonomy).
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dom from coercion. 34 The classic example, from John Stuart Mill, is
detaining someone who is about to unknowingly cross a dangerously dilapidated bridge. 35 Under these circumstances it cannot fairly be said that
the individual's decision was freely or autonomously made because the
individual did not fully understand the dangerous consequences of her
behavior. Thus, it is widely agreed that intervention under these circumstances is only "soft" paternalism; in fact, it is not really paternalistic at
all.

36

If soft paternalism represents interventions that do not interfere with
autonomy, then the only real paternalism is "hard" 3 7 or "strong" 38 paternalism, which constrains individuals' decisions even when those decisions are informed and voluntary. Hard paternalism is not held in high
regard in this country39 and has even been described as an "un-American
rationale" for government regulation. 4° Nevertheless, I argue that the hard
34. For an overview of the conceptual terminology, see Beauchamp, supra note 33. John
Kultgen argues that the term "parentalism" is preferable to "paternalism" because it does "not incorporate a negative evaluation in its very definition . . . [and therefore does not] bias judgment."
KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 61; see also id. at x, 48. But cf KLEINIG, supra note 8, at xiii (admitting
the attractiveness of the alternate vocabulary but choosing, nevertheless, to "bow to convention");
NIKgu, supra note 6, at 18 n.2 (choosing the "notion paternalism" over that of "parentalism" because "it has a sharper and clearer association"); Brock, supra note 22, at 539 (rejecting the use of
the term "parentalism" because it has "connotations which are just as negative as the term
'paternalism' ").
35. See MILL, supra note 17, at 166 ("They might seize him and turn him back without any
real infringement of his liberty, for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire
to fall into the river.").
36. See infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 124; HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 12-13.
38. See, e.g., HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 12 n.16; PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS, supra note 6, at
413; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 81-86; Beauchamp, supra note 33, at 1915; Hayry, supra note
27, at 454-55.
39. See Shapiro, supra note 24, at 529-45.
40. See Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1103
(1983); see also WILLIAM A. DONOHUE, THE NEW FREEDOM: INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM IN THE
SOCIAL LIVES OF AMERICANS 5 (1990) ("Americans have always prized liberty; it is the most defining characteristic of what it is to be an American."); Robert H. Blank, Regulatory Rationing: A Solution to Health Care Resource Allocation, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1573, 1577 (1992) ("Americans depend heavily on the liberal tradition and emphasize individual autonomy, self-determination, and a
shared belief in the value of the individual.
...); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 588 (1982) ("[Pjaternalism is if anything more taboo than distribution as a subject for open discussion in the literature of decisions about rules."); Lawrence M.
Mead, Telling the Poor What To Do, 132 PUB. INTEREST 97, 111 (1998) ("[P]aternalism ... conflicts
with American values . . . . In the land of the free, this is not welcome."); Daniel Wikler, Who
Should be Blamed for Being Sick?, 14 HEALTH EDUC. Q. 11, 13 (1987) ("[P]aternalism is not, in this
country, a respectable public rationale for coercive government policies.").
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paternalism principle, like the harm principle and the soft paternalism
principle, can (and does in some circumstances), serve as an ethically
justifiable basis for the government regulation of tobacco. Acknowledging the use and permissibility of hard paternalism conceptually clarifies
the issues at stake, allows us to provide a more obvious and natural explanation for current regulations, and lays the groundwork for future pol41
icy development.
The harm, soft paternalism, and hard paternalism liberty-limiting
principles represent morally relevant and often decisive reasons for limiting individual liberty. Nevertheless, given the strong presumption in favor
of liberty, these principles should be strictly construed. The application
of these three principles should be guided by one meta level rule: "the
' ' 42
principle of the least restrictive alternative.
41. See Dershowitz, supra note 18, at 156 (calling for the justifiability of hard paternalism to
be "exposed and openly debated" so that we "may decide how much deprivation of individual liberty should be permitted to achieve a tolerable level of safety."). After all, explains Dershowitz,
" '[wihen you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and into the daylight, you can count his
teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength.' " Id. (quoting but not citing Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187 (1920)); see also JAMES BoVARD, FREEDOM IN CHAINS: THE RISE OF THE STATE AND THE DEMISE OF THE CITIZEN 50 (1999); Alisdair Maclntyre, Utilitarianismand Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Essay on the Relevance of Moral Philosophy to Bureaucratic Theory, in ETHICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 139, 139 (Donald Scherer &
Thomas Attig eds., 1983) ("One of the tasks of moral philosophy is to help us recognize and, if possible, to exorcise . . . unrecognized theoretical ghosts. . . . Being unrecognized they go
uncriticized.").
42. Dworkin, supra note 20, at 126 ("1 suggest a principle of the least restrictive alternative.
If there is an alternative way of accomplishing the desired end without restricting liberty although it
may involve great expense, inconvenience, etc., the society must adopt it."); SCHONSHECK, supra
note 25, at 69 ("[Cjetris paribus the less intrusive methods of discouraging [harmful] conduct are to
be preferred over the more intrusive."); see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 283 (arguing that intervention can be justified if "[t]he least autonomy-restrictive alternative that will secure
the benefits and reduce the risks is adopted"); CALLAHAN, supra note 7, at 199 (explaining that although some coercive measures will be necessary to promote public health, it would be better to improve public health in ways that avoid conflict with personal liberty); GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra
note 2, at 199 ("Coercion by the state must be subject to the tightest controls utilizing the narrowest
grounds of ethical justification."); HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 138; HUSAK, supra note 6, at 99
("Whenever possible, the objectives of a social policy should be achieved by means less drastic than
a total prohibition."); KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 74 ("If x is less or nonrestrictive of A's freedom ...
then ceteris paribus, x is to be preferred."); id. at 70, 135-37, 185, 216 (citing other examples where
the least restrictive means of regulation is to be preferred); KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 167 (noting
that legislators considering safety legislation should ask whether there is a less coercive means of
meeting the need for public protection.); JONATHAN RILEY, ROUTLEDGE PHILOSOPHY GUIDEBOOK TO

MILL ON LIBERTY 141 (1998) (noting Mills's reluctance to support governmental intervention in certain cases); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 56 (1997) ("A good government
should have a presumption in favor of the least intrusive means ....
); VANDEVEER, supra note 6,
at 312 ("[L]egislatures rationally could create more fine-textured sets of laws .... Indeed, there is a
presumption in favor of so doing-subject to constraints of workability."); Gostin et al., supra note
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The principle of the least restrictive alternative demands that government regulation that interferes with individual liberty be no broader or

43
more intrusive than necessary to accomplish the regulation's purpose.
As one commentator explained, "it is essential to think carefully about
the 'fit' between any given set of policy proposals in a composite package and the underlying scientific and moral bases for regulatory action." 44 For example, the harm principle cannot justify a regulation restricting the use of chewing tobacco because that activity poses no
apparent harm to others. Similarly, we cannot use soft paternalism to restrict an adult from smoking if her decision to smoke is informed and
voluntary.
In this Article I will identify and evaluate three ethical bases for tobacco regulation and some particular policy options that each can justify.
I discuss the "harm to others" liberty-limiting principle in Section One.
12, at 124 ("[Sltatutes should require health officials to choose the least restrictive alternative that
will accomplish the public health goal."); Gostin, supra note 15, at 332 ("The intervention must also
be no more restrictive than necessary to achieve the public health objective."); Douglas N. Husak,
Reasonable Risk Creation and Overinclusive Legislation, 1 BUFF. cRIM. L. REV. 599, 604 (1998)
("[A] statute that is underinclusive is to be preferred to a statute that is overinclusive."); Michael
Lavin, Substance Abuse: Smoking, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BioETHics 2422, 2425 (Warren T. Reich

ed., 1996); Pellegrino, Health Promotion, supra note 6, at 376 (arguing that coercion should be only
as strong as necessary); Donald H. Regan, Justificationsfor Paternalism, in THE LIMITS OF LAW 189,
191 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1974) (claiming we should interfere "only where
people lack information"); Shapiro, supra note 24, at 570; Daniel Wikler, Persuasion and Coercion
for Health: Ethical Issues in Government Efforts to Change Life-Styles, in PATERNALISM 35, 39, 45
(Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983) (suggesting limitations on state intervention); cf Bruce A. Arrigo, Paternalism, Civil Commitment and Illness Politics: Assessing the Current Debate and Outlining a Future
Direction, 7 J. L. & HEALTH 131, 151-54 (1992-93) (discussing the least restrictive alternative doctrine); Moffat, supra note 24, at 605 ("Criminalizing conduct ... should always be our last resort in
responding to social problems."). Indeed, the least restrictive alternative should guide public policy
even though public health is the "preeminent justification for the government to act for the welfare
of society." Lawrence 0. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care?: The Effect of the Health
Care System on the Health of America, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7, 12 (1994).
43. This principle might not always be so simple to apply. When effectiveness can be gained
only with severely intrusive restrictions, tradeoffs will have to be made between effectiveness and intrusiveness. In other words, even the least restrictive alternative might be too restrictive when there
is an alternative almost as effective but not nearly so restrictive. For an illustration of the different
types of measures for reducing health damage, see William Haddon, Jr., Advances in the Epidemiology of Injuries as a Basis for Public Policy, 95 PUB. HEALTH REP. 411 (1980); W. Kip Viscusi, Constructive Cigarette Regulation, 47 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1098-99 (1998).
44. Rabin, supra note 5, at 495; see also RABIN & SUGARMAN, supra note 21, at 6 ("[T]here
are many different senses in which the health risks of smoking can be viewed as 'a problem' warranting governmental intervention. . . .[Elach perspective in turn implies different governmental responses."). This "least restrictive alternative" analysis parallels that used in constitutional law when
analyzing government interference with "fundamental rights." See, e.g., HARM TO SELF, supra note
8, at 87-94; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 532, 643 (1997);
1997 NBAC REPORT, supra note 24, at 81; Kelso, supra note 19, at 1298-1305.
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In Section Two, I discuss the "soft paternalism" liberty-limiting principle. Finally, in Section Three, I discuss the "hard paternalism" libertylimiting principle and conclude that policymakers ought to justify any
regulation of tobacco smoking on the basis of one of these three principles. Furthermore, pursuant to the rule of the least restrictive alternative,
the scope and manner of that regulation ought to be no broader or more
intrusive than the underlying principle allows. Doing this will better
frame the issues and lead to clearer, 45 more consistent, 46 and more legitimate 47 public policy.
I.

REGULATION TO PREVENT HARM TO OTHERS: THE "HARM

PRINCIPLE"

The most ethically sound basis upon which to justify the government regulation of tobacco is that the use of tobaccb causes harm to
others. In this section I will first define the harm principle. After laying
that conceptual groundwork, I will demonstrate the harm principle's use
as a liberty-limiting principle in the context of tobacco regulation. Finally, I argue that although the harm principle could theoretically justify
almost any regulation, its limitations as a liberty-limiting principle leave
much room for tobacco regulation on pure paternalistic grounds.
A. Defining "Harm to Others"
Regulating public health risks with the goal of preventing harm to
others has proven to be the most politically compelling rationale for gov45. See supra notes 5 & 6; cf. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 5 ("The purpose of
theory is to enhance clarity, systematic order, and precision of argument in our thinking .... ");
DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 165 ("[P]hilosophical theory ... provid[es] a clearer picture as to what
the conflicts are about .... "); Kahn, supra note 5, at 7 ("Ethical analysis can help frame the issues
. . . make explicit the principles at issue and lead to more consistent and clear policy."); Wikler,
supra note 40, at 25 ("[T]he debate over personal responsibility for health involves fundamental
moral and philosophical questions . . . [p]arties in this dispute, however . . . will need to examine

the logic of the respective positions . . . . We need to know what policy conclusions follow from
what premises .... ").
46. Cf Beauchamp, The Regulation of Hazards, supra note 27, at 252 ("Without a systematic
evaluative system that is itself normally justified we may stand condemned to the arbitrary preferences of those who emerge in society as the makers of policy....
Without some form of objective
standards against which to judge their decisions, there will be no way to determine the appropriateness of their policy decisions.").
47. Cf. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 18, at 216 (explaining that "basic principles not
only can be 'applied' to develop guidelines, but also to properly serve as the justification of the
guidelines."); Daniel I. Wikler, Coercive Measures in Health Promotion: Can They Be Justified?, 6
HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 223, 225 (1978) ("In question, then, is the health educator's legitimacy ....
On what moral foundation can this authority be justified? What mandate does he have to
seek and use such power?").
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ernment intervention. 4s The ethical foundation for such regulation is
firmly established in the writings of John Stuart Mill. 49 Mill maintained
that "the only purpose for which power' can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm
to others." 50 That, he argued, is the extent of the power we ceded when
we entered into the social contract forming the basis of human society.
Mill's theory is further delineated in a widely quoted paragraph:
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise
or even right ....
The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns
himself, his independence, of right, is absolute. Over himself, over his own body
and mind, the individual is sovereign."

For Mill, there is only one justification for state intervention:
namely, that it is necessary to prevent harm to others. 52 It is a fairly ob48. See, e.g., FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 18, at 41 (listing as the most commonly invoked compelling interests supporting state intervention in patient treatment choices, the interests of
particular third parties and the health and welfare of society at large); GOODN, supra note 5, at 57,
136 (discussing harm to others as a basis for smoking restrictions); HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9,
at 11, 26 ("[T]he need to prevent harm ... to parties other than the actor is always an appropriate
reason for legal coercion."); HUSAK, supra note 6, at 63 ("The least controversial rationale in favor
of criminalization is that the conduct to be prohibited is harmful to others"); Gilbert, supra note 22,
at 7 ("In the case of smoking in public places, the ethical basis of legislative restrictions upon smoking is uncomplicated."); see also id. at 145 ("[D]efenders of the harm principle need not struggle
with the legitimacy of their rationale for legal intervention."); KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 189
("Where significant externalities are predictable, there is a case for imposing standards that will minimize or diminish their likelihood.") (citations omitted); PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS, supra note 6, at 389
("The harm principle is almost universally accepted as a valid autonomy-limiting principle."); Lavin,
supra note 42, at 2425 ("All defensible theories of just laws recognize a conduct's harmfulness to
others as a good reason for regulating it."); Daryl B. Matthews, Where There's Smoke There's Ire,
MEDICOLEGAL NEWS, Winter 1979, at 4, 19 ("[T]here is far greater consensus . . . about the role of

law in protecting the nonsmoker .... ").
49. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 17, at 303 (noting Mills's influence in this area); cf supra
note 23.
50. MILL, supra note 17, at 68.
51. Id. at 68-69; see also IMMANUEL KANT. ON THE OLD SAN THAT IT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY, BUT rr WON'T WORK INPRACTICE 58 (E.B. Ashton trans., 1974) (1793) ("No man can compel
me to be happy after his fashion, according to his conception of the well being of someone else. Instead, everybody may pursue his happiness in the manner that seems best to him provided he does
not infringe on other people's freedom to pursue similar ends ..
").

52. The "harm to others" fairly includes harm to non-human others, the mere risk of harm as
opposed to actual harm, and harm to public goods. See Albert Weale, Paternalismand Social Policy,
7 J. Soc. POL'Y 157, 159 (1978).
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vious proposition that "[i]f a person does an act hurtful to others ...he
is de jure amenable to those whose interests are concerned." 53 This principle is known as Mill's "harm principle" and it has become the primary
philosophical, political, and legal rationale for interfering with individual
4

autonomy.1

B.

Applying the Harm Principle

The reluctance to accept pure paternalism, that is, government intervention for the sole good of the individual restrained, leads philosophers
and courts to justify liberty-limitation largely on a harm-to-others basis.
Fortunately for these self-professed anti-paternalists, harm to others or, in
the parlance of economists, "negative externalities, ' 55 can be found in almost any type of behavior.5 6 Even smoking and motorcycle riding, activities which appear to affect only those who engage in them, can create
the added social costs of health care, reduced productivity, and increased
Social Security disability payments.5 7 As Mill recognized5 8 the notion of
indirect harm is subject to limitless expansion. 9
In the late 1960s, the supreme courts of Michigan, Illinois, Ohio,
and other states held unconstitutional statutes requiring motorcyclists to
wear protective helmets and automobile drivers to wear seatbelts. 6° These
53. MILL, supra note 17, at 70; see also id. at 141 ("As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it."); id. at 163 ("[Tjhe
individual is not accountable to society for his actions in so far as these concern the interests of no
person but himself.").
54. See, e.g., HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 11; Shapiro, supra note 24, at 546.
55. See generally DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
ECONOMIcS 22-34 (1992) (discussing negative externalities); RALPH T. BYRNS & GERALD W. STONE,
ECONOMICS 91-92 (4th ed. 1989) (same); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1
(1960) (same); Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J. L. & EcON. 141 (1979) (same).
56. See infra notes 115-40 and accompanying text.
57. See Kenneth E. Warner, Bags, Buckles, and Belts: The Debate Over Mandatory Passive
Restraints in Automobiles, 8 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 44, 67 (1983).

58. Mill recognized this possibility but argued that contingent harm to others was not a sufficient basis for social control of individual behavior. MILL, supra note 17, at 147-49. Mill required
that the harm be localized to particular individuals and constitute more than de minimus loss. On the
other hand, modem economic theory allows us to take account of diffuse and cumulative effects. See
HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 216.

59. See infra notes 115-40 and accompanying text.
60. See People v. Fries, 250 N.E.2d 149, 151 (Il1. 1969) ("The manifest function of the headgear requirement in issue is to safeguard the person wearing it .... Such a laudable purpose, however, cannot justify the regulation of what is essentially a matter of personal safety."); American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Betts, 252 N.E.2d 866,
872 (Ohio Misc. 1969) ("Whether or not a motorcyclist wears a helmet and goggles is a matter of
concern solely to the individual involved. Included in a man's 'liberty' is the freedom to be as fool-
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courts determined that the protection of the individual from himself did
not bear a substantial-or indeed, any-relation to the public health or
welfare. As the public health or welfare was the only legitimate basis for
interfering with individual liberty, the courts concluded that the statutes
were invalid. 61 The helmet and seatbelt laws did not restrict liberty in order either to prevent or reduce harm to others or negative externalities.
Therefore, the statutes could not be justified.
Eventually, however, these courts and others shifted gears, upholding both motorcycle helmet and automobile seatbelt laws 62 on the basis
of the harm principle. Not surprisingly, courts expanded their notion of
harm to others, perceiving that the risks that riders and drivers posed to
themselves translated into a drain on medical resources. 63 "Indeed, the
conduct proscribed by so-called 'victimless' crimes is, upon further reflection, not at all victimless .... The accident victim's injuries impose a
burden on the entire community." 64 Eventually, this account came to be
recognized as so obvious that one court wrote, "[w]e do not understand a
ish, foolhardy or reckless as he may wish, so long as others are not endangered thereby."); see also
Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1520 & nn.1-2 (1lth Cir. 1989) (collecting cases); Kenneth M. Royalty, Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionality of Self-Protective Legislation, 30 OHIO ST.
L.J. 355, 355 n.7 (1969) (same). Most states had helmet laws in the late 1960s because the federal
government mandated such laws as a condition for receiving federal highways funds. See Highway
Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (1966); 23 C.F.R. § 1204.4 (1979). Ostensibly
to protect individual liberty, the helmet requirement was dropped when the law was amended in
1976. See Stephen P.Teret & Ruth Gaare, The Law and the Public's Health, BIoLAW § 3, at 29, 3940 (1986) (quoting House and Senate floor statements).
61. See Michael R. Pollard & John T. Brennan, Jr., Disease Prevention and Health Promotion
Initiatives: Some Legal Considerations,6 HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 211, 215 (1978) ("Few courts
have been willing to uphold motorcycle helmet legislation solely on the grounds that the state has an
inherent power to protect individuals from their own imprudent actions. In fact, courts have gone out
of their way to avoid basing their decision on this justification."); see also Teret & Gaare, supra
note 60, at 41 ("[T]he courts seem to have strained to establish society's interest in motocycle helmet use."). But see Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Validity of Traffic Regulations Requiring Motorcyclists to Wear Protective Headgear, 32 A.L.R.3d 1270, § 4 (1970 & Supp. 1998) (collecting cases
in which courts upheld helmet regulations where the only identified state interest was the protection
of the motorcyclist himself).
62. See People v. Kohrig, 498 N.E.2d 1158, 1164-66 (I11.
1986); People of City of Adrian v.
Poucher, 247 N.w.2d 798 (Mich. 1976); State v. Stouffer, 276 N.E.2d 651 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971); see
also Simon v. Sargent, 346 F.Supp. 277 (D. Mass), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972); Purver, supra note
61, § 3(a) & § 5 (collecting cases where courts upheld helmet regulations because they found a public welfare justification).
63. See Jonathan D. Moreno & Ronald Bayer, The Limits of the Ledger in Public Health Promotion, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1985, at 37, 39.

64. Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still a Wonderful Life?, 70 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 519, 526 (1995). But see Daniel I. Wikler, Persuasion and Coercionfor Health: Ethical Issues in Government Efforts to Change Life-Styles, 56 HEALTH AND SOC'Y (MILLBANK MEMO-

RIAL FUND Q.) 303, 319 (1978) (questioning the legitimacy of the economic rationale).
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state of mind that permits plaintiff to think that only he himself is concerned." 65 Courts and legislatures not only recognized and identified negative externalities but began to premise lifestyle control regulation on the
basis of those externalities.
Today, the argument that "[i]t's my body and I have the right to do
as I please with it"66 is usually defeated not by denying the existence or
validity of this right, but rather by illustrating that seemingly personal behavior does in fact violate the harm principle and is therefore subject to
societal control. For example, Mary Ann Glendon responds to the individual rights plea to be free of lifestyle controls like motorcycle helmet
laws:
This way of thinking and speaking ignores the fact that it is a rare driver, passenger, or biker, [or smoker] who does not have a child, or a spouse, or a parent. It
glosses over the likelihood that if the rights-bearer comes to grief, the cost of his
medical treatment, or rehabilitation, or long-term care will be spread among many
others. The independent individualist, helmetless and free on the 67open road, becomes the most dependent of individuals in the spinal injury ward.

A 1979 report by the Surgeon General similarly concludes that although
"[m]otorcyclists often contend that helmet laws infringe on personal liberties. .

.

.the high costs of disabling and fatal injuries, the burdens on

families, and the demands on medical care resources are borne by society
'68
as a whole."
In the liberty-limiting lifestyle control context of motorcycle helmet
and automobile seatbelt laws, courts initially were unreceptive to "regulations which have as their purpose and effect solely the protection of the
individual from his own folly."' 69 These same courts later justified the

same regulations by showing that they were "directed [only] on a primary level toward protecting the individual from [herself; more importantly,] . ..on a secondary level they protect much broader societal in-

terests." 70 The direct effects on the restrained individual, no matter how
65. Simon, 346 F. Supp. at 279.
66. MARY ANN GLENDON. RIGHTS
67. Id. at 45-46.
68.

TALK

45 (1991).

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, HEALTHY PEOPLE: THE SURGEON GENERAL'S
112 (1979); see also U.S. DEP'T TRANS.

REPORT ON HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION

NATIONAL HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, WITHOUT MOTORCYCLE HELMETS WE ALL PAY THE

PRICE 11-16 (Aug. 1998) (DOT Pub. HS-808-601).
69. State v. Cotton, 516 P.2d 709, 710 (Haw. 1973).
70. Id.; see also Tom Christoffel, The Role of Law in Reducing Injury, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE 7, 11 (1989) ("When it comes to forcing individuals to protect themselves through mandatory
use of seat-belts and motorcycle helmets, the courts often rely on the indirect cost of injuries to soci-
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substantial, as a matter of principle (i.e. the harm principle) could not
justify the regulations. These direct effects had to be conjoined with indirect effects on society before courts agreed to uphold laws regulating ap7
parently private behavior.

1

This same transition took place in the arena of tobacco regulation.
As with motorcycle helmet and seatbelt laws, the pure paternalistic basis
for tobacco regulation was rejected from the start. In the nineteenth century, smoking was viewed as a moral problem, a problem of the individual alone.7 2 Goodin explains that Victorian moralists were pragmatic and
"took care to express their disapproval in such a way that their moral authority would remain unimpaired when their injunctions were widely disregarded."'73 Smoking was thus established as best controlled through etiquette and social pressure. 74 Victorian moral philosophers bolstered this
approach and agreed that it was not society's place to stop us from doing
7
things that harm only ourselves. 1

In spite of this Victorian attitude, the United States witnessed a brief
period of pure paternalistic government regulation of tobacco. 76 "At the
beginning of the 20th century, 14 states had passed laws banning the
production, sale, advertisement, or use of cigarettes within their boundaries."' 77 This paternalism reached its high water mark in 1900, when the
United States Supreme Court upheld Tennessee's complete prohibition of
the sale and manufacture of tobacco products on the grounds that such
ety to justify the mandates.").
71. For an extended application and exposition of this argument, see People v. Carmichael,
279 N.YS.2d 272, 277 (1967), rev'd, 288 N.YS.2d 931 (1968).
72. See generally JOHN C. BURNHAM, BAD HABITS: DRINKING, SMOKING, TAKING DRUGS, GAMBLING, SEXUAL MISBEHAVIOR, AND SWEARING IN AMERICAN HISTORY 89-92 (1993) (describing societal
attitudes toward smoking in the Victorian era); TATE, supra note 27, at 19, 47, 52-53, 120, 148.
73. GOODIN, supra note 5, at 2.
74. See id. at 3; cf PIERRE LEMIEUX, SMOKING AND LIBERTY: GOVERNMENT AS A PUBLIC
HEALTH PROBLEM 82-84 (1997).
75. See GOODIN, supra note 5, at 3 (citing Mill, Spencer, and Sidgwick).
76. See RONALD J. TROYER & GERALD E. MARKLE, CIGARETTES: THE BATTLE OVER SMOKING
34 (1983) (describing prohibitions in various states at beginning of twentieth century); Christopher
Cobey, Note, The Resurgence and Validity of Antismoking Legislation, 7 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 167,
169 (1974) (describing the increase in state restrictions on smoking in early twentieth century
America); see generally Gordon L. Dillow, Thank You for Not Smoking: The Hundred-Year War
Against the Cigarette, AM. HERITAGE, Feb./Mar. 1981, at 94; Rivka Widerman, Tobacco is a Dirty
Weed. Have We Ever Liked It? A Look at Nineteenth Century Anti-Cigarette Legislation, 38 Loy. L.
REV. 387 (1992). These regulations were directed almost exclusively at cigarettes and not at other
forms of tobacco. See Cobey, supra, at 169 n.14.
77. JACOBSON & WASSERMAN, supra note 4, at 4; TATE, supra note 27, at 120, 159-60 (listing
both laws and proposed laws).
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products were "wholly noxious and deleterious to health." ' 78 The state supreme court explained that the use of cigarettes "is always harmful,
never beneficial. They possess no virtue, but are inherently bad, and bad
only. . . . [T]heir every tendency is towards the impairment of physical
health and mental vigor." 7 9 By 1901, all but two states had considered
legislation which would have restricted the tobacco trade or prohibited it
entirely.80 By 1921, fourteen states had enacted such legislation.8
Nonetheless, regulation of tobacco on a pure paternalistic basis died
83
out quickly. 82 By 1927, all anti-smoking legislation had been repealed,
and even the courts became less receptive to pure paternalistic regulation. 84 For example, in 1914 an Illinois court struck down an ordinance
that prohibited tobacco smoking in any public place in the city of Zion
because the ordinance prohibited smoking in instances where it posed no
harm or offense to anyone other than the smoker. 85 The court held that
78. Austin v. State, 48 S.W. 305, 306 (Tenn. 1898), aff'd, 179 U.S. 343 (1900). The United
States Supreme Court declined to "take judicial notice of any special injury resulting from [the use
of cigarettes]" as the Tennessee court did. Austin v. State, 179 U.S. 343, 348 (1900). However, in
affirming the state supreme court, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly recognized that "a belief in
[cigarettes'] deleterious effects . . . has become very general." Id.
79. Austin, 48 S.W. at 306; see also State v. Nossaman, 193 P. 347 (Kan. 1920) (upholding
prohibition on the sale, barter, and gift of cigarettes).
80. See Cobey, supra note 76, at 169; Victoria L. Wendling, Note, Smoking and Parenting:
Can They Be Adjudged Mutually Exclusive Activities?, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (1992).
81. See Cobey, supra note 76, at 171; see also Wendling, supra note 80, at 1031 (calling 1921
the peak of the anti-smoking movement).
82. See Rabin, supra note 5, at 476 ("[B]y the 1920s, political initiatives aimed at regulating
smoking were moribund."); see also Elaine Nuehring & Gerald E. Markle, Nicotine and Norms: The
Re-emergence of a Deviant Behavior, 21 Soc. PROB. 513, 514-15 (1974) (describing the rise and fall
of the early anti-smoking movement).
83. See Cobey, supra note 76, at 171; see also TATE, supra note 27, at 120 & n.5, 132;
Wendling, supra note 80, at 1031 (describing the repealment of early anti-smoking laws); Widerman,
supra note 76, at 418 (describing same, focusing on Kansas legislation).
84. See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Extinguishing Brushfires: Legal Limits on the Smoking of
Tobacco, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 435, 443 (1984) ("[T]he early smoking cases showed considerable deference to the rights of smokers and great judicial readiness to strike down smoking restrictions
.... "). The chronology of cases upholding and invalidating smoking bans is uneven. This is largely
explained by two factors. First, the laws in the several states differed in form and substance. Second,
courts more readily invalidated statutes that were directly paternalistic (i.e. applied to the smoker
herself) rather than ones that were indirectly paternalistic (i.e. applied to a distributor). See
Widerman, supra note 76, at 403, 422.
85. See City of Zion v. Behrens, 104 N.E. 836, 837 (I11.1914); see also Dempsey v. Stout,
107 N.W. 235, 235 (Neb. 1906) (holding the cigarette law applied only to the "manufacturer" of
cigarettes); State v. Lowry, 77 N.E. 728, 733 (Ind. 1906) (construing the state statute to not apply to
the act of smoking cigarettes); Hershberg v. City of Barboursville, 133 S.W. 985, 986 (Ky. 1911) (invalidating an ordinance banning smoking in the city limits because the smoker has the "right to control his own personal indulgences").

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:419

"[t]he personal liberty of the citizen cannot be interfered with unless the
'86
restraint is reasonably necessary to promote the public welfare."
As the decades progressed, it became increasingly obvious that in
order to pass constitutional and ethical muster, tobacco laws needed a
solid public welfare justification.87 Such a justification was definitively
provided in 1986 when the Surgeon General identified the dangers of
secondhand or environmental tobacco smoke (ETS).8 8 ETS comes from
two sources: "mainstream smoke," which is drawn through the cigarette
into the mouth and exhaled by the smoker; and "sidestream smoke,"
emitted by the burning end of the cigarette in between puffs.8 9 Today, it
is well established 90 that both sources of ETS cause physical harm to
nonsmokers varying from minor irritations to demonstrable respiratory,
cardiovascular, and carcinogenic effects. 9'
86.

City of Zion, 104 N.E. at 837.

87.

[T]he anti-smoking movement had to overcome a widely held sentiment that, harm or no
harm, everyone should be allowed to do his own thing.
A way, therefore, had to be found to argue that smokers harmed not only themselves but
others. In other words, an 'innocent bystander' had to be uncovered.
Berger, supra note 23, at 23; see also Susan P. Baker & Stephen P. Teret, Freedom and Protection:
A Balancing of Interests, 71 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 295, 296 (1981). Even after harm to others was
found, many laws still had "impure" rationales, aimed at protecting both third parties and smokers
themselves. Indeed, public space bans do reduce smoking. See Julie A. Fishman etal., State Laws on
Tobacco Control-United States 1998, 48 MORTUALITY & MORBIDITY WEEKLY REP. 21, 29 & nn.2224 (June 25, 1999).
88. See OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING (1986). Of course, harm to others had been identi-

fied before 1986. The harm from ETS had been discussed in several earlier Surgeon General reports.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING 117-35
(1972). The potential fire hazard from smoking has been a basis for smoking regulation since Colonial days. See Morley Swingle, Comment, The Legal Conflict Between Smokers and Nonsmokers:
The Majestic Vice Versus the Right to Clean Air, 45 Mo. L. REV. 444, 445 (1980).
89. See Flue-Cured Tobacco Co-op. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450 & n.21
(M.D.N.C. 1998), appealfiled, Nos. 98-2407 & 98-2473 (4th Cir., filed Sept. 15, 1998).
90. Although there are a number of independent studies on the dangers of ETS, a particularly
vigorous debate has focused on the scientific validity of the Environmental Protection Agency's 1992
Report. See, e.g., Flue-Cured Tobacco, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 450-63 (questioning the methodology used
by the EPA in finding a correlation between ETS and health problems); Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 11, 1994) (collecting testimony, statements, and other material
both attacking and defending the EPA's report); GIo B. GORI & JOHN C. LUIK. PASSIVE SMOKE: THE
EPA's BETRAYAL OF SCIENCE AND POLICY 13-46 (1999); RALPH HARRIS & JUDITH HATTON, MURDER
A CIGARETTE: THE SMOKING DEBATE (1998); Antony Flew, Passive Smoking, Scientific Method, and
Corrupted Science, in SMOKING: WHO HAS THE RIGHT? 336 (Jeffrey A. Schaler & Magda E. Schaler

eds., 1998); Michael Fumento, Is EPA Blowing Its Own Smoke? How Much Science is Behind Its Tobacco Finding?, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Jan. 28, 1993, at 1;LEMiEux, supra note 74, at 12-29.

91.

See generally U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF
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Protecting the nonsmoker from the direct adverse health effects of
tobacco smoke is now the cited basis for most existing private, local,
state, and federal regulation of tobacco. The federal government, fortynine states, and over 800 local municipalities now restrict smoking in
some manner in public places.9 2 Across the country, smoking is restricted
(and often banned) in airplanes, 93 buses 94 elevators, 95 workplaces, 96 office
buildings, 97 retail stores, 98 libraries, 99 and restaurants1°° to list only a few
examples. Some jurisdictions have even banned smoking in open outdoor
spaces.101
PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS (1992) [hereinafter 1992 EPA REPORT]; U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: SECOND HAND SMOKE IS A

PREVENTABLE HEALTH RISK 1, 44 (1994); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO
SMOKE: MEASURING EXPOSURE AND ASSESSING HEALTH EFFECTS (1986); CALIFORNIA EPA, HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE (Sept. 1997); see also Deborah E. Barnes
& Lisa A. Bero, Why Review Articles on the Health Effects of Passive Smoking Reach Different
Conclusions, 279 JAMA 1566 (1998) (concluding that conclusions of such articles are strongly associated with affiliations of their authors); Elizabeth T.H. Fontham et al., Environmental Tobacco
Smoke and Lung Cancer in Nonsmoking Women, 271 JAMA 1752, 1759 (1994) (finding that longterm exposure to ETS increases risk of lung cancer in nonsmoking women); cf. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35-37 (1993) (holding that a prisoner's cellmate's heavy smoking stated a cause of
action under the Eighth Amendment).
92. See JACOBSON & WASSERMAN, supra note 4, at 10-14; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., ToBACCO OR HEALTH: A GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 224 (1998); Fishman et al., supra note 87, at 23-28
(summarizing state anti-smoking laws categorized by type and severity of restriction). But see Peter
D. Jacobson & Jeffrey Wasserman, The Implementation and Enforcement of Tobacco Control Laws:
Policy Implications for Activists and the Industry, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 567, 569 (1999)
(noting that mere enactment of tobacco control measures does not imply that these measures will be
rigorously enforced).
93. See 49 U.S.C. § 41706 (1994).
94. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-14-103(e) (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-913(5) (1995);
MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 270, § 22 (1990).
95. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-342(b)(6) (Supp. 1999); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720,
para. 56013 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 479.015 (1987).
96. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5 (West Supp. 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-913(8)
(1995).
97. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 19994.30-.34 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.350 (1991).
98. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-913(2) (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 328K-2(7) (Michie
1996); MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 270, § 22 (1990).
99. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 328K-2(5) (Michie 1996); MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 270,
§ 22 (1990); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 2000).
100. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-913(7) (1995); see also Sayville Inn 1888 Corp. v. County
of Suffolk, No. 98-CV-4527 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1998) (denying preliminary injunction against law
prohibiting smoking in restaurants because "[it is beyond dispute that secondhand smoke is a
carcinogen.").
101. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY ADMIN CODE §§ 17-501 to -514; see also infra notes 272-79 and accompanying text; SULLUM, supra note I, at 156 (describing various bans on smoking); Marv Balousek, Smoking Ban May Expand: Proposal Includes Some Outdoor Areas, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8,
1998, at Al (discussing proposed anti-smoking ordinance); Douglas Belkin, Smoking Flags Going
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Still, immediate health risks are not the only harm smokers pose to
others. 0 2 Tobacco regulations are also aimed at protecting "others" from
more indirect forms of harm imposed by smokers. 10 3 Today it is widely
recognized that "[t]he most persuasive argument for singling out smokers
[is based on] the costs these behaviors impose on society. ' 1°4 The FDA
Up at Boca Area Beaches, Parks, PALM BEACH POST, June 22, 1999, at Al (describing recent ban
restricting smoking and tobacco use on beaches and in parks); Richard Berman, A Smoking Ban
Goes Too Far, RESTAURANT Bus., Dec. 10, 1996, at 169 (discussing outdoor smoking ban); Elsa
Brenner, Battle Over Smoke Moves Outdoors, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1998, at WC-1 (describing recent
laws banning smoking in various public places); Maria Alicia Gaura, Smoked Out-Laws Increasingly Target Right to Light Up in the Open Air, S.F. CHRON., May 11, 1998, at A13 (reporting on
California municipal ordinances); Shandra Martinez, Holland Council OKs Limits on Smoking in 8
City Parks, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 22, 1999, at A14 (describing new anti-smoking ordinance);
Marcia Meyers, Smoking Limits Spread Outdoors, BALT. SUN, Apr. 26, 1998, at Al (reporting bans
in Santa Cruz, CA, Mesa, AZ, and Sharon, MA). Some private institutions have also gone beyond
banning smoking in the workplace. Motorola, Inc., for example, forbade smokers from smoking even
inside their own cars in the company parking lot. See Motorola Bans Smoking in Workers' Cars,
ARIz. REP./PHOENIX GAzETTE, July 3, 1996, at A2. Other companies have installed special outdoor
structures that contain and filter the air. See, e.g., Heather Kamins, The Exiled Smoker, BOST. GLOBE,
June 12, 1999, at FL (describing such a measure). Disney has recently banned both tobacco sales and
smoking in its California and Florida theme parks. See E. Scott Reckard, More Smoking Limits at
Disneyland, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1999, at C4.
102. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case
for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1229-36 (1998) (discussing "noninsurance externalities"); Lavin, supra note 42, at 2425 ("The rationales are in two general forms: social
costs and health risks."). The argument for liberty restriction in order to prevent or reduce these indirect costs is often made in terms of justice and fair allocation of costs. See, e.g., KLEiNiG, supra
note 8, at 113-15 (discussing "distributive justice"); Amy Darby, The Individual, Health Hazardous
Lifestyles, Disease and Liability, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 787 (1999) (discussing the legitimacy
of justice-based arguments for distributing the economic burden of health hazardous lifestyles);
Rajendra Persaud, Smokers' Right to Health Care, in SMOKING: WHO HAS THE RIGHT? 318 (Jeffrey
A. Schaler & Magda E. Schaler eds., 1998); Robert L. Schwartz, Making Patients Pay for Their
Lifestyle Choices, 4 CONTEMP. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 393 (1992); Robert M. Veatch, Voluntary Risks
to Health: The Ethical Issues, 243 JAMA 50, 53-55 (1980) (discussing justice-based arguments);
Wikler, supra note 47, at 232-34 (discussing fair distribution of societal burdens). The judgment of
voluntariness in these discussions is really about responsibility and blameworthiness rather than autonomy. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, A Note on "Voluntary" Versus "Involuntary" Risks, 8 DUKE ENvTL. L.
& POL'Y F. 173, 176-77 (1997).
103. See Moffat, supra note 24, at 589 (arguing that state intervention for this reason ought to
be characterized as the prevention of "secondary harm" because in these cases, "no specific person
is injured even though the community as a whole may suffer in some way").
104. Jendi B. Reiter, Essay, Citizens or Sinners?-The Economic and Political Inequity of
"Sin Taxes" on Tobacco and Alcohol Products, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 443, 465 (1996) (emphasis added); see also HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 138 ("A rather more persuasive nonpaternalistic argument ... appeals to the great public cost .... "); David Charny, Book Review, Economics
of Death, 107 HARV. L. REv. 2056, 2066-67 & n.31 (1994) (justifying the singling out of smokers on
basis of efficiency); Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Societal
Self-Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329 (1989) (citing preventive
jurisprudence as basis for regulation of dangerous behaviors); Robert Veatch & Peter Steinfels, Who
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calculated these costs at $97 billion. This figure includes $50 billion in
direct health care costs, $7 billion in indirect morbidity costs-like the
value of economic output lost while individuals are unable to work-and
$40 billion in lost future earnings from premature death. 05
Some commentators have observed that "[t]he focus on the economic costs of personal behavior like smoking . . . seems to suggest that
if it were possible to limit the costs to the smoker . . . there would be
little justification for tolerating government intrusion."1 06 According to
the principle of the least restrictive alternative, 10 7 they are absolutely correct. If the harm that smokers cause can be eliminated, prevented, or
ameliorated in a feasible way that does not interfere with smokers' liberty, then ceteris paribus that alternative ought to be preferred. 10 8 Recouping the economic costs of smoking may increase the cost of cigarettes, but it interferes with liberty less than the direct prohibition of
smoking. 10 9 To illustrate by way of contrast, the costs imposed by
Shall Pay for Smokers' Medical Care?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1974, at 8.
105. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,572, 44,575-76 (1996). Because states had absorbed many of these costs
over the years through Medicare and other social service programs, they sued and later settled with
the tobacco companies. See generally Jana Schrink Strain, Note, Medicaid vs. The Tobacco Industry:
A Reasonable Legilative Solution to A State's Financial Woes?, 30 IND. L. REV. 851 (1997) (addressing the propriety of such lawsuits). Mississippi, Florida, Minnesota, and Texas settled their claims for
$36 billion. See Bob Van Voris, Laws Targeting Tobacco Spread, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1998, at A6.
The rest of the states and the District of Columbia settled their claims for $206 billion. See Milo
Geyelin, States Agree to $206 Billion Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1998, at B 13. The United
States Government also sued to recover medical costs from the tobacco companies. See Alissa J.
Rubin & Henry Weinstein, Tobacco Suit Represents a Quick Reversal Law, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1999, at A13. Foreign nations and American Indian tribes have also brought lawsuits in United
States federal courts to recover their smoking-related health care costs. See Carrie Johnson, Tobacco
Fights on a Foreign Front, LEG. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1998, at 1; Milo Geyelin, Four Tobacco Firms Are
Sued by Indian Tribes, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1999, at B5. But cf Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Lawsuit
Filed by Guatemala Dismissed by Judge, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1999, at B7 (reporting that the D.C.
Federal District Court dismissed Guatemala's lawsuit and predicting a similar fate for suits brought
by several other countries). Union health funds, on the other hand, have generally been unsuccessful
in recovering the costs of smoking to employee health and welfare funds. See Local Union No. 420
Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 844 (2000) (denying certiorari to three federal appellate courts that affirmed dismissals of the welfare fund's claims).
106. Moreno & Bayer, supra note 63, at 41.
107. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
108. See id.; see also SCHONSHECK, supra note 25, at 114-15.
109. Of course, once recouped costs reach a certain point, the tobacco companies will withdraw from the market. Several scholars have recently argued that the political unpalatibility of paternalism in the legislatures has led to the de facto paternalistic regulation of unhealthy and risky activities like smoking via tort law in the courts. See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, Guns, Tobacco, Big Macsand the Courts, COMMENTARY, June 1999, at 32; Greg Sobo, Look Before You Leap: Can the Emergence of the Open and Obvious Danger Defense Save Diving from Troubled Waters?, 49 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 175 (1998); Bill Pryor, Looking Down the Barrel: More "Tobacco-Like" Suits Threaten Lib-
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helmetless motorcycle riders supported helmet laws." 0 On the contrary,
the costs imposed by smokers cannot justify laws restricting smoking. In
the first place, although costs may be imposed, the net economic impact-surely the most relevant measure"'-is arguably positive." 2 Moreover, even if smoking does impose societal costs, a ready alternative exists by which states can recoup them." 3 It would violate the least
restrictive alternative principle to interfere with smokers' liberty so as to
prevent the costs (if any) of smoking when it is feasible, and in fact eas114
ier, to simply recover those costs.
erty, the Law, ARIZ. REP., May 2, 1999, at E14; cf W. Kip Viscusi, A Postmortem on the Cigarette
Settlement, 29 CumB. L. REv. 523, 544-45 (1998/99).
110. See CALLAHAN, supra note 7, at 194-98. But cf. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 139-41
(arguing that not health but only psychic costs can support helmet laws).
111. See Richard A. Epstein, The Harm Principle-andHow it Grew, 45 U. TORONTO L.J.
369, 417 (1995).
112.

See generally WILLIAM G. MANNING ET AL., THE COSTS OF POOR HEALTH HABITS 62, 77

(1991) (demonstrating costs of dangerous health habits); Kip Viscusi, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CIGARETTE TAXATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSE-

QUENCES OF SMOKING (1995); Hanson & Logue, supra note 102, at 1232-59 (reviewing and critiqu-

ing the central literature regarding whether the fact that smokers die sooner, consume fewer medical
and old age expenses, and collect less social security and pensions, is related to the fact that the net
cost of smoking is a savings); Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing Out the Rule
of Law, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 601, 636 (1998) (illustrating the costs and benefits of smoking to taxpayers); Andre Raynaulalt & Jean-Pierre Vidal, Smokers' Burden on Society: Myth and Reality in Canada, 18 CAN. PUB. POL'Y 300 (1992) (examining the burden smokers place on Canadian resources);
Viscusi, supra note 109, at 534-37; Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of
Smoking, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51 (James Poterba ed., 1995); cf HARM TO SELF, supra
note 8, at 378 n.29; KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 114 (discussing potential social costs of decreased
smoking); LEMIEUX, supra note 74, at 71-75 (same); Jacob Sullum, Following Suit: Clinton Wants to
Stick It to Smokers Again, REASON, Apr. 1999, at 6, 7 (discussing costs and benefits of tobacco).
113. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. Of course, such a cost recovery is not always feasible. Cf Robert F. Meenan, Lifestyles: Controlled or Libertarian,294 NEW ENG. J. MED.
732, 732 (1976) ("Dr. Charrette's suggestion that individuals compensate society for their unhealthy
behavior is certainly reasonable in theory but presents some practical problems.").
114. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 316 (recommending along a similar
line that chemical plants protect susceptible workers not by banning them from employment but by
devising protective equipment or altering the work environment); DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 126-27
(analyzing costs); HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 24-25 (same); HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at
136, 139; KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 93 (same); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 75-76 (1993) (same); Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and Tuberculosis, 19 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 149, 153 (1994) ("Proposals ... meet[ing] the threat of tuberculosis with a carrot
rather than a stick [are laudatory because they] appear to obviate the need to choose between liberty
and the public health. They are, for the most part, uncontroversial."); Wikler & Beauchamp, supra
note 6, at 1367 ("Paternalistic arguments ... may indeed seek to justify curbs on [unhealthy] behavior in order to forestall the imposition of burdens. But this can also be accomplished by requiring the
individual to pay his or her own way, perhaps through excise taxes, without any diminution of the
unhealthy behavior."). Similarly, employers ought not to prohibit employees from smoking off-site
when the only justification is to save costs. But see City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025,
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Limitations of the Harm Principle

Because the harm principle provides the least controversial basis for
regulation, and because some kind of harm can always be attributed to a
particular behavior, many invoke the harm principle to "explain" regulations that would be more appropriately justified on pure paternalistic
grounds. Alan Dershowitz explains that "[tihe best evidence of how influential Mill's principle has become .. .may be the repeated efforts of

those who would compel a given action against protesting individuals to
rationalize such force by reference to the rights of others than by reference to the good of the compelled individual."1' 15 Indeed, many describe
the nearly universal agreement on the harm principle's moral acceptability as "superficial and deceptive" because often "the harm principle is
hardly more than a pious remark."' 16 Given the harm principle's malleability, "harm to others" accounts are frequently "employed only to camouflage a rejection of Mill's [harm principle] criterion." 1 1 7 In other
1028-29 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996) (upholding regulation requiring job applicants to sign an affidavit that they have not smoked for one year prior to employment); Deborah
Lynn Stewart, Note, City of N. Miami v. Kurtz-Is It Curtainsfor Privacy in Florida?, 20 NOVA L.
REV. 1393, 1402 (1996) (disagreeing with Kurtz's conclusion). Still, cost recovery is not the only
less restrictive alternative. Cf. KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 95 (discussing other alternatives). Some
commentators have suggested that rather than restricting smoking, it can be scientifically redesigned
to be less harmful. See, e.g., Michael Day, The Lesser of Two Evils, NEW SCIENTIST, May 8, 1999, at
18.
115. Alan M. Dershowitz, Introduction, to JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM vii, x (Bantam 1993).
116. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 24.
117. Note, Limiting the State's Police Power: Judicial Reaction to John Stuart Mill, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 605, 621 (1970); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 90 (1998) ("[T]he modern expansion of the harm
principle ... is wholly destructive of the original Millian mission of limiting the scope of government action."); id. at 102 ("The current view sees externalities everywhere, or, more concretely,
negative externalities everywhere."); HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 13 ("Most of the controversial criminal statutes that receive apparent blessing from the principles alternative to the harm principle . ..have often been said to have support also from the harm principle itself. Often the consequences .. .are said to be harmful to others in some very subtle way ....So much confusion has
resulted from these allegations.
...
); HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 138 (observing that
"[n]umerous writers have noticed how forced and contrived" harm principle arguments seem); id. at
141 (criticizing "evasive rationales"); HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 20, at 37 ("[E]nlarging
our conception of what can count as harm .. . render[s] respectable some [paternalistic] causes
'dressed in harm principle clothes' ") (quoting Gerald Postema, Collective Evils, Harms, and the
Law, 97 ETHICS 414, 433 (1987)); KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 82 ("Paternalistic rationales are clearly
an embarrassment, and strenuous efforts are usually made to provide a nonpaternalistic justification .... But as we shall see, it is only with some difficulty that these considerations ... can sustain
[lifestyle] legislation, and there is often a surreptitious appeal to paternalistic reasons."); id. at 108
("[T]here is a tendency to favor arguments in which some public interest can be discerned and appealed to ....");SCHONSHECK, supra note 25, at 250-51 (noting tendency of government to find
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words, the harm principle is invoked to justify regulations that are actually grounded in pure paternalism. Bioethicists Willard Gaylin and Bruce
Jennings explain:
[P]ublic policy-makers sometimes coerce individuals to change their behavior (because they believe it is morally right to do so), then justify the coercion by arguing
that the old behavior was harmful to others. . . .Policy-makers are forced into this
deceptive stance by the culture of autonomy, which says, in essence, that public officials are not supposed to make moral judgments in their official capacity; that
their sole legitimate job is to protect the public and individuals from harm. In other
words, we first purport to find something to be harmful to others, then on that
ground label it wrong. In reality, we often first conclude that something is wrong,
then seek evidence that it is harmful.'18

The problem, then, is that the actual harm to others-the harm supposedly justifying the liberty limitation-is often so small and indirect
that the regulation loses all credibility." 9 Because it is important to be
clear with justificatory principles, I argue that if we are going to reject
harm to others in clearly self-affecting behavior); Donald A. Dripps, The Liberal Critique of the
Harm Principle, CRIM. JUST. ETHics, Summer/Fall 1998, at 3, 9 ("A little causal creativity can go a
long way toward eviscerating the harm principle."); id. at 8 (suggesting that Feinberg stretches the
harm principle in "strugl[ing] mightily to explain away laws that require motorcyclists to wear helmets"); Epstein, supra note 111, at 371 ("The principle that was once a shield of individual liberty
has been forged into a sword against it."); Moffat, supra note 24, at 590 ("[Plublic harms are by
their very nature the most abstract, indirect, and ephemeral in character. For that same reason, they
are also the most easily abused ....");Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of
Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1943 (1986) ("[Tjhe social-interconnectedness justification probably masks a paternalistic argument."); Regan, supra note 42, at 201 ("[W]e can bring
much paternalistic legislation under the 'harm principle,' so that it presents no special problem at
all."); Wikler, supra note 40, at 13 ("[P]aternalism is not, in this country, a respectable public rationale for coercive government policies. The paternalistic argument, then, tends to be either masked as
something else, or else marshalled only in support of relatively innocuous programs, such as consumer education." (emphasis added)); Wikler & Beauchamp, supra note 6, at 1366 ("In the United
States, paternalist justifications are rarely provided as such ....[L]ip service is still paid to the tradition of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty."); Walter E. Williams, Cigarettes and Property Rights, in
SMOKING: WHO HAS THE RIGHT? 305, 317 (Jeffrey A. Schaler & Magda E. Schaler eds., 1998) ("Social costs or external diseconomies are a politician's dream."); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. RaV. 229, 231 n.5 (1998) (observing a "tendency to bypass the issue of paternalism"). Of course, a particular regulation might be unjustifiable on either harm to' others or
paternalistic grounds.
118. GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 2, at 64-65 (emphasis added).
119. See, e.g., KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 166-67 ("Some authors who . . .have saddled
themselves with a categorical condemnation of paternalism attempt to define their paternalism away
by tortured appeals to the interests of third parties .... The magnitude and probability of bystander
harms are [often] too slight to justify curtailment of [individual] liberty."); Epstein, supra note 111,
at 416 ("[Tjhe modern theories presuppose an alternative theory of harm that is indefensible: the exercise of individual choice is now regarded as an act of pure negative externality.").
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the harm principle, we should do so openly rather than secretly. 120 If a
principle other than harm to others is the true basis of some public health
law, it is better to recognize that explicitly.
The concept of harm to others is subject to limitless expansion. As
John Donne eloquently put it, "No man is an island."' 121 Mill recognized
this, stating:
The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life which concerns
only himself and that which concerns others, many persons will refuse to admit.
How (it may be asked) can any part of the conduct of a member of a society be a
matter of indifference to the other members? No person is an entirely isolated being. It is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to
himself without
mischief reaching at least his near connections, and often far be22
yond them.

Theoretically, there is little, if any, individual conduct that does not
"harm" other people. The term "harm" is thus plagued with conceptual
ambiguities that permit its expansive interpretation. 23
120. See Dershowitz, supra note 115, at xi (arguing against Lawrence Tribe: "l, too, favor
mandatory seat belt laws, but I recognize that support for such paternalistic legislation requires a
compromise with Mill's principle. And it is a compromise I am prepared to make explicitly rather
than uncomfortably try to squeeze seat belt laws into Mill's principle by invoking flying people and
convoluted logic."); see also id. at xv-xvi ("[lit is far better to argue about the limits of the principle itself rather than to accept it as an almost biblical (or constitutional) rule of action and then try
to find ways to squeeze what are really exceptions into the parameters of the principle."); cf. Richard J. Arneson, Liberalism, Freedom and Community, 100 ETHICS 368, 371 n.7 (1990) ("We should
put aside unpersuasive arguments to the effect that harms to nonconsenting third parties could justify
a ban.
...
); Epstein, supra note 111, at 417 (calling for "revitalizing the harm principle"); John
Kleinig, The Ethical Challenge of AIDS to Traditional Liberal Values, 5 AIDS & PuB. POL'Y J. 42,
44 (1990) ("[Lliberal values .. .are in need of regular attention and rearticulation."). For an illustration of an open and a masked rejection of the harm principle, compare State v. Mele, 247 A.2d
176, 178 (Hudson County Ct. 1968) ("[T]he state has an interest in attempting to protect people
from the consequences of their own carelessness."), with People v. Carmichael, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931,
935 (Genesee County Ct. 1968) (offering a thinly veiled rejection of Mill).
121.

JOHN DONNE, Meditation XVII, in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 87 (Anthony

Raspa ed., 1975) (1624) ("No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine . ..Any Mans death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind;
And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee.").
122. MILL, supra note 17, at 146-47.
123. See, e.g., Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 155
(1969) ("Even Mill's strenuous effort to mark the distinction between the spheres of private and social life breaks down under examination."); EPSTEIN, supra note 117, at 76 ("IT]he broader the definition of harm, the more extensive the justified role of government intervention. The definition of
harm thus becomes as a first approximation, the litmus test for the use of state power."); GEORGE
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 404 (1978) ("The notion of harm appears to be infinitely expandable."); HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 22 ("Indeed, the public interest is always involved, at
least to some small extent, when persons harm themselves."); id. at 56 ("[Elvery decision is bound
to have some 'ripple-effect' on the interests of others."); PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS, supra note 6, at 390
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For this reason, it is easy for policymakers to "invoke every possikind
of social harm, however remote or speculative, to justify an inble
tervention that would otherwise have to be supported on paternalistic
grounds."' 124 Although the harm principle is frequently offered as an ex("Little debate surrounds the justifiability of the harm principle (by contrast to the meaning of
harm)."); id. at 389 ("[C]ertain ambiguities surround the concept of a harm and how far the harm
principle stretches."); VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 310 ("The question of whether persons in their
actions 'impose costs on others' is slippery for two reasons. First, there is the question of what is to
count as a cost or a harm. Second .... when is a cost imposed on others?"); id. at 430 (arguing that
the harm principle "may justify more extensive constraints than may initially be obvious.");
Beauchamp, The Regulation of Hazards, supra note 27, at 242; Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness
of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Dripps, supra note 117, at 3 ("The
idea of harm is too vague, too dependent on baseline assessments of private rights, too open to long
chains of causal speculation .... ); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 445, 455-56 (1983); Robert F. Meenan, Improving
the Public's Health: Some Further Reflections, 294 NEW ENG. J. MED. 45, 45 (1976) ("[V]irtually all
aspects of lifestyle could be said to have an effect on the health or well-being of society."); Moreno
& Bayer, supra note 63, at 37; John P. Safranek & Stephen J. Safranek, Can the Right to Autonomy
be Resuscitated After Glucksberg?, 69 COLO. L. REv. 737, 745 (1998) ("[Tlhe harm principle's formal character mitigates its jurisprudential utility. . . .[w]hat constitutes harm ... will be governed
by one's view of the good."); Williams, supra note 117, at 316 ("[Ilt is possible to prove that every
private act has external effects of one sort or another.").
124. See Dennis F. Thompson, Paternalism in Medicine, Law, and Public Policy, in ETHICS
TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 245, 249 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok eds., 1980); see also Robert Crawford, Individual Responsibility and Health Politics in the 1970s, in HEALTH CARE IN
AMERICA 255 (Susan Reverby & David Rosner eds., 1979) ("The cost of sloth, gluttony, alcoholic
intemperance, reckless driving, sexual frenzy and smoking have now become a national, not an individual, responsibility.... [Olne man's or woman's freedom in health is now another man's shackle
in taxes and insurance premiums.") (quoting John Knowles, former president of the Rockefeller
Foundation); HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 222 ("Advocates of legal coercion are always
tempted to use the elasticity of the 'public interest' to stretch the harm principle so that it will justify
criminal prohibition of disapproved conduct that is at first sight harmless to persons other than the
actors ....");RILEY, supra note 42, at 98; id. at 208 (observing that states have "hidden truly selfregarding acts, by transforming them into fake other-regarding acts that cause no harm."); HENRY
SIDGWiCr, TE METHODS OF ETHICS 477-78 (7th ed. 1907); H.E. Baber, The Ethics of Dwarf Tossing,
INT'L J. APPLIED PHIL., Fall 1989, at 1 (arguing that although the participants may be willing, the
practice of dwarf tossing hurts not only the participants but all little people); Epstein, supra note
111, at 378 (noting the "ominous" parallels with the expansive interpretation of the Constitutional
Commerce Clause); Faith T. Fitzgerald, The Tyranny of Health, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 196, 197
(1994) ("Certain failures of self-care have become, in a sense, crimes against society, because society has to pay for their consequences."); Bruce M. Hannon & Timothy G. Lohman, The Energy Cost
of Overweight in the United States, 68 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 765 (1978) (arguing that obesity consumes a substantial fraction of the nation's fossil fuels, because the excess food consumption entails
fuel costs in food production (farm machinery, transportation, etc.)); Emmet B. Keeler et al., The External Costs of a Sedentary Life-style, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 975 (1989); Matthews, supra note 48,
at 4; Meenan, supra note 123, at 45 ("[V]irtually all aspects of life-style could be said to have an
effect on the health or well-being of society, and the conclusion reached that personal health choices
should be closely regulated."); Tom Nagel, The Enforcement of Morals, HUMANIST, May/June 1968,
at 20, 21-23.
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planation for liberty-limiting regulation, it is less often an adequate justification.1 25 Indeed, many current anti-smoking legislative efforts lack a
coherent underlying justification because the harm at issue is simply insignificant. 26 To stretch the concept of "harm" to others this far renders
Mill's harm principle less useful. "If the principle is not susceptible to
falsification, it becomes vacuous, and in the view of some, meaningless."' 127 Essentially, the state may use the concept of harm to others to
justify any regulation. The result, as John Kleinig explains, is to "open
the door to 'unlimited paternalism.' "128
The harm principle simply cannot be trusted to limit state intervention.' 29 Its overuse (and, indeed, misuse) creates a slippery slope that
would justify far-reaching government regulation of tobacco and other
consumer products. 3 0 Given our historical and cultural emphasis on per125. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 16 ("The reason that in fact supports it, may not
then be the reason that impelled a legislator to vote for it.").
126. See Jacobson et al., supra note 11, at 77 (citing Rabin); see also infra notes 273-79 and
accompanying text (discussing restrictions on smoking outdoors).
127. Dripps, supra note 117, at 15 (arguing that the harm principle should be abandoned in
favor of "practical institutional limits"). See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 123, at 404; Epstein, supra
note 111, at 399 ("The modem expansion of the harm principle, however, is destructive of the original Millian mission to use the harm principle as a way to restrain the scope of government action.");
Nagel, supra note 124, at 22 (arguing that the harm principle "excludes virtually nothing from the
scope of justifiable legal enactment-unless some agreement is first reached on what to count as
'harm or evil to others' "); cf Kentucky v. Wasson, 42 S.W.2d 487, 512-13 (Ky. 1992) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) ("If the Mill concept was ever valid, it has been totally overcome by the development of the interconnection of modern society .... Clearly, almost any act that a person performs may affect prejudicially the interests of others.").
128. KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 94. One of the more famous examples of stretching the harm
principle to justify paternalistic (albeit impurely paternalistic) legislation can be found in Justice
Holmes's almost Naziesque opinion upholding Virginia's sterilization law. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200, 207 (1927) (arguing that the mentally disabled "sap the strength of the State" and that therefore "[tihe principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.").
129. Some commentators argue that Mill's principle, at least as articulated in On Liberty, has
never been a coherent or useful limit. See, e.g., RILEY, supra note 42, at 189-90; Joseph Hamburger,
Individual and Moral Reform: The Rhetoric of Liberty and the Reality of Restraint in Mill's On Liberty, 24 POL. Sci. REV. 7, 42, 51-52 (1995); Richard Warner, Liberalism and the Criminal Law, I S.
CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 39, 44 (1992) (arguing that the harm principle "draws no line at all-

not even a blurry line").
130. Cf TREBILCOCK, supra note 114, at 75 ("Once one moves beyond rather tangible harms
to third parties, however, many activities might be viewed as generating some of these third-party effects, including inadequate dietary or exercise regimens, excessively stressful work habits, risky leisure activities[,] . . . or risky business investments, thus inviting wholesale social controls on all
kinds of activities."); John Cottingham, Book Review, 28 PHIL. BOOKS 242, 243 (1987) (reviewing
JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (1986)) ("[A]ppeal to what we may call 'other-regarding side-effects
of self-regarding conduct' seems to involve a dangerous slippery slope .... "). Several of the courts
ruling on the helmet laws expressed a fear of unlimited paternalism because the "public harm" argu-
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sonal liberty, we must establish clear limits on the state's ability to regulate private behavior.' 3' "Almost every act in a complex, crowded, industrial society involves externalities, but we would not expect government
to institute rules for all of them. Consequently, an important task is to
determine which externalities might be candidates for government intervention and which should clearly be ruled out." 13 2
Clearly, not every externality is sufficient to justify state intervention; common sense tells us that some threshold of harm to others must
be met before the state can interfere with the behavior at issue. Some social costs-be they financial, psychological or otherwise-simply do not
warrant government regulation. 33 Professor Roger Dworkin explains that
"[a] full social impact calculus would consider the number of persons affected, the nature and extent of the effects on them, the certainty of the
effects on them, and alternative ways to modify those effects, as well as
the interests of the person most affected."' 34 Intervention is justified if
the costs to others outweigh the costs to the smoker. This idea can be
represented formulaically as PS(M) > PS(N1
N2
. . . .Ni), where
'P' is probability, 'S'is the severity of all types of negative effects
(physical, financial, emotional, psychic), 'M' is the smoker, and 'N' is a
collateral person. 135 Obviously, it is impossible to place values on all
these variables, and I do not attempt to do so here. What is clear is that
defining the "harm to others" threshold, and the minimal harm necessary
to justify government intervention, is no easy task.
Notwithstanding this difficulty, one limit can be drawn with the
principle de minimus non curat lex to exclude trivial harms. 36 "Since the
ments were so tenuous and obscure. See, .e.g., American Motorcycle Assoc. v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d
72, 75 (Mich. 1968); People v. Fries, 250 N.E.2d 149, 151 (I11.
1969).
131. See Wikler, supra note 40, at 20 ("The problem .. .is part of the more general debate
• . .of separating 'self-regarding' and 'other-regarding' behavior."); see also EPSTEIN, supra note
117, at 82 ("The intuitive invocation of the harm principle thus fails to answer the simple question
of which harms should be prohibited by the legal system ....");GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 2,
at 237 ("The definition of harm is a crucial question and a thorny problem for public policy.");
KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 32-34.
132. ALAN STONE, REGULATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 91 (1982); see also Butler, supra note

14, at 3-4.
133. See Dworkin, supra note 20, at 125 ("[T]here must be a heavy and clear burden of proof
placed on the authorities to demonstrate the exact nature of the harmful effects ....");DWORKIN,
supra note 5, at 127 ("[T]hese arguments either are not relevant to justifying restrictions on behavior
... or, if they are relevant, do not seem strong enough to tip the scale by themselves.").
134. Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L.J. 727,
737-38 (1993).
135. See id.
136.

See, e.g., HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 189; HUSAK, supra note 6, at 186-89; MILL,
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raison d'etre of public health statutes is to protect the welfare of the
community, it may not be surprising that the law often confines itself to
conditions that pose immediate risks to others."1 37 Even Mill required the
harm to constitute a "definite damage" or "perceptible hurt;"'' 3 under
this theory, disease and perhaps irritation caused by ETS might constitute
sufficient harm, but mere annoyance would not. 139 Although this limitation is perhaps a good starting point, it does not sufficiently protect the
liberty of individuals engaging in "harmful" behaviors:
[T]he harm principle must be made sufficiently precise to permit the formulation of
a criterion of "seriousness," and also, if possible, some way of grading types of
harms in terms of seriousness. Without these further specifications, the harm principle may be taken to invite state interference without limit, for virtually every kind
of human conduct can affect the interests of others for better or worse to some degree, and thus would properly be the state's business.'40

Joel Feinberg has provided the most thoughtful analysis of this problem,' 4 1 arguing that the concept of harm must be normative in characsupra note 17, at 147-49. Of course, not only must the harm be non-trivial but also there must be
sound scientific evidence that it is, in fact, harmful. See Pellegrino, Autonomy and Coercion, supra
note 6, at 89-90.
137. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Tuberculosis and the Power of the State: Toward the Development
of Rational Standards for the Review of Compulsory Public Health Powers, 2 U. CI. L SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 219, 255 (1995) (emphasis added); see also HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 56 (arguing that indirect and remote effects of self-regarding behavior does not make it other-regarding).
138. MILL, supra note 17, at 149.
139. But see Butler, supra note 14, at 7-11 (arguing that even this consideration carries "some
moral weight").
140. HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 12; see also LEICHTER, supra note 12, at 14 ("Clearly
the government cannot interfere in every instance in which personal behavior has the potential to
cause discomfort, harm, or cost to others."); Unwin, supra note 21, at 44 ("[l]ts logical extension is
that any type of behaviour that increases the chance of an individual calling upon the 'common resource' should be prevented. Thus, it would be logical to ... make sedentary people take more exercise, and to prevent people practising dangerous sports .... ").
141. See, e.g., GERALD F. GAUS, VALUE AND JUSTIFICATION: THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL THEORY 420 (1990) (suggesting that after Feinberg "anything one has to say on the subject is hopelessly
incomplete and sketchy"); RILEY, supra note 42, at 146; Michael D. Bayles, Book Review, 7 L. &
PHIL. 107, 109 n.3 (1988) (reviewing JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (1986)) ("Feinberg deftly handles the much-discussed question of whether there is any purely self-regarding conduct. He admits
that conduct in which persons harm themselves always involves the public interest at least to a slight
extent, but often not enough to invoke the harm to others principle."); Dripps, supra note 117, at 8
("Joel Feinberg has devoted the greatest care to explicating the concept."); Dworkin, supra note 17,
at 304 ("One of the most fully developed views that seeks to provide answers [about the nature and
limits of harm] . . . is that of Joel Feinberg."); Epstein, supra note 11l, at 374 n.13; John Gray, An
Epitaph for Liberalism, TimEs LITERARY SUPP., Jan 12-18, 1990, at 31, 31 ("Feinberg's minute and
illuminating taxonomy of the notions of harm and interests aims to give Mill's 'one very simple
principle' . . . a definite sense sufficient at least for its use in contexts of legal policymaking."); Ian
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ter.142 It is empirically indisputable that smokers exert physical effects on
others; according to Feinberg, the relevant question is whether those effects are both significant and wrongful. 43 Feinberg gives the vague notion of "harm" some "flesh and blood,"' 144 defining "harm" as a (1)
wrongful (2) setback to a person's interests. 45 Taking the second element
first, harm includes not just any interference with another person's preference (e.g., to be free of all tobacco smoke), but only interference with
those things in which the other person has a stake (e.g., to be free of tobacco smoke that is sufficiently dense to adversely affect the body).
Thus, under many circumstances, smoking is not sufficiently harmful to
justify its regulation. For example, although there is ETS in open outdoor
spaces, it is rarely concentrated enough to cause harm by Feinberg's definition. 46 Each cigarette slightly increases the concentration of ETS, but
the ETS level still remains below the threshold of what is considered
Hunt, Risking One's Life: Soft Paternalism and Feinberg'sAccount of Legal Liberalism, 8 CAN. J.L.
& JURISPRUDENCE 311, 314 (1995) ("Feinberg's account of harm . . . is an important advance on
Mill's rather vague and hazy conception.").
142. See HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 36, 214, 245; see also Joel Feinberg, Harm and
Offense, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 437 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 1992);
Joel Feinberg, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 145
(1986) (refining his analysis of harm).
143. See HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 36, 105; cf TREBILCOCK, supra note 114, at 20
("Determining which of these impacts, if negative, are to count . . . poses major conceptual
problems.").
144. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 24.
145. These two elements are independent so that conduct can be harmful but not wrongful (for
example, where a surgeon cuts a patient with her informed consent) and wrongful but not harmful
(for example, where one trespasses upon unused land). See HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 3334; HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 11; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 193;
NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS:
ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 42-43 (Aug. 1999).
146. See, e.g., Ronald M. Davis, Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke: Identifying and
Protecting Those at Risk, 280 JAMA 1947 (1998); S. Katherine Hammond et al., Occupational Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 274 JAMA 956 (1995); Michele I. Tyler, Blowing Smoke:
Do Smokers Have a Right? Limiting the Privacy Rights of Cigarette Smokers, 86 GEO. L.J. 783, 806
& n.182 (1998); cf LEMIEUX, supra note 74, at 64; Reynolds, supra note 84, at 442 n.45 (observing
that the Illinois Supreme Court in striking the municipal smoking ban in City of Zion, was influenced by the fact that "city streets and ways were wide and that much of the smoking here prohibited therefore would occur in open spaces"). Notably all the federal agency reports focus exclusively
on the effects of indoor smoking. See, e.g., 1992 EPA REPORT, supra note 91, 3-51 to 3-52; Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 21 (1994) (testimony of Carol Browner, Administrator of
EPA); id. at 63 (statement of Browner). Of course, such laws are motivated not by just physical
harm but also by other externalities such as litter and the message to children. See Tyler, supra, at
806 & nn.184, 186. However, it is unclear that the litter is more than de minimus or that smoking,
apart from the effects of ETS, constitutes an "offense" to bring it under the scope of the harm principle; cf OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 20, at 34-35.
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medically deleterious. 47 The other element of Feinberg's definition further narrows the concept of harm by restricting it to cases where the in48
terference is "wrongful," or violates a right.
As the harm principle is stretched to its limits, it becomes clear that
"harm to others" simply cannot justify some smoking regulations such
as outdoor bans. If these regulations are justifiable at all, that justification
must be grounded in the prevention of harm to self rather than harm to
others.149 Pure paternalistic justification offers a conceptually and methodologically more principled basis upon which to premise intervention
50
when the harm to others is insignificant.1
147.

Cf. HARM

TO OTHERS,

supra note 9, at 228.

148. See id. at 34-36, 110. Of course, determining what is "wrongful" requires recourse to a
theory of rights. See generally id. at 109-14, 215; HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 20, at 11
Deciding which should be protected is a moral
("Some interests are unavoidably in conflict ....
decision on grounds of greater relative worthiness or importance."); see also KLEINIG, supra note 8,
at 16 ("[Tlhe harm principle is not concerned with harm merely in the sense of damage. It is concerned with harm as an injury, a wrong."); id. at 33-36 (suggesting that even this definition might
not be sufficient and it might be better to focus on the motivation for restriction rather than the conduct restricted); Doppelt, supra note 9, at 260.
149. See Thompson, supra note 124, at 268 (observing that lawmakers often "stretch the concept of social harm to the point where it merges with paternalism"); see also City of Zion v. Behrens, 104 N.E. 836, 836-37 (Ill. 1914) (finding the municipal ban too broad to be upheld on the basis
of fire prevention); GAYLIN & JENNINGS, supra note 2, at 182 ("[T]hey try to use prevention of harm
to others as the rationale for rules or policies that limit individual freedom of choice. This bad habit
of civic discourse frequently leads to ethically distorted arguments and sometimes to dishonest or at
least disingenuous ones."); Michael N. Goldman & Alan 0. Goldman, Paternalistic Laws, 18 PHIL.
TopIcs 65, 72 (1990) ("Such justifications should not be morally convincing, however. If we can interfere in free choice whenever doing so prevents such possible indirect costs from being incurred,
then the scope of protected free choice will be vanishingly small."); Jacobson et al., supra note 11,
at 79 (discussing "conceptual limitations in the current regulatory regime"); Regan, supra note 42,
at 202 ("[Tjhe tenuousness of the connection between the conduct and the 'harm' gives the argument something of the false ring of rationalization."); Jendi B. Reiter, Citizens or Sinners? The Economic and Political Inequity of 'Sin Taxes' on Tobacco and Alcohol Products, 29 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBs. 443, 460 (1996) (arguing that stretching the harm principle leaves the regulations with
"dubious moral legitimacy").
150. Cf. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 22 & n.30 ("We can assume ... a line can be drawn
. . . between other-regarding behavior and behavior that is primarily self-regarding and only indirectly and remotely, therefore, trivially other-regarding."). Of course, when there is clear harm to
others, the harm principle is properly invoked and justifies liberty restriction to prevent the harm. In
such circumstances it is unnecessary to examine the justifiability of paternalism. The harm principle
is both a sufficient and preferable liberty limiting principle. Cf. VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 43334. Of course, the least restrictive alternative principle still requires that the regulation be only as restrictive as is necessary to abate the harm.
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REGULATION TO PREVENT HARM TO SELF: SOFT PATERNALISM

Not all regulation of tobacco can be justified on the basis of harm to
others. Smokers do not always light up in public. There is no secondhand smoke from chewing tobacco. These activities create minimal if
any, negative externalities. They do, however, pose health risks to the
users themselves. Such conduct can often be justifiably regulated on the
basis that the individuals engaging in these activities are acting without
sufficient voluntariness. Their decision to smoke or to chew may be uninformed, misunderstood, or coerced. The justification for regulation
under these circumstances is the soft paternalism liberty-limiting
principle.
In this section I will first elucidate the concept of soft paternalism.
After laying this conceptual groundwork, I will demonstrate soft paternalism's role as a liberty-limiting principle. Finally, I will identify the limitations of soft paternalism, arguing that although the soft paternalism
principle, like the harm principle, can be manipulated to justify almost
any regulation, its appropriate limitations leave room for hard
paternalism.
A.

Defining "Soft Paternalism"

The principal argument for the pure paternalistic regulation of voluntarily assumed risks is that "it is difficult for the individual decision
makers to obtain, process, and use information on the consequences of
their choices." '' In the context of tobacco regulation, overriding a
smoker's decision to smoke is justified primarily on the basis that the
choice was not factually informed, was not adequately understood, was
152
coerced, or was otherwise not autonomous.
The overriding of stated preferences to preserve individual autonomy
and to protect the good of the individual is "pure" soft paternalism.153 Of
151. Richard Zeckhauser, Measuring Risks and Benefits of Food Safety Decisions, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 539, 541-42 (1985).
152. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1129, 1166-69 (1986).
153. In "pure" paternalism, the benefit to be provided or the harm to be prevented by the intervention pertains only to the restricted individual herself. See Dworkin, supra note 20, at 111 ("In
'pure' paternalism the class of persons whose freedom is restricted is identical with the class of persons whose benefit is intended to be promoted by such restrictions."); see also HARM TO SELF, supra
note 8, at 12-16; KLEINIo, supra note 8, at 12; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 28, 66, 312 & n.14,
314; Beauchamp, The Regulation of Hazards, supra note 27, at 245 (citing Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CAN. J. PHIL. 105, 113 (1971)). "Pure" paternalism will also be "direct" when the
benefitted individual is the only one whose liberty is restricted to provide the benefit. See, e.g.,
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course, in reality most intervention is "impure" paternalism, that is, it is
for the good of the individual and also of others. 5 4 Nevertheless, I examine only "pure" paternalism, in which "the interference with a person's liberty of action is justified by reasons referring exclusively to the
welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the person being
coerced."' 55 For example, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
relied on pure paternalism to justify its tobacco regulations. 56 In its
"Statement of Need for Action" the FDA writes, "FDA's justification of
this regulation [banning tobacco for children] relies on the total costs associated with childhood addiction to tobacco, rather than on the external
HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 9; KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 13-14.

154. See Dworkin, supra note 20, at 108 ("[Ilt is not easy to find 'pure' examples of paternalistic interferences."); see also HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 16 (calling "impure paternalism" this
"mixed paternalism" because it aims to "protect the directly restricted party himself, but also to
protect third parties from indirect harm"); id. at 56 ("Clear examples of wholly self-regarding decisions are less easy to come by because 'No man is an island,' and every decision is bound to have
some 'ripple effect' on the interests of others."); KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 79; Dan E. Beauchamp,
Community: The Neglected Tradition of Public Health, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1985, at 28, 29;
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Constitutional Balance Between Health and Liberty, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Dec. 1985, at S2, S4.
155. Dworkin, supra note 20, at 108. Most philosophers doubt that there are any truly selfregarding risks. Nevertheless, as discussed in section I.C., at some point harm-to-others justifications
becomes so tenuous that it is appropriate to characterize the paternalism as pure. See HARM TO SELF,
supra note 8, at 22 (admitting that conduct in which persons harm themselves always involves the
public interest to some extent but often not enough to invoke the harm principle); see also id. at 56
("As John Stuart Mill pointed out, however, a rough and serviceable distinction can be drawn between decisions that are plainly other-regarding . . . and those that are 'directly,' 'chiefly,' or 'primarily' self-regarding."); HUSAK, supra note 6, at 64 ("Perhaps there are no examples of 'pure' or 'unmixed' paternalism, that is, of an interference with liberty that is justifiable solely on the ground that
the conduct to be prohibited harms the doer ... [Ilt is a distinction between rationales for laws...
the distinction between harm to oneself and harm to others . . . must be drawn in order to evaluate
each of the arguments .... "); KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 12 ("What is important so far as paternalism is concerned is not whether it is possible to isolate a class of 'paternalistic' impositions, but
whether a particular (e.g. paternalistic) rationale for imposing upon others has any moral standing,
and if so, how much."); id. at 18 ("Unless something like this [distinction] is assumed, the whole
issue of paternalism is rendered academic."); NIKKU, supra note 6, at 122-24.
156. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to
Protect Children and Adolescents, Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996). The U.S. Supreme Court
later struck down these regulations, holding that the FDA lacks authority to regulate tobacco products. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S.Ct. 1291, 1316 (2000) ("Reading the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as a whole, as well as in conjunction with Congress's subsequent tobacco-specific legislation, it is plain that Congress has not given the FDA the authority that it seeks
to exercise here."). Nevertheless, the tobacco industry is already obligated to do many of the same
things required by the regulations. pursuant to contractual obligations in the national Medicaid settlement with the states. See National Ass'n of Attorneys Gen., Master Settlement Agreement (Nov. 23,
1998) (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.naag.com/cigmsa.rtf>; see also Ross D. Petty, Tobacco
Marketing Restrictions in the Multistate Attorney General Settlement: Is This Good Public Policy?,
18 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 249 (1999).
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or spillover costs to nonusers."' 57 In other words, the FDA aimed to control children's access to tobacco for their own good.
Pure soft paternalism holds that it is proper to interfere with an individual's liberty for that individual's own good only if-indeed, precisely
because-her contrary choice was not, or may not have been, substantially autonomous. For example, if you were about to eat a hot dog that
only I knew was poisoned, then on soft paternalistic grounds I could justifiably interfere with your liberty and prevent you from eating that hot
dog. My interference would be justified because you were unaware of
this important feature of your action. I did not stop you from doing what
you wanted to do, i.e. eat a hot dog. Rather, I stopped you from doing
something that you (almost certainly) did not want to do, i.e. eat a
158
poisoned hot dog.
Intervention is proper not only when the person's conduct is clearly
not substantially voluntary but also when the subject's conduct is very
probably or strongly suspected to be not substantially voluntary. Under
such circumstances, voluntariness must somehow be ascertained. After
all, "[p]eople do not always want what they say; they do not always say
what they want; and they do not always want what they say they
want."' 59 Individuals' desires and preferences are not always reflected in
the choices they make. A lack of information, maturity, or voluntariness
can thwart the realization of desires. 60 For these reasons, soft paternalism
157. 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,572. In fact, this rule was not 100% "pure" paternalism. The FDA
noted social benefits of reduced medical costs and fire costs. Nevertheless, the paternalism was close
to pure. The agency was clear that the "major beneficiaries" were the children themselves. Id. at
44,574. In contrast, Dan Beauchamp might justify the same regulation, but by reference to the "collective good." Beauchamp, supra note 27.
158. Voluntariness will, of course, vary inversely relative to the thickness of the description of
the act. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 18, at 244 & n.13; HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at
123, 129, 132, 277, 282, 294, 304-05; see also Sunstein, supra note 152, at 179; VANDEVEER, supra
note 6, at
viduation,
GOLDMAN,
159.

30; see generally CARL GINET, ON ACTION 45-71 (1991) (discussing key literature on indiparticularly DONALD DAWDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS (1980) and ALVIN I.
A THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION (1970)).
Carl Elliott, Meaning What You Want, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 61, 63 (1993).

160. See Cass R. Sunstein, Disrupting Voluntary Transactions, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE (NOMOS XXXI) 279, 282, 290 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989) [hereinafter Disrupting Voluntary Transactions] ("Absence of information is of course a conventional basis for the
disruption of voluntary transactions."); see also Sunstein, supra note 152, at 1158-66; Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 3, 24-27 (1991) [hereinafter Preferences].
The principles of soft pure paternalism are mirrored in, among other places, products liability law.
Specifically, the "assumption of risk defense bars recovery where (1) a dangerous condition exists
which is inconsistent with the injured party's safety, (2) the injured person is actually aware of the
condition and appreciates the danger, and (3) the injured person voluntarily exposes himself to the
danger which produces the injury." Forrest City Mach. Works v. Aderhold, 616 S.W.2d 720, 724
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is widely accepted as an appropriate basis for intervention.' 6 ' Mill allowed that an individual's own good is "good reason for remonstrating
with him, or persuading him, or entreating him."' 162 Even professed liber163
tarians will allow regulation on soft paternalistic grounds.
Soft paternalism is not foreign to public health issues. 164 As Robert
Goodin explains, "[t]o a very large extent ...the justification of public

health measures in general must be baldly paternalistic."' 165 For example,
the FDA exists in large part to protect consumers from being duped; it
prevents people from making uninformed and involuntary decisions about
which foods to ingest or which drugs or devices to use. 166 Indeed, the
stated mission of the FDA is to protect the "health of people which, in
the circumstances of modern industrialism, [is] largely beyond selfprotection."' 167 In explaining the philosophy of FDA regulation, Peter
(Ark. 1981); see also

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1977); STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 3
THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 12:52-§ 12:54 (1986 & Supp. 1998). The basic idea is that only if

the individual's (i.e. the prospective plaintiff's) behavior is not substantially voluntary or informed,
does the (tort) law have a role (i.e. a soft paternalistic role) to play. Otherwise, the individual is presumably able to adequately protect (or, if she wishes, not protect) herself. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971) ("It is a fundamental principle of the common

law that volenti non fit injuria-to one who is willing no wrong is done. The attitude of the courts
has not, in general, been one of paternalism. Where no public interest is contravened, they have left
the individual to work out his own destiny, and are not concerned with protecting him from his own
folly in permitting others to do him harm. In the field of negligence, this policy has been given effect by the doctrine of assumption of risk ....").
161. See, e.g., Beauchamp, The Regulation of Hazards, supra note 27, at 245; Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 939, 940 (Lawrence C. Becher & Charlotte B. Becker

eds., 1992).
162. MILL, supra note 17, at 68; cf Marion Smiley, Paternalism and Democracy, 23 J. VALUE
INQUIRY 299, 316 n. I (1989) ("Contemporary philosophers often begin their discussions of paternalism by pointing out that they are in accordance with John Stuart Mill's principle of paternalism.").
163.

See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A LIBERTARIAN 104 (1997). '

164. See Ronald Bayer et al., Book Review, Trades, AIDS, and the Public Health: The Limits
of Economic Analysis, 83 GEo. L. 79, 84 (1994).
165. GOODIN, supra note 5, at 31; see also Robert D. Tollison & Richard F Wagner, SelfInterest, Public-Interest, and Public Health, 69 PUB. CHOICE 323, 325 (1991) ("[P]aternalism is
sometimes advanced as a third type of explanation for the supply of public health.").
166. See generally JAMES T. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (2d ed. 1995); PETER
BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW (2d ed. 1991).

167. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943). There is also a diachronic
aspect to the problem. Motorcycle helmet laws often find justification in that "riders fail to grasp,
poignantly, what their feelings will be if a horrible crash without a helmet leaves them battered or
paralyzed." Eric Rakowski, Review of Dworkin's Sanctity of Life, 103 YALE L.J. 2049, 2110 (1994)
(citing Donald H. Regan, Paternalism, Freedom, Identity and Commitment, in PATERNALISM 113,
122-127 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983)); see also Sanford Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral
Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REv. 857, 873-74 & n.77 (1992); Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaptation
of Miranda to Advance Directives: A Critique of the Patient Self Determination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 171-80 (1999). Similarly, smokers do not identify with their later selves.
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Barton Hutt quotes from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
168
Dalehite v. United States:
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever increasing extent our population
is dependent upon mass producers for its food and drink, its cures and complexions, its apparel and gadgets. These no longer are natural or simple products but
complex ones whose composition and qualities are often secret. Such a dependent
society must exact greater care than in more simple days .... Where experiment or
research is necessary to determine the presence or the degree of danger, the product must not be tried out on the public, nor must the public be expected to possess
the facilities or the technical knowledge to learn for itself of inherent but latent
dangers.'69

The underlying premise of the soft paternalism liberty-limiting principle is that the only "real" decisions (i.e. those with which the government should not interfere) are those that are informed and voluntary, free
of either cognitive or volitional defects. Pure soft paternalism is "soft"
because it does not override any "real" decisions. 70 On the contrary, it
constrains only impaired decisions, decisions which are the product of
"compulsion, misinformation, excitement or impetuousness, clouded
judgment . ..or immature or defective faculties of reasoning." 1 71 Thus,
soft-paternalism, rather than counteracting autonomy, actually helps to
protect and promote it.'72 Despite its nomenclature, most ethicists do not
168. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
169. Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 101, 101 (1995) (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 51-52 (1953)
(Jackson, J., dissenting)); see also Who Benefits?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1981, at 19 (reprinted from
PiL. LEDGER, Aug. 28 & 30 (1852)) ("Leave everyone to regulate his own business, and let consumers take care of themselves .... Yes! And after they are blown up, run over and crushed,
knocked down dead, or poisoned to death, they will discover that have made a mistake ......
KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 105-06.
170. See, e.g., HANS BLOKLAND, FREEDOM AND CULTURE IN WESTERN SOCIETY (Michael
O'Loughlin trans., 1997) (explaining that substantially nonvoluntary choices can be restricted because they are "just as alien to the individual as someone else's choices"); Feinberg, infra note 173,
at 391-92 ("To restrict his liberties in such circumstances ... we will not be interfering with his real
self or blocking his real will ....");HUSAK, supra note 6, at 130 ("[A]n agent's apparent choice is
not truly his if it is nonvoluntary, so interference with it would not violate his autonomy.");
Kasachkoff, supra note 24, at 413 ("Paternalistic restrictions in these cases-sometimes called cases
of 'soft' or 'weak' paternalism-can be countenanced by a liberal society because they do not deprive the individual of any autonomous choice that he or she is in fact capable of making."); MILL,
supra note 17, at 69 ("[T]his doctrine [of liberty] is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties."); NIKKU, supra note 6, at 126-27; Thompson, supra note 124, at 245 ("If a
paternalistic intervention restricts only decisions that are already unfree. . . .the paternalism can be
consistent with the principle of liberty.").
171. Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 3, 7 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983).
172. See Hiyry, supra note 27, at 454 ("The core idea of all weak paternalism is ... interventions can actually support their autonomy instead of suppressing it."); see also KLEINIG, supra
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identify "soft paternalism" as being truly paternalistic; 17 3 under circumstances of coercion or cognitive defect, the individual has not exercised
her autonomy. Robert Goodin explains,
If it is autonomy that we are trying to protect in opposing paternalistic legislation
in general, then the same values that lead us to oppose such legislation in general
will lead us to welcome it in those particular cases where what we are being protected from
is something that would deprive us of the capacity for autonomous
74
choice.

Nevertheless, it is conceptually important to distinguish "soft paternalism" as a form of paternalism. Whatever its underlying premise, soft paternalism still results in some tangible interference with the individual's
range of opportunity-even if the interference actually preserves her
note 8, at 100; Pope, supra note 167, at 188-90 ("There is no usurpation of autonomous decisionmaking because there was none to usurp. On the other hand, soft paternalism is needed to ensure autonomous decision making." (emphasis added)).
173. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & LAURENCE B. MCCULLOUGH, MEDICAL ETHICS: THE
MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF PHYSICIANS 93-94, 96 (1984); HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 12 ("It is
not clear that 'soft paternalism' is 'paternalism' at all, in any clear sense."); id. at 14 (arguing that it
is "severely misleading to think of [soft paternalism] as any kind of paternalism"); HETA HAYRY, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND MEDICAL CONTROL 29-30, 34 (1998); PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS, supra note 6, at
413; RILEY, supra note 42, at 198 ("Mill's absolute ban on paternalism can be compatible with what
is often called 'soft' or 'weak' paternalism."); Beauchamp, supra note 33, at 1917 ("Weak paternalism, then, seems to be a defensible but noncontroversial position that nearly everyone accepts in
some form. Weak paternalism is thus not a form of paternalism that can be distinguished in any
morally relevant respect from antipaternalism."); Tom L. Beauchamp, Medical Paternalism, Voluntariness, and Comprehension, in ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR SOCIAL POLICY 123, 136 (John Howie ed.,
1983) [hereinafter Medical Paternalism];Tom L. Beauchamp, Paternalism and Bio-Behavioral Control, 60 MONIST 62, 67 (1977) ("[Weak paternalism] is not paternalism in any interesting sense, because it is not a liberty limiting principle independent of the 'harm to others' principle.") [hereinafter Paternalism and Bio-Behavioral Control]; Joel Feinberg, Paternalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 390, 391 (Donald M. Borchert ed., Supp. 1996) ("Clarity would be improved if philosophers would speak of paternalism only when what is meant is hard paternalism."); Soren Holm, Autonomy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHICS 267, 272 (Ruth Chadwick ed., 1998) ("If the decision
overridden is not fully autonomous . . . the problem is not a problem of paternalism .... "); Bill
New, Paternalism and Public Policy, 15 ECON. & PHIL. 63, 67-69 (1999) (making the same argument
in economic terms); Regan, supra note 42, at 191 ("Since the person ... is unfree even if we do
not intervene to constrain his choice, we are not really decreasing his freedom by intervening
.... ); Shapiro, supra note 24, at 547 (arguing that soft paternalism "justif[ies] a particular intervention on the grounds that the preconditions for autonomy are not present").
174. GOODIN, supra note 5, at 7; see also Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., FDA Regulation of Tobacco and Youth Smoking: Historical, Social, and Constitutional Perspectives, 277 JAMA 410, 412
(1997) ("The principal objection to stricter tobacco regulation-that it represented an inappropriate
form of paternalism-began to erode. In its place, regulators could argue, based on science, that nicotine actually diminishes the capacity of an individual to make voluntary reasoned choices about
whether to continue smoking.").
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autonomy. 175
B. Applying the Soft PaternalismLiberty-Limiting Principle
The precise conditions that make one's decisions to smoke "autonomous" remain unclear. 176 Nevertheless, some necessary elements of autonomy include: (1) having sufficient relevant information (knowledge);
(2) being of majority age (maturity); and (3) being free of coercion (voluntariness). When any of these conditions are not substantially met, the
choice to smoke is not substantially autonomous and soft-paternalistic in177
tervention is justified.
The earliest federal regulation of smoking was premised on the belief that smokers were unaware of the risks. 7 8 It is upon the other two
soft paternalistic bases (lack of maturity and lack of voluntariness) that
the FDA premised its short-lived regulation of tobacco. 79 First, the FDA
argued that children lack both the relevant facts and the mental capacity
to rationally process risk information. Second, the FDA argued that the
addictive nature of tobacco impairs the voluntariness of smokers. I will
175. The antipaternalism of soft paternalism can be helpfully explained using Gerald Dworkin's distinction between "liberty" and the "richer notion" of "autonomy." DWORKIN, supra note 5,
at 13-15, 104-07. "In limiting his liberty . . . we promote, not hinder, his [autonomy]." Id. at 106;
see also supra notes 32-36; cf KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 21 ("[Iln the case of invasions of liberty,
autonomy may not always be threatened . . . weak paternalism need involve no threat to autonomy
.
...); id. at 58; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 30 n.20 ("Even if we concede that stopping S
against his will . . . it remains true, certain puzzles aside, that the intervener does restrict S's liberty
of action."). Heta Hayry draws a similar distinction between actions that do not interfere at all (e.g.
mere provision of information) and those which interfere (e.g. pursuant to any liberty limiting principle). Unfortunately, she uses the terms "hard" and "soft," which I and many others already use in
the same manner that Hiyry uses "strong" and "weak." See HAYRY, supra note 173, at 42; see also
NIKKU, supra note 6, at 128 n.22. Instead of additional vocabulary, Tom Beauchamp has proposed
restricting the use of the term "paternalism" to instances of hard paternalism. See Medical Paternalism, supra note 173, at 136-37; see also NIKKU, supra note 6, at 38. This proposed usage has generally been rejected. See, e.g., BERNARD GERT ET AL., BIOETHICS: A RETURN TO FUNDAMENTALS 208

(1997).
176.

See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 115-17.

177. See Lavin, supra note 42, at 2423. Donald VanDeVeer adds further conditions for the justifiability of soft paternalism. See VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 354-55 (arguing that the mere presence of some lack of voluntariness does not mean a forfeiture of ascriptive autonomy); cf GERT ET
AL., supra note 175, at 226 ("[Jlust because people are not competent to make a rational decision
does not mean that it is justified to violate any moral rule with regard to them."); KULTGEN, supra
note 24, at 78.
178.

See SULLUM, supra note 1, at 64.

179. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,248-44,441 (1996); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 897.14, 897.16, 897.30; David
A. Rienzo, About Face: How the FDA Changed Its Mind, Took on the Tobacco Companies in Their
Own Back Yard and Won, 53 FOOD DRUG L. 243 (1998).
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demonstrate pure soft paternalism's operation as a liberty-limiting principle through an examination of these three justifications.
1. Regulation to Protect the Uninformed
No behavior, including smoking, can be autonomous unless done
with adequate knowledge and understanding of the nature and consequences of that conduct. "Obviously people cannot voluntarily accept the
health risks of smoking if they do not know what they are." 180 Therefore,
soft paternalism is justified because it eliminates ignorance and enhances
understanding. 81
Education is always an appropriate government response to public
health risks.' 82 Even Mill allowed labeling of dangerous products, arguing
that when an individual makes an unwise decision, that is good reason
for "remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him,
or entreating him."' 8 3 By pointing out the consequences of one's behav180. GOODIN, supra note 5, at 20; see also NIKKU, supra note 6, at 219-20; Pope, supra note
167, at 186-96; cf Luke 23:34 ("Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do.").
181. If education could, in fact, accomplish this, then, pursuant to the principle of the least restrictive alternative, there would not be any need for more intrusive restrictions. However, "the difficulties in disseminating adequate, intelligible information . . . are so formidable that some kinds of
regulation are necessary." KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 110.
182. See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 158 (1985); Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 19, 21 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983); HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 134 ("The
way for the state to assure itself that [smoking] practices are truly voluntary is continually to confront smokers with the ugly medical facts so that there is no escaping the knowledge of what the
medical risks exactly are."); KULTOEN, supra note 24, at 70 ("[R]ational persuasion hardly needs
justification."); PETER MCWILLIAMS, AIN'T NOBODY'S BUSINESS IF You Do: THE ABSURDITY OF CON.
SENSUAL CRIMES IN OUR FREE COUNTRY 608-09 (1996); RILEY, supra note 42, at 122, 145
("[G]overnment should provide relevant information but otherwise leave individuals alone .... ");
id. at 162 ("[Plersuasion, advice, counsel, encouragement, attempts to inform and the like are not the
same thing as coercion."); VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 128 ("[Ilt is permissible to use fair, open
means to dissuade him."); id. at 317 ("[A]n information-providing policy is defensible ....
); id. at
321-22, 336, 424; Dworkin, supra note 20, at 110, 124; Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATER.
NALISM 3, 11 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983); Gilbert, supra note 22, at 5; Medical Paternalism, supra
note 173, at 132; Regan, supra note 167, at 114-16; Daniel Wikler, Persuasion and Coercion for
Health, in PATERNALISM 35, 53-53 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983). Admittedly, education might influence
individuals' decisions but only an extreme form of influence, manipulation, comes close to determining the choice. Cf Barbara Rippel, Welcome to Wellville, CONSUMER'S RES. MAO., Feb. 1999, at 34.
But see Douglas J. Den Uyl, Smoking, Human Rights, and Civil Liberties, in SMOKING: WHO HAS
THE RIGHT? 267, 272 (Jeffrey A. Schaler & Magda E. Schaler eds., 1998) (arguing that the expenditure of public funds for smoking education is unjustifiable hard paternalism).
183. MILL, supra note 17, at 68; see also id. at 163 (allowing "advice, instruction, persuasion"). The government instructs and persuades not only through direct exhortation but also through
providing incentives. For example, the IRS now permits a tax deduction for the costs of quitting
smoking. See Rev. Rul. 99-28, 1999-25 I.R.B.; Michael Lynch, Kick the Habit, 188 J. ACCOUNTANCY
99 (1999).
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ior without actually restricting that behavior, education actually increases
autonomy. 184
Not surprisingly, education was the focus of regulatory efforts until
the 1980s. One year after the release of the 1964 Surgeon General's report, Congress passed the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of
1965.185 This law mandated the health warning on cigarette packaging:
"Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health." Assuming that people would not engage in risky behavior if they knew better, early efforts focused on providing information. 18 6 Congress later provided for rotating warnings in the Comprehensive Smoking Education
Act of 1984.187 These warnings were stronger and meant to impress the
184.

See, e.g., FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 18, at 347 ("Reasoned argument in defense

of an option is itself information."); KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 101 ("[K]nowledge enhances her

chance of choosing actions that will succeed in their purpose."); Daniel Wikler & Dan E.
Beauchamp, Health Promotion and Health Education, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1126, 1127
(Warren T. Reich ed., 1996). Education is, in Heta Hiiyry's terminology, not only not "strong" (i.e.
"hard" as used in this article) paternalism but it is not even "hard" paternalism (i.e. prima facie in
need of justification). See HYRY, supra note 173, at 73; see also id. at 57-65; NIKKU, supra note 6,
at 198; Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 625 (1999). On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the mere
provision of information can be paternalistic either when individuals do not want to receive the information or when it is presented in a very persuasive manner. Cf. RUTH CHADWICK ET AL., THE
RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW (1997); GERT ET AL., supra note 175, at 211-12 (pro-

viding an example of informative paternalism); KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 71; NIKKU, supra note 6,
at 23 ("[I]nformative actions can be performed paternalistic .... "); id. at 199 ("[T]he purpose of
health information is not only improved knowledge but also a steering of habits toward what authorities consider health promotion and right behavior. When this is performed through information we
may talk about informative paternalism."); Allen E. Buchanan, Medical Paternalism,in PATERNALISM
61, 62 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983); Ruth R. Faden & Alan I. Faden, The Ethics of Health Education
as a Public Health Policy, 6 HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 180 (1978) (arguing that although education facilitates voluntary choice, as it becomes more persuasive, government bears a heavier burden
of justification).

185. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40).
186. See generally JACOBSON & WASSERMAN, supra note 4, at 9; SULLUM, supra note 1, at 64;
TROYER & MARKLE, supra note 76, at 73; Allan M. Brandt, The Cigarette, Risk, and American Culture, DAEDALUS, Fall 1996, at 155, 176; Howard Leventhal et al., Is the Smoking Decision an "In-

formed Choice"?: Effect of Smoking Risk Factors on Smoking Beliefs, 257 JAMA 3371, 3373
(1987); E.L. Thompson, Smoking Education Programs 1960-1976, 68 AM, J. PuB. HEALTH 250
(1978).
187. Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333); cf H.R. 2579,
106th Cong. (1999) (requiring federal warning labels on cigars); S. 1421, 106th Cong. (1999)
(same). Canada is now considering far more graphic warnings which include, inter alia, a diseased
heart, a diseased lung and a diseased mouth. See Julian Beltrame & Gordan Fairclough, Canadians

to Place Graphic Warnings of Smoking Dangers on Cigarette Packs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2000, at
B16; Health Minister Reveals New Cigarette Labelling Measure, HEALTH CANADA NEWS RELEASE
2000-07 (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http:llwww.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/archives/releases/2000O07e.htm>
(posting the labeling requirements and color photos of the proposed labels).
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message upon the warning-jaded smoker: "Quitting Smoking Now
Greatly Reduces Serious Risk to Your Health," "Smoking Causes Lung
Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy." '8 8
To reduce the powerful countering effect of pro-smoking messages, Congress also banned television and radio advertising. 8 9
Today, "[s]mokers are generally cognizant of the risks they face.'' g9
Indeed, knowledge of the risks is often presumed. 191 Still, federal, state,
and local governments continue to develop and institute new educational
measures. 92 These measures are uncontroversial because interference
with liberty is minimal. 193 Moreover, these educational initiatives are typ188. See supra note 187.
189. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40); cf. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, CIGAR SALES AND ADVERTISING AND PROPORTIONAL EXPENDITURES FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1996 AND 1997 § V.B (1999)

(calling for a similar ban on cigar advertising).
190. See KIP VISCUSi, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 61-78 (1992) [hereinafter SMOKING]; PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 179-204 (1988)

[hereinafter 1988 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT]; see also Leventhal et al., supra note 186, at 3374;
Daniel Shapiro, Tobacco: Irrationality, Addiction, and Paternalism, 8 PUB. AFFAIRS Q. 187, 188-93
(1994); W. Kip Viscusi, Promoting Smokers' Welfare with Responsible Taxation, 47 NAT'L TAX J.
547, 556 (1996). On the other hand, because new risks associated with smoking are still being identified, perhaps smokers are unaware of the scope and limits of their knowledge. See HARM TO SELF,
supra note 8, at 160-61; cf. KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 185 ("Even where we have plenty of data, it
may not be in a form that we need."); Michael Schoenbaum, Do Smokers Understand the Mortality
Effects of Smoking? Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 755
(1997) (reporting that heavy smokers significantly underestimate the risks of premature mortality);
Viscusi, supra note 43, at 1102 ("A general awareness of the hazards of smoking does not provide
consumers the specific information they need to understand.
...
); Kip Viscusi, Smoke and Mirrors: Understanding the New Scheme for Cigarette Regulation, 16 BROOKINGS REV. 14, 19 (1998)
(explaining the need for a "standardized rating system to assess relative risks").
191. In product liability litigation the assumption of the risk defense has been a successful affirmative defense for the tobacco industry for over thirty years. See Daniel Givelber, Cigarette Law,
73 IND. L.J. 867, 890 (1998). But cf. Gordon Faircloth, Jury Tells Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds to
Pay $20 Million in Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2000, at A3 (reporting the first jury
verdict for a plaintiff, Leslie J. Whiteley, who began smoking after government-mandated health
warnings first appeared on cigarette packs).
192. See Office on Smoking and Health, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Educational
Materials (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/edumat.htm>.
193. Of course, as a political and tactical matter, even these efforts are often opposed by the
tobacco industry. See, e.g., Gostin et al., supra note 12, at 73 (noting in regard to 1998 tobacco industry opposition to federal legislation that "[tlhis classically liberal objection also commonly extends even to government advice on the ground that such a collective expression of proper behavior
is inherently coercive"). Indeed, related to the regulation of smoking itself is a related but distinct
debate concerning First Amendment issues and the construction of social meaning. See, e.g., id. at
73 (citing inter alia Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943,
947 (1995)); Noah, supra note 3; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 903, 947 (1996).
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ically aimed at children, with whose liberty the state may usually justifiably interfere.
2.

Regulation to Protect the Immature

Most would agree that the ethical justification for the pure paternalistic regulation of children's conduct has a firm foundation. 94 Children
are recognized as the "clearest case of permissible (even obligatory) paternalism." 195 After all, it is well recognized that immaturity prevents minors from making autonomous choices. 196 "We force young people to
stay in school ...we allow them to dishonor contracts, we don't allow
194. See MILL, supra note 17, at 69 ("[Tlhis doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings
in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children who . . must be protected against
their own actions"); see also id. at 166; GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 12 (Barbara S. Lynch & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 1994) [hereinafter
GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE]; KLEINIo, supra note 8, at 144-56; RILEY, supra note 42, at 47. Analo-

gous reasons would justify pure paternalistic regulation for the senile and mentally defective. See,
e.g., BAYLES, supra note 28, at 139; Caplan, supra note 14, at 138 ("That the government should
protect through law, rule, and sanction, the weak, the vulnerable, the incapacitated, and the traumatized is a political obligation whose standing seems secure."); Heta Hiyry et al., Paternalism and
Finnish Anti-Smoking Policy, 28 Soc. SCI. & MED. 293, 296 (1989); Regan, supra note 42, at 207
n.3.

195.

Robert E. Goodin, Democracy, Preferences, and Paternalism, 26 POL'Y SCIENCES 229,

232 (1993); see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 138 (observing that children are

"judged incompetent because they fail on a pragmatic standard such as age"); BLOKLAND, supra
note 170, at 163 ("[W]ith regard to children paternalism is generally considered not only acceptable
but also desirable."); BOVARD, supra note 41, at 255; HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 202; HARM

TO SELF, supra note 8, at 153, 325-32; HUSAK, supra note 6, at 246 ("[A]dolescents are and ought to
be subject to a much wider ranger of paternalistic interference than adults."); KLEINIG, supra note 8,
at 144-56; Dworkin, supra note 20, at 119 (arguing that it is "not only permissible but even a duty
to restrict the child's freedom in various ways"); Gilbert, supra note 22, at 4 ("[I]n the case of children . . . legislation against their smoking . . . is appropriate."); id. at 6 ("[Slociety has more of an
obligation to protect the child's health .... [O]ur culture ... recognizes children as being in need of

special care and protection."); Gostin et al., supra note 23, at 414 ("Paternalism is often regarded as
an appropriate state response for the protection of minors."). Although children are presumed incompetent, many writers have stressed (1) that children have varying degrees of capacity and (2) that
children will eventually become autonomous. See Donald M. Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable
Populations: The Supreme Court's Reckless Disregardfor Self Determination and Social Science, 37
VILL. L. REV. 1569 (1992); see also KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 53; DAVID SEEDHOUSE. LIBERATING

MEDICINE 118 (1991) (describing the "autonomy flip," the point at which respecting self determination takes precedence over creating autonomy); TREBILCOCK, supra note 114, at 150-51; VANDEVEER,
supra note 6, at 139-40, 346, 436 (distinguishing children as "precompetent" as opposed to "incompetent"); Goodin, supra, at 232 ("The children's own preferences in all of this do not exactly count
for nought."); Richard Nicholson, The Greater the Ignorance, the Greater the Dogmatism, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., May/June 1993, at 4.
196. See GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE, supra note 194, at 12-13; see also U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES. PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE

SURGEON GENERAL 261-63 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
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them to purchase alcohol."' 197 Unlike adults, children cannot adequately
appreciate the consequences of their actions. 98 They focus on the shortterm and discount the long-term consequences of their actions. 199 Even
the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized "the peculiar vulnerability of
children [and] their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
' 2
mature manner. 00
Given this presumption of incompetence,2 1 it is natural that tobacco
20 2
regulation has long been based largely on the protection of children.
By 1890, twenty-six states passed laws banning cigarette sales to minors.20 3 In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court of California noted that
"[a]s early as 1891, the Legislature cared deeply enough about smoking
and minors that it prohibited the sale of cigarettes to them . . . with a
watchful eye, in its role as parens patriae it has maintained a paternalis' '2 4
tic vigilance over this vulnerable segment of our society. 0
197. RABIN & SUGARMAN, supra note 21, at 8.
198. See generally LAURA M. PURDY, IN TI:EIR BEST INTERESTS: THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL
RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN (1992); Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607 (1992); see also Note, Good Whiskey, Drunk Driving and Innocent
Bystanders: The Responsibility of Manufacturers of Alcohol and Other D'mgerous Hedonic Products
for Bystander Injury, 45 S.C. L. REV. 269, 314 n.215 (1994).
199. See, e.g., GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE, supra note 194, at 13-15 (citing Paul Slovik, What
Does It Mean to Know a Risk? Adolescents' Perceptions of Short-term and Long-term Consequences
of Smoking, Report No. 94-4 (June 1994)); Bruce C. Hafen, Review: The Changing Legal World of
Adolescents, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1060 (1983) (noting that children do not have sense of their
long-term future); see also Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents' Competence and Culpability, 18 Q.L.R. 403, 406-13 (1999) (reviewing research on not
only cognitive factors but also psychosocial factors affecting adolescent decisionmaking).
200. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 834-35 & n.43 (1988).
201. Although often irrebuttable (as in the case of statutory rape), some writers argue that the
strength of the presumption should be inversely proportional to the ability of the child and directly
proportional to the complexity of the decision. See, e.g., KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 154-56.
202. See, e.g., TATE, supra note 27, at 29 ("The opening wedge in the organized campaign
against cigarettes was the charge that they corrupted the young."); Jennifer McCullough, Note,
Lighting Up the Battle Against the Tobacco Industry: New Regulations Prohibiting Sales to Minors,
28 RUTGERS L.J. 709, 727 n.114 (1997); Widerman, supra note 76, at 398 ("The first statutes curbing tobacco use prohibited the sale of snuff and chewing tobacco to minors."). In addition to the
ethical justification, regulating the use of tobacco by children has a pragmatic benefit. Most smokers
begin as children, and if they are prevented from smoking at that time, then they probably will not
ever begin to smoke. See 61 Fed. Reg. 45,248-49, 44,441 (1996). Because of the addictive nature of
tobacco, it is most effective to prevent individuals from becoming smokers in the first place. See 61
Fed. Reg. 49,399 (1996) (citing 1994 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 196, at 5, 50, 65-67);
see also GOODIN, supra note 5, at 30, 137; GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE, supra note 194, at 5; RABIN
& SUGARMAN, supra note 21, at 8; David A. Kessler, Remarks by the Commissioner, 51 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 207 (1996).
203. See SULLUM, supra note 1, at 28 (citing TROYER & MARKLE, supra note 76, at 34).
204. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds, 875 P.2d 73, 83 (Cal. 1994).
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In 1992, Congress required every state to adopt and enforce laws
banning the sale and distribution of tobacco products to minors. 2 5 All
states now have such laws. 20 6 Moreover, because many children still
manage to obtain cigarettes in spite of these laws, 20 7 municipal regulations in many areas prohibit children from smoking in public. 08
In 1996, the FDA also aimed to regulate tobacco in order to protect
children. The agency conceded that "some children do make rational
choices," but maintained that these exceptional cases cannot alone rebut
the presumption of immaturity. The FDA explained that "the agency's
regulatory determinations must reflect the societal conviction that children under the age of legal consent cannot be assumed to act in their
29
own best interest." 0
3.

Regulation to Protect the Coerced

The justification for pure paternalistic intervention on the basis of
tobacco's addictive qualities is similar but distinct from the justifications
based on immaturity. In both cases, the decision-maker's autonomy is
called into question. However, addiction does not affect one's ability to
understand the risks of smoking. Rather, it renders the decision to smoke,
205. See Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26
(known as the Synar Amendment, restricting federal grant allocations on state compliance); see also
Pro Children Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6081-84 (prohibiting smoking in federally funded indoor facilities used for the delivery of services to children such as schools and daycare); 45 C.F.R. § 96.130
(detailing requirements for state compliance with the Synar Amendment).
206. See, e.g., GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE, supra note 194, at 201; WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
supra note 92, at 223; Fishman et al., supra note 87, at 26-27.
207. See, e.g., Fishman et al., supra note 87, at 30-31; Jean L. Forster et al., The Effect of
Community Policies to Reduce Youth Access to Tobacco, 88 AM. J.PUB. HEALTH 1193 (1998); cf
Centers for Disease Control, Tobacco Use Among High School Students-1997, 47 MORTALITY &
MORBIDITY WEEKLY REP. 229 (1998) (reporting that 43% of American teenagers use tobacco); Joni
Hersch, Teen Smoking and the Regulatory Environment, 47 DUKE LT 1143 (1998); Mark Wolfson et
al., Adolescent Smokers' Provision of Tobacco to Other Adolescents, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 649
(1997).
208. See, e.g., Ault Bans Teen Smoking in Public, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, July 16, 1998, at A8;
Janice D'Arcy, Can Law Douse Teen Smoking?, HARTFORD COURANT, July 4, 1998, at Al; Tom Hester, Limits on Teen Smoking Sweep Legislature, STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Jan. 11, 2000, at 18;
Reginald Johnson, Fighting Tobacco at the Local Level, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1998, at 14CN. Smoking is, of course, already forbidden in schools. See 20 U.S.C. § 6083(a).
209. 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,571 (citing GooDIN, supra note 5, at 30-32); see also HARM TO SELF,
supra note 8, at 325-32 (explaining boundary problems); Glen McGee & Frederic D. Burg, When
Paternalism Runs Amok, 15 POLITICS & LIFE Sci. 308 (1996). But see Ahaon Aviram, The Paternalistic Attitude Toward Children, 41 EDUC. THEORY 199 (1991) (arguing that the presumption is conceptually and empirically unsound).
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in whole or in part, volitionally deficient.210
In the materials supporting its 1996 regulation, 2" the FDA cited a
plethora of scientific evidence to demonstrate that the nicotine in tobacco
is addictive. 2 12 Addiction is defined as the presence of physiological effects after regular use and the presence of physiological impediments
upon withdrawal. 2 3 Clinical criteria developed by the American Psychiat2 14
ric Association for the diagnosis of addiction state that "addiction" is
a maladaptive pattern of substance abuse, leading to clinically significant impairment or distress, as manifested by three (or more) of the following occurring at
any time in the same 12 month period:
1) Tolerance marked by need for increased amounts of the substance or diminished effects with use of the same amount
2) Characteristic withdrawal symptoms
3) Taken in larger amounts or over a longer period of time than intended
4) Persistent desire for the substance or an unsuccessful desire to cut down on it
5) Much time spent to obtain the substance
6) Important social, occupational, or recreational activities given up for the
substance
7) Continued use despite knowledge of physical or psychological problems
2t 5
Regular users of tobacco satisfy all seven of these criteria.
The upshot of this clinical and epidemiological evidence is that tobacco exerts a coercive or compulsive effect on its users.2t 6 With time,

210. See GOODIN, supra note 5, at 25-30; cf. MILL, supra note 17, at 166 (accepting as a basis
for soft paternalistic intervention "some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full
use of the reflecting faculty"). Joel Feinberg uses "voluntariness" as an umbrella concept, which
characterizes autonomous action. He identifies compulsion and coercion as two voluntarinessreducing factors relevant to addiction. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 150-52. I will use "voluntary" and "autonomous" interchangeably to describe actions substantially free of ignorance, immaturity, or coercion. In this section I will also use "voluntariness" to describe behavior substantially free from only coercion and compulsion.
211. See supra note 179.
212. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,555-56, 44,701-48 (1996); see also Brief for the American College
of Chest Physicians, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp. (U.S. No. 98-1152), 1999 WL
492568 (filed July 9, 1999) (arguing in support of the FDA and citing recently released tobacco industry internal memoranda recognizing the addictive nature of nicotine).
213. See, e.g., 1988 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 190, at 7; GOODIN, supra note 5,
at 25-28; RABIN & SUGARMAN, supra note 21, at 9.
214. AMERICAN PSYCHIATARIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 166 (3d ed. rev. 1987); Harold Kalant, Addiction: Concepts and Definitions, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DRUGS AND ALCOHOL

18 (Jerome H. Jaffe ed., 1995); see also Jack E. Henningfield &

John Slade, Tobacco Dependence, Medications: Public Health and Regulatory Issues, 53 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 75 (1998).
215. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,731 (1996).
216. Of course, this is true only if the scientific evidence is accurate. The focus of this article
is to probe the normative as opposed to the empirical assumptions of smoking regulation. For the
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the decision to use tobacco becomes less than fully autonomous.2 17 For
example, although "15 million smokers try to quit, fewer than 3%
achieve one year of abstinence. ' 218 As the physiological effects are "in
fact, very hard to overcome, then on philosophical grounds, we should
regard the [smoker] as deprived of free choice. ' 21 9 Simply put, addiction
makes the choice to smoke, or more precisely the decision to continue to
smoke, nonautonomous.
In order to explain how addiction interferes with autonomy, it is
useful to use the Dworkin/Frankfurt conception of autonomy. According
to Philosophers Harry Frankfurt and Gerald Dworkin, "[a] person is autonomous if he identifies with his desires, goals, and values and such
identification is not influenced in ways which make the process of identification in some way alien to the individual. ' 220 This identification takes
place when an individual determines what he desires and, at a higher
level, approves of having these desires. This higher level desire is a desire about a desire, for example, the desire to smoke. Here, the lower order desire (LOD) would be the desire to smoke a cigarette. The higher
order desire (HOD) might be to not have the (LOD) desire to smoke.
Without getting too deeply immersed in metaphysical issues of free will,
the basic point is that our HODs should control and be congruent with
purpose of this normative enquiry, I will assume the accuracy of the FDA's conclusions and make no
effort to assess the scientific evidence. Cf Richard A. Knox, Nicotine Vaccine Takes Aim at Smoking
Addiction, BOST. GLOBE, Dec. 17, 1999, at A3 (reporting that scientists have developed a vaccine
that blocks the effects of nicotine). But see supra note 90.
217. Joel Feinberg characterizes addiction as "compulsive pressure" for while addiction is resistible, such resistance is very "difficult, inconvenient, troublesome, or costly." HARM TO SELF,
supra note 8,at 190; see also id. at 151, 158, 166, 189-228. Feinberg introduces some finer conceptual distinctions but he also observes that it is often "nearly impossible to distinguish" compulsive
pressure (where no conscious decision is made) from coercive pressure (where a conscious decision
is made that resistance is too difficult). Id. at 194-95, 199. Daniel Shapiro argues that this compulsive pressure is insufficiently strong to make the decision to smoke less than substantially voluntary.
See Shapiro, supra note 190, at 198-200.
218. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,372 (1996).
219. Rabin, supra note 5, at 481; see also Neal L. Benowitz & Alice S. Fredericks, Tobacco
Dependence, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DRUGS AND ALCOHOL 1026 (Jerome H. Jaffe ed., 1995). But see

HUSAK, supra note 6, at 110-17 (requiring a higher level of coercion before an act is nonvoluntary);
id. at 72 ("The most plausible paternalistic arguments .. .suffer not only from theoretical defects
but also from dubious empirical assumptions.").
220. DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 14-15; Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will, in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABoUT 11, 20 (1988); Gerald Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in THE

INNER CITADEL 61 (John Christman ed., 1989); Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 1 (1971); see also Irving Thalberg, Hierarchical Analysis of Unfree Action, in THE INNER CITADEL, supra, at 123. This is, of course, a purely formal conception of autonomy, allowing persons to "give meaning to their lives in all kinds of ways." DWORKIN, supra note
5, at 31.
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our LODs. 22 1 Addiction makes the LODs insusceptible to HODs; that is,
the individual doesn't want to want to smoke but just can't help it. This
makes the decision to smoke-or to continue to smoke-less than substantially voluntary.
Just as lack of knowledge (regarding the risks of smoking) prevents
individuals from autonomously deciding whether to smoke, so does the
coercive or compulsive pressure imposed by addiction impinge on autonomy.22 2 Indeed, regulation under these circumstances actually protects autonomy by ensuring that an individual's choice reflects her true preferences. 223 Robert Goodin explains that "[w]here people 'wish to stop
smoking but do not have the requisite willpower ... [intervention is] not
imposing a good on someone who rejects it. [It is] simply using coercion
to enable people to carry out their own goals.' ",224
C.

Limitations of the Soft Paternalism Liberty-Limiting Principle

Like the harm principle, soft paternalism can theoretically justify
any intervention. Just as we can always find harm to others in a particular activity, we can always argue that a decision was made without substantial autonomy. 225 "Autonomy," like "harm" is an inherently vague
and variable concept; 226 thus, soft paternalism, like the harm principle,
221.

See Gerald Dworkin, Autonomy and Behavioral Control, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.

1976, at 23.
222. It is not necessary that the smoker have no choice at all in the matter. The smoker's decision to smoke is made nonautonomous when to do otherwise would be unreasonably difficult. See
HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 150-52, 189-95, 340-43; see also id. at 158 ("His act need not be
close' to the extreme of total involuntariness in order to be 'involuntary enough' to warrant interference."); JON ELSTER. STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION, ADDICTION. AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR §§ 3.2-3.4

(1999).
223. Cf.GOODIN, supra note 5, at 48 (arguing that intervention in the case of addiction "helps
people implement their own preferred preferences. It overrides people's preferences, to be sure, but
the preferences which it overrides are ones which people themselves wish they did not have."). Of
course, someone's true preferences might be to smoke. Still, at least temporary intervention is justified to determine this. See Dworkin, supra note 20, at 124 (arguing that there is "no theoretical
problem .. .simply using coercion to enable people to carry out their own goals").
224. GOODIN, supra note 5, at 28 (quoting Dworkin, supra note 182, at 32).
225. See supra notes 115-40 and accompanying text.
226. See JULES L. COLEMAN. MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 243-76 (1988); Feinberg, supra
note 173, at 392 (discussing work by Gert and Culver and noting that "voluntariness is usually a
matter of degree with no conveniently placed bright lines to guide us. In this respect it resembles the

concept of harm ....");cf. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 371 (1985).
Wibren Van der Burg would also characterize the use of a notion like "hypothetical consent" as a
slippery slope. Wibren Van der Burg, Slippery Slope Arguments, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHICS 129, 133 (Ruth Chadwick ed., 1998) ("The gray zone in the second slippery slope argument is
usually the result of both semantic indeterminacy and epistemic indeterminacy."). Wibren Van der
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poses the threat of the slippery slope and potentially unlimited government intervention.
In its most extreme form this slippery slope is exemplified by the
notion of "hypothetical consent. ' 227 This type of consent is used to justify interventions for a person's own good when that person does not
consent to the intervention. 228 Her hypothetical consent is obtained by
presuming, in spite of her contemporaneously expressed contrary preferences (or simply without regard to her preferences when none are expressed or elicited), that if she truly understood the risks or were truly
free of autonomy-reducing factors, then she would consent to the intervention because that would be the rational thing to do. 229
The framing of hypothetical consent as an enterprise of what a person would do if rational and informed is misleading.230 At bottom, there
is a strong normative judgment that persons ought to be rational and,
moreover, be rational in a certain way.23' Gerald Dworkin, a leading exponent of hypothetical rational consent, 232 admits that "there is always a
danger that a dispute over agreement and rationality being a disguised
version of evaluative and normative disagreement. ' 233 The only justificaBurg argues, however, that legislation and regulation, as opposed to judicial decisionmaking, are not
subject to this kind of slippery slope because the slide in those contexts can be stopped by choosing
(even arbitrarily) some bright line. See id. at 134, 137. Of course, this is inapposite when it comes to
making laws in the first place.
227. See generally HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 184-86; KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 123;
VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 70-75; Daniel Brudney, Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force, 10 L.
& PHIL. 235 (1991).
228. See DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 88-89.
229. See PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS, supra note 6, at 414 ("[Tlhe justification of the position rests
on the argument that completely rational agents fully aware of their circumstances would 'consent to
paternalism' and would consent to a scheme of penalties that would deter them from any motive to
undertake a foolish action.").
230. See Beauchamp, supra note 33, at 1916 ("A justification based on consent may do more
to obscure than to clarify issues."); see also KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 63 ("[Any pretense of an actual consent is abandoned and replaced by what is effectively a concern with rationally justifiable
interferences.").
231. See, e.g., MRS. GASKELL, CRANFORD 242 (1907) (nicely illustrating the problem with hypothetical rational consent where Martha, upon the loss of her money, exclaims "I'll not listen to
reason .... Reason always means what some one 'else has got to say.' "); KLErNIG, supra note 8, at

63 ("There is a tendency for the rational individual to reflect the understanding and values of upholders of power or the dominant ideology. It [The Argument from Hypothetical Rational Consent] is
therefore prey to idiosyncrasy and partisan constructions."); ROBERT YOUNG, PERSONAL AUTONOMY:
BEYOND NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY 67 (1986) ("Whether we acknowledge distortion or not

tends to turn on what we value. This may circularly lead us to apply our conception of the good for
a person as a criterion for the proper objects of rational and informed consent.").
232. See DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 76, 124; Dworkin, supra note 20, at 119.
233.

Dworkin, supra note 20, at 120; cf. JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING
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tion for this judgment is another appeal to what persons would do. 234 Yet
this only pushes the normative foundation deeper. Thus, hypothetical consent relies not on the supposition that the individual would consent if she
were rational, but instead on the normative judgment that she should consent.235 As Douglas MacLean explains,
In order to yield any answer at all to the question of what a rational person would
choose under ideal conditions, we must assume much more about that person than
formal conditions of rationality, such as consistency. These
further conditions will
236
include assumptions about the values of a rational person.

Because the notion of rationality is necessarily infused with subjective
values, any theory that appeals to hypothetical consent to justify paternalistic actions will justify too much. "Almost any risk accepted by an
agent can form the basis of an intervention on grounds that no rational
237
person would assume the risk."
Despite the masking dangers of hypothetical consent, there are
forms of soft paternalism that serve as legitimate liberty-limiting princiLivEs 80 (1979) ("[Tlhis loophole cannot be stretched far without the autonomy principle collapsing
into utilitarianism."); HUSAK, supra note 6,at 134 ("[Rjelatively weak ... irrationality ... rationale
for interference would open a far wider door to paternalism than almost anyone should accept.");
VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 74 ("[T]he concept of a 'fully rational person' is too indeterminate
a logical construct ....");Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the
"Fresh Start," 45 HASTINGS L.J.
175, 205 n.92 (1994) ("To suggest that persons who fail to perceive
what is in their interest could perceive it if they engaged in a Rawlsian gedanker experiment does
not alter the fact that they do not perceive it, and that others are accordingly acting on their behalf."); Medical Paternalism, supra note 173, at 131 ("[Tlhe identification of the 'informed rational
individual' is often a mask .... The rationale for paternalistic policies is often nothing but the...
rejection of an alternative lifestyle or set of preferences ....");Smiley, supra note 162, at 303-06.
234. Donald VanDeVeer offers an alternative that he calls the "Principle of Hypothetical Individualized Consent (PHIC)." VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 75-81. In VanDeVeer's alternative, the

hypothetical is answered by reference to facts and values of the subject of restriction. The inquiry is
"empirically focused" on the subject. Id. at 83 n.30. VanDeVeer argues that this lessens the imposition of alien values typical in hypothetical rational consent. See id. at 75-81, 234, 336; see also id. at
398-414 (making a similar analysis of paternalism toward prior competents); KLEINIG, supra note 8,

at 59 (making a similar argument in terms of "integrity"). Nevertheless, the agent of paternalism
still retains a not insignificant range of discretion regarding the interpretation and extrapolation of
the subject's preferences. Cf.VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 392.
235. See Kennedy, supra note 40, at 637 ("[T]here is no clear line between what the parties

'would have decided had they adverted to this issue,' 'what reasonable people would have decided
had they adverted to this issue,' and 'what the parties should have decided had they adverted to this
issue.' ").
236. Douglas MacLean, Risk and Consent: Philosophical Issues for Centralized Decisions, in
VALUES AT RISK 25 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986); see also Douglas MacLean, Introduction, in VALUES AT RISK, supra, at 5 ("As the kind of consent becomes more indirect, the role of rationality becomes correspondingly more important.").
237. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 281 (emphasis added).
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ples. Just as society devised limits to make the harm principle workable,
society may specify limits to make soft paternalism workable. Although
necessarily arbitrary to some extent, we can set threshold ages above
which individuals must be to engage in certain kinds of risky conduct.
We can set threshold levels of addictiveness above which substances
must exhibit to render their use less than substantially voluntary. We can
set threshold levels of understanding above which individuals must have
with regard to their conduct in order to engage in it with substantial voluntariness. Soft paternalism is a legitimate and particularly germane liberty-limiting principle in the smoking context. The danger lies in setting
any of these thresholds too low.
In order to maintain conceptual clarity, it is important to demarcate
the justificatory limits of soft paternalism. As Gerald Dworkin explains,
"[i]t is possible to relate [all] cases to the soft paternalistic thesis by
claiming ignorance or weakness of the will, [but] the strategy seems too
ad hoc to be convincing. ' ' 238 Nevertheless, as discussed in the next section, this is precisely the project that Joel Feinberg undertakes in Harm
to Self, the third volume of his treatise, The Moral Limits of the Criminal
Law. 23 9 Whether and to what degree Feinberg succeeds helps to establish
a much-needed distinction between soft and hard paternalism.
III.

REGULATION TO PREVENT HARM TO SELF: HARD PATERNALISM

Hard paternalism is the intentional overriding of an individual's informed and voluntary choice for the sole purpose of benefitting that individual. In this section I will begin by clarifying this definition. Next, I
will demonstrate hard paternalism's plausibility, both descriptively and
normatively, as a liberty-limiting principle. 24° Finally, I will identify the
238. DWORKN, supra note 5, at 125 ("[Tlhis approach seems implausible."); see also HARM
TO SELF, supra note 8, at 181 (calling hypothetical consent a "dangerous counterfeit[] of consent that
cannot have the moral purchasing power of the real thing"); id. at 187 (calling hypothetical consent
"a sham and an outrage"); KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 134 ("Weak paternalistic arguments . . . stretch
the criteria for noncompetence to breaking-point .... ); Dworkin, supra note 20, at 119 (observing
that "[t]he dangers of . . . extensions of [soft] paternalism . . . have been sufficiently exposed by

Berlin in his Two Concepts of Freedom").
239. See infra notes 280-318 and accompanying text.
240. I do not make a complete normative defense of the hard paternalism liberty-limiting principle. Instead, after defining hard paternalism's conceptual boundaries, I merely make a descriptive
case for it, performing the conceptual analysis necessary to recognize hard paternalistic legislation
for what it is. Although I suggest that such legislation might be morally justifiable, I leave a careful
defense of that proposition to another day. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Are There Good Reasons for
Limiting the Liberty of Autonomous Persons: A Definition and Defense of Hard Paternalism (unpublished thesis proposal for Ph.D. dissertation in Philosophy, § V, Georgetown University) (on file with
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limitations of hard paternalism as a liberty-limiting principle.
A. Defining "Hard Paternalism"
Hard paternalism is the position that it is morally justifiable to protect adults against their will from the harmful consequences of their
choices, even when those choices are informed, voluntary, and do not
harm others. The state "protects" the adult by overriding her autonomous decision. Thus, hard paternalism holds that autonomy can be
trumped by beneficence;2 4' that is, the "good" of an individual can out242
weigh her right to self-determination.
As Joel Feinberg explains, hard paternalism "'seems to imply that
. ..the state can know the interests of individual citizens better than the
citizens can know themselves. ' 243 Not surprisingly, this liberty-limiting
principle is widely condemned "because it foists on people a conception
of the good that they, on reflection, find unattractive." ' 244 In part because
the Georgetown University Graduate School, Washington, D.C.).
241. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 281, 271-84 ("Beneficence alone truly
justifies paternalistic actions .... ");see also KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 5. In contrast, soft paternalism sanctions intervention only when and because conduct is not substantially voluntary. See supra
notes 158-75. Douglas Husak offers two ways to conceptualize hard paternalism. The first conception is that "autonomy applies to and protects the decision to take a risk, unless the extent of the
risk exceeds a given critical threshold." HUSAK, supra note 6, at 94. The second conception is that
"autonomy applies to and protects the decision to take any risk, however great. But after the extent
of a risk exceeds a given critical threshold, the protection afforded by the principle of autonomy is
outweighed by the need to prevent persons from harming themselves." Id. The second way is more
clearly recognizable as hard paternalism, allowing the supposed good of an individual to trump her
autonomy. Yet, there is really no difference between the two conceptions. In both, an alternative conception of the good is being imposed. In the first case, it is simply being imposed indirectly.
242. An alternative conception holds that autonomy is a component of a person's good, which
is outweighed by other ingredients of the good. See KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 177.
243. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 23; see also BOVARD, supra note 41, at 224 ("Paternalism presumes that government will serve the people even better than the people could have served
themselves. And why? Because government knows best.").
244. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 134 ("As a principle of public policy [hard paternalism]
has an acrid moral flavor and creates serious risks of government tyranny."); BAYLES, supra note 28,
at 119, 128-32; see also HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 23 ("[L]egal paternalism is . . . arrogant
and demeaning ... patronizing ...."); id. at 60-61, 70, 98 ("We undermine his status as a person
... if we force our better conception of his own good upon him."); HUSAK, supra note 6, at 138-41;
KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 16 ("Being treated paternalistically inclines us to condemn it. We resent
incursions on our autonomy."); id. at 211 ("[P]aternalism is firmly entrenched as a tag of disapproval."); TREBILCOCK, supra note 114, at 150 ("The problems posed by hard paternalism are obvious: once one abandons as the principal reference point an individual's own preferences, the danger
of an authoritarian imposition of others' preferences . . . are relatively unconstrained."); Brock,
supra note 22, at 559 ("[Platernalistic interference involves the claim of one person to know better
what is good for another person than that other person him or herself does."); Dworkin, supra note
20, at 124 (describing paternalism as "imposing a good on someone in that given his current ap-
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our political system rejects the notion of an objectively definable "good
life," the right to self-determination has become the preeminent value in
the United States.2 45 Given this value, it is widely believed that "people
are capable of making up their own minds about what is good for
them. ' 246 Americans are naturally reluctant to give the government the
authority to tell them what is and is not in their own best interests.
The central assumption of hard paternalism is that even when individuals are informed and uncoerced, they often fail to act in their own
best interests. 247 Critics of hard paternalism "resist the suggestion that
there is only one acceptable conception of the 'good.' "248 They maintain
that laws constraining voluntary, informed, and solely self-affecting actions are "profoundly insulting. 21 4 9 Although anti-hard paternalists may
praisal of the facts, he doesn't wish to be restricted"); Feinberg, supra note 173, at 391 ("Those
who are strongly opposed to paternalism find it not only mistaken but arrogant and demeaning.").
Despite the attractiveness of policies aimed at the prevention of tobacco use .. .the moral
defensibility of policies that go beyond education and the protection of nonsmokers is suspect. It is difficult to discern what moral grounds could support such policies, if the grounds
are neither weakly paternalistic nor rooted in the harm principle.
Lavin, supra note 42, at 2426; see also Eric Rakowski, Taking and Saving Lives, 93 COLuM. L. REV.
1063, 1123 (1993); Viscusi, supra note 43, at 1101-02 ("The mere existence of a large risk, however, is not a legitimate rationale for government regulation .. . .In a world of rational choice, with
full information, there would be no rationale ... for interfering with those decisions."); Eyal Zamir,
The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 231 (1998) (recognizing "hostility toward paternalism that characterizes the prevailing liberal discourse").
245. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
246. Capital Broad. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 593 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting).
See also John H. Knowles, The Responsibility of the Individual, 106 DAEDULUS 57, 66 (1977)
("[M]any people won't change their habits . ..and are annoyed with the restrictions on their freedom when someone tries to make them."); David Skinner, Reasons to Smoke, 132 PUB. INTEREST
117, 121 (1998) ("[I]t is hard to see what justifies this usurpation of moral agency.").
247. Goodin describes this as soft paternalism. See GOODIN, supra note 5, at 23 ("What is involved here is a relatively weak form of paternalism, one that works within the individual's own theory of the good and merely imposes upon him a better means of achieving what after all are his own
ends."). However, given the epistemological problems of ascertaining what is, in fact, an individual's
own theory of the good, Goodin's approach is imprudent. It comes very close to engaging in the
same masking as theories of hypothetical consent. See supra notes 227-37 and accompanying text.
248. DANIELS, supra note 182, at 156.
[W]e cannot invasively intervene in his choices on the basis of a myopic focus on what constitutes his own good even if we happen to possess superior insight on that score ....To do
otherwise is to treat [the smoker] as a 'good receptacle' or a 'utility location,' but persons are
not just that. They are arbiters of their own well-being, and not merely sentient, computing,
devices to be kept in good repair.
VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 112; cf BENEDICT SPINOZA, ETHICS 143 (A. Boyle trans., E.P. Dutton
& Co. 1941) (1677) ("One and the same thing can at the same time be good, bad, and indifferent.").
249. See, e.g., Berlin, supra note 123, at 136-37 ("[N]othing is worse than to treat them as if
they were not autonomous . .. whose choices are manipulated by their rulers ....");id. at 157
("Paternalism is despotic ... because it is an insult to my conception of myself as a human being
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concede that people are often poor judges of their own interests,250 they
will not admit that anyone else is in a better position to judge those
interests.2 5'
....");RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 263 (1978);

KLEINIO, supra note 8, at 4
(describing paternalism as "distasteful" and "insulting"); id. at 38 ("demeaning" and "degrading");
KANT, supra note 51, at 58-59 ("If a government were .. .a paternalistic government (imperium
paternale) .. . such a government would be the worst conceivable despotism."); Mead, supra note
40, at 111-12 ("Paternalism .. .is demeaning, for it implies that these individuals cannot manage
their own lives."); Paul Starobin, A World of Risk, 31 NAT'L J. 2006, 2012 (1999) (calling paternalism "undeniably elitist"); Vermont Royster, Thinking Things Over: The Eighth Deadly Sin, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 26, 1986, available in 1986 WL-WSJ 286305 (arguing paternalism is self-righteousness).
250. See, e.g., KLEiNIG, supra note 8, at 29 ("If we are often affronted by the presumption of
paternalists, we ought to be no less astonished at the carelessness, thoughtlessness, and stupidity of
people with respect to the unelevating character or self-destructive potential of their self-regarding
behavior."); id. at 48 ("Despite the interest that people have in their well-being, there is ample evidence that they are often poor judges of it."); Rippel, supra note 182, at 34 ("People do not always
make the right choices for their health or their well-being, but the question is whether others can
better decide for them.").
251. See, e.g., KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 29-30 ("Argument from Paternalistic Distance"); id.
at 183 (quoting Robert Reich who said that " '[s]ubstitution of the choices of bureaucrats for those
of consumers carries with it a not so subtle implication that consumers are powerless, if not incompetent ' "); LEMIEUX, supra note 74, at 48 ("Individual choices are not always optimal, but neither
are the paternalistic state's coercive interventions."); id. at 49 ("There is nothing to suggest that the
state has a superior capability ... or that its ability to make the right choices about the risks people
take in their lives is necessarily better."); RILEY, supra note 42, at 127 ("Given that all are fallible
...the individual ought to decide for himself ...."); TREBILCOCK, supra note 114, at 158 (paraphrasing Matthew 15:14 and stating that state paternalism is "a quintessential case of the socially
constructed blind leading the blind"); Richard J. Arneson, Paternalism, in 7 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 250, 251 (Edward Craig ed., 1998) ("[Hlumans, including the humans who
would administer any paternalistic rule, are imperfectly rational, imperfectly well-informed, and not
always disposed to be moral."); Dworkin, supra note 20, at 125 ("[R]ational men knowing something about the resources of ignorance, ill-will, and stupidity available to the law-makers of a society
...will be concerned to limit such intervention to a minimum."); Gerald Dworkin, Autonomy, in A
COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 359, 361 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Petit
eds., 1993) ("[Tjhe state must not justify its actions on the basis that some ways of life are intrinsically better than others."); Goodin, supra note 195, at 237; Daniel B. Klein, The Moral Consequences of Paternalism, 44 THE FREEMAN 238 (1994); Rippel, supra note 182, at 34 ("[P]eople still
prefer to choose . . . rather than have somebody else making those decisions for them."); John
Skorupski, Introduction to CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MILL 1 (John Skorupski ed., 1998) (arguing
that modern liberalism grounds liberty in value neutrality or epistemological barriers, in contrast to
classical liberalism which held liberty as a substantive ideal); cf. New, supra note 173, at 71, 75, 81
(arguing that individuals are subject to various reasoning failures, paternalism is justified only if the
state can "make these decisions better than individuals."). Even if they were to make this concession, that would not mean the paternalism was justified. There is a value in choosing apart from the
wisdom or consequences of the choice. In other words, autonomy has both an intrinsic and an instrumental value. See, e.g., BOVARD, supra note 41, at 222 ("Paternalism perceives happiness as deriving
solely from a final result ... [blut happiness is also the result of an active pursuit of one's own values."); GLOVER, supra note 233, at 81 ("[P]eople can mind more about expressing themselves than
about the standard of result."); KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 30-32 ("[Elven if they do not make the
best choices, there is a value in choosing ....");KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 103-04. Indeed, this
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Applying the Hard Paternalism Liberty-Limiting Principle
Protecting public health on the basis of hard paternalism has not al-

ways been so controversial. 2 2 Today, however, it seems that hard paternalism is universally rejected.25 3 Autonomous "self-affecting behaviors,
seems to be the point of the classic dystopian novels in which there was adequate security but little
liberty or freedom. See, e.g., RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953); ALDUOus HUXLEY, BRAVE
NEW WORLD (1939); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949); YEVGENY ZAMYATIN, WE (Mirra Ginsburg

trans., 1972) (1952).
252. Before the 1960s paternalism was still offered (and accepted!) as a policy rationale. See
Berger, supra note 23, at 23 ("Puritan impulses were rather muted in the post-1960's culture
....");Starobin, supra note 249, at 2007-08 ("By the prosperous and secure 1950s, paternalism
had become the unquestioned establishment ethos .... It was the Sixties' New Left, with its commitment to radical individualism, that struck the first blow against the paternalistic compact that governed 1950s America."). It was not until the late 1960s that individualism, in the wake of the consumer protection and civil rights movements, became firmly established. See generally ROBERT H.
BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 56-65 (1996);

FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 18, at 86-132; ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIoETHIcs (1998);
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING (1991); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:

RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 24-30 (1990).
Although paternalism was better received before the 1960s, that dark history serves as a better
argument against paternalism than "a volume of logic." Cf New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S.
345, 349 (1921). Paternalistic rationales were often (and sometimes still are) employed to justify
gender, racial, and other invidious discrimination. See, e.g., KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 78, 171;
Jack D. Douglas, Cooperative Paternalism Versus Conflictual Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 171,
197-98 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983); Zamir, supra note 244, at 281. For gender discrimination, see, for
example, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (striking on 5th Amendment due process
grounds a military regulation that presumed only female spouses are dependents for benefits purposes). The Frontiero court noted that "[tlraditionally, [discrimination against women] was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." Id. at 684 (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872), which
upheld a state law refusing to grant women, for their own good, the license to practice law). For racial discrimination, see, for example, KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 171; Anita L. Allen & Thaddeus
Pope, Social Contract Theory, Slavery, and the Antebellum Courts, in A COMPANION TO AFRICANAMERICAN PHILOSOPHY (Tommy Lott & John Pittman eds., forthcoming 2000). For disability discrimination, see, for example, Harlan Hahn, Paternalism and Public Policy, 20 SoC'Y 36 (1983); Mike
Jackman, Enabling the Disabled: Paternalism is Enemy No. 1, PERSPECTIVES: CIv. RTs. Q., Winter/
Spring 1983, at 22.
253. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra
note 9, at 278 ("[S]trong paternalism is rejected by most writers ....");KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 9
("Ceteris paribus, the stronger the paternalism, the heavier the burden on the interferer ....");
KULTGEN, supra note 24, at ix ("Most authors who write about paternalism condemn it in most of its
forms."); Robert E. Goodin, Permissible Paternalism: In Defense of the Nanny State, 1 RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY 42, 42 (1991) ("Paternalism is desperately out of fashion."); Hayry, supra note 27, at
449 ("The paternalistic attitude has been widely discredited .... ");cf. MARK A.R. KLEIMAN,
AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS 291 (1992); Bayer, supra note 114, at 150-51 ("The argument for [liberty] restrictions must, however, always be that the public's health is in danger, not
that the competent individual's well-being, survival, or liberty are in danger."). But see infra notes
340-41.
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however harmful, tend to be seen as falling within a sphere of individual
freedom. ' 254 In the context of smoking, Joel Feinberg argues that "a
demonstrated danger to the user is a necessary condition of justified government prohibition of a dangerous substance on self-regarding
grounds. ' 255 However, Feinberg argues, it is not a sufficient condition;
there must also be "a further showing that the users do not voluntarily
choose to run the risks. ' 25 6 In the United States there is a strong individual rights attitude which holds that "as long as individuals understand
the hazards involved, they should be free to engage in [any] risky activ' 257
ity that provides personal satisfaction.
I argue that in spite of this liberal attitude, hard paternalism is frequently the unrecognized but fundamental ethical justification of much
public health law. It is unrecognized because it is usually masked by an
appeal to the harm principle or to the soft paternalism principle.2 58 One
hundred years ago, there was widespread consensus "that the state
should extend special protection to those who are incapable of judging
their own best interest, or of taking care of themselves .. .and .. .in
[public health] matters the public at large are thus incompetent. ' 259 As
Robert Goodin explains, even today "[w]e do not leave it to the discre254. DANIELS, supra note 182, at 142; see also Wikler & Beauchamp, supra note 6, at 1369
("Much of the bioethics literature on lifestyles indicates that the choices posing the greatest problem
for public-health authorities are those which involve personal or intimate behavior, are entirely selfregarding, and represent fully voluntary behavior.").
255. Joel Feinberg, Review Essay, 5 BIOETHICS 150, 151 (1991) (reviewing ROBERT E.
GOODIN, No SMOKING: THE ETHICAL ISSUES (1989)).

256. Id.
257. RABIN & SUGARMAN, supra note 21, at 7; see also Dworkin, supra note 251, at 361
("[Tihe state must recognize and acknowledge the autonomy of persons .... In order to recognize
this ideal of autonomy the state must not justify its actions on the basis that some ways of life are
intrinsically better than others."); Rabin, supra note 5, at 479 ("Once information about risk has
been adequately conveyed, the standard liberal position holds that individual choice should be
respected rather than limited."); id. at 482 ("[O]ur political culture has resisted telling individuals
what is good for them .... ); Weale, supra note 52, at 169 ("[Tjhe chief objection to paternalistic
intervention is that it interferes with the autonomy of the individual ....").Interestingly, legal moralism is more widely accepted as a liberty limiting principle, at least in the context of constitutional
analysis. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (upholding Indiana's ban
on nude dancing against a First Amendment challenge because protection of morals is a substantial
government interest); id. at 574-75 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[There is no basis for thinking that our
society has ever shared that Thoreauvian 'you-may-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-injuresomeone-else' beau ideal-much less for thinking that it was written into the Constitution . . . .Our
society prohibits . . . certain activities . . . because they are considered . . . immoral.").

258. See supra notes 115-49 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 227-37 and accompanying text.
259.

John S. Billings, Introduction, to TREATISE ON HYGIENE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 38 (Albert

H. Buck ed., 1879).
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tion of consumers, however well-informed, whether or not to drink
grossly polluted water, ingest grossly contaminated foods, or inject
grossly dangerous drugs. '2 60 Hard paternalism may be appropriate in
some contexts but not others. Goodin continues: "Ordinarily it is not the
business of public policy to prevent people from relying on false inferences from full information that would harm only themselves. Sometimes,
however, it

' 26 1

is."

1. Overt Hard Paternalism: Laetrile and Outdoor Smoking Bans
The controversy in the 1970's surrounding the drug laetrile is a classic example of hard paternalism in public health regulation. 262 Laetrile
was introduced as a cancer-fighting drug, though, in fact, no study
proved that the drug offered any clinical benefit. 263 Nevertheless, terminally ill patients fought desperately for the right to use laetrile; the drug
gave them hope, even if it did not necessarily provide any medical
benefit. 64
The FDA denied these cancer patients the opportunity to try laetrile
even though the patients were fully aware of its shortcomings and potential side effects. 265 Because the FDA could not adequately justify its denial by invoking the harm principle,2 66 or soft patemalism, 267 a federal
260. GOODIN, supra note 5, at 30-31 (emphasis added).
261. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
262. See, e.g., VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 323 ("So long as competent persons are aware of
the results of scientific studies-so that their choices do not reflect ignorance of relevant data-a paternalistic prohibition of laetrile seems unjustified."); Beauchamp, supra note 33, at 1918; Caplan,
supra note 14, at 145 ("[T]here is little justification for asking mature adults to subscribe to a system in which laetrile is restricted for sale and use."); Lisa H. Newton, Liberty and Laetrile: Implications of Right of Access, 15 J. VALUE INQUIRY 55, 66 (1981); Thompson, supra note 124, at 267 (arguing that "paternalistic prohibition of its use would be justifiable" only if FDA can show that "the
decision to use [Laetrile] is substantially impaired"). Another popular example of FDA hard paternalism concerns breast implants. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF
MEDICINE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996); Marcia Angell, Breast Implants: Pro-

tection or Paternalism, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1695 (1992); Beauchamp, supra note 33, at 1918-19
(arguing that the issue of "breast implants exemplifies paternalistic controversies that have beset the
FDA"); Lisa S. Parker, Social Justice, Federal Paternalism, and Feminism: Breast Implants in the
Cultural Context of Female Beauty, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 57 (1993).

263.
(reviewing
264.
CosM. L.J.

See Arnold S. Relman, Closing the Books on Laetrile, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 236 (1982)
the major studies).
See, e.g., Richard M. Cooper, Laetrile-Of Choice and Effectiveness, 38 FOOD DRUG
417, 420 (1983); J.C. Holland, Why Patients Seek Unproven CancerRemedies: A Psycho-

logical Perspective, CANCER J. FOR CLINICIANS, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 10; Newton, supra note 262, at 65.

265. See Laetrile, 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768, 39,803 (1977). But see HUSAK, supra note 6, at 137
(arguing that patients were misinformed).
266. Patients' use of laetrile does slow research of other drugs. See Caplan, supra note 14, at
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district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that patients had a right to laetrile. 268 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision of the lower courts in Rutherford v. United
States,269 accepting the FDA's argument that because the drug had not
been proven clinically effective, there were no benefits to outweigh the
risks inherent in taking the drug. 270 Because there were only risks and no
benefits, the net benefit of taking laetrile was negative. Thus, the FDA
and the Supreme Court denied terminally ill patients the right to take laetrile because according to the economic model of choice, their desire to
take it was irrational and did not deserve to be honored.
The same hard paternalism used to justify the FDA's denial of laetrile can-and in fact, already does-justify tobacco regulation. Some
people smoke despite the costs. They are fully rational, knowledgeable,
and are able to accurately assess the consequences of smoking, including
potential addiction. To them, the pleasures of smoking simply outweigh
the costs. Because such people constitute a large proportion of smokers
and because these people often smoke in circumstances in which there is
no significant harm to others, much tobacco regulation is plausibly justifiable only as hard paternalism. 7 '
Take, for example, the recent bans on smoking in outdoor areas like
beaches and parks. 27 2 In these places the low concentration of ETS can
hardly cause irritation, much less disease.273 Therefore, these regulations
cannot seriously be justified on the basis of the harm principle. As applied to adults who make the decision to smoke with substantial auton140. Still, this unquantifiable and indirect harm is not of the type identified in section one sufficient
to invoke the harm principle.
267. There may have been some soft paternalistic basis for the denial, though it was not a major factor in the ethical and constitutional debate that surrounded this case. See supra notes 136-48
and accompanying text. The Commissioner pointed out that laetrile, unlike traditional cancer treatments, did not have painful side effects. Thus, when cancer patients took laetrile, they sometimes
falsely believed that their condition was ameliorated. See Rutherford v. United States, 442 U.S. 544,
557 n.15 (1979) (citing 42 Fed. Reg. at 39,777, 39799-800).
268. See Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1215 (W.D. Okla. 1975), aff'd, 542
F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
269. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
270. See id. at 559.
271.

Cf. KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 167.

272. See supra note 101.
273. See supra note 146. Even more extreme hard paternalism underlies the proposed Universal Tobacco Settlement, which anticipated the complete ban of cigarettes after 2009. See S. 1415,
105th Cong. §§ 907(e)(1) & 3(6) (1997) (allowing FDA to "completely eliminate the nicotine yields
in a tobacco product"). But see id. at § 903 (forbidding FDA from prohibiting "the sale and distribution of a tobacco product solely on the basis of the fact that tobacco causes disease.").
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omy, such regulations can neither be justified on the basis of soft paternalism.2 7 4 Outdoor smoking bans can thus only be justified on hard
paternalistic grounds.
One such ban was passed expressly and admittedly on the basis of
hard paternalism. In 1996, the city council of the Maryland village of
Friendship Heights, just outside Washington, D.C., passed an ordinance
that prohibited smoking outdoors everywhere in the village except the
two main commercial streets. 275 The ordinance was the most restrictive of
its kind in the United States. 276 Surprisingly, the city council admitted
277
that the ordinance was the result of a governmental "judgment call.
Rather than attempting to justify the regulation on the basis of harm to
others or lack of autonomy, the law's drafter explained, "Just as we regulate what's in the best interest of the community with seat-belt laws, alcohol restrictions, and motorcycle helmets, in this case we're trying to
persuade people to stop smoking with a little gentle pressure. ' 278 The
Friendship Heights ordinance, had it been enforced, would have restricted
279
smokers' liberty for their own good.
2. Masked Hard Paternalism: Feinberg and His Soft Paternalistic
Strategy
Joel Feinberg argues that hard paternalism is never justified. 280 At
the same time he admits that many quite reasonable laws seem to have
hard paternalistic rationales. 28' In order to reconcile these two positions,
274. See supra notes 159-77.
275. See Karl Vick, Maryland Village Votes to Ban Nearly All Outdoor Smoking, WASH. POST,
Oct. 16, 1996, at D4.
276. The ordinance, as written, was one of the more restrictive anti-smoking laws ever drafted
and proposed. However, it was never approved or enforced. Friendship Heights is an unincorporated
municipality and its ordinances must be approved by Montgomery County in which it is situated.
The village discarded the ordinance because county approval was unlikely. See Manuel Perez-Rivas,
Montgomery Snuffs Another Smoking Curb, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1996, at B 1.
277. See Janet Firschein, Physician-Mayor Fights for Nation's Toughest Smoking Ban, AM.
MED. NEWS, Nov. 4, 1996, at 6.
278. Michael Janofsky, No Smoking Section: Entire Village?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1996, at 8
(emphasis added).
279. This assumes, of course, that what the Council says genuinely expresses its reasons. Cf
KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 17 n.10, 178.
280. See HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 15; HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 26, 54-55,
59-61. But see HARMLESS WRON DOING, supra note 20, at 319-23 (making the "trivial" concession
that paternalism puts some weight, though not decisive weight, on the decisional scales).
281. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 25, 98; see also Feinberg, supra note 173, at 391
("[I]f we reject paternalism altogether, we seem to fly in the face both of common sense and of
long-established customs and laws.").
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Feinberg argues that what seems like hard paternalism can often be adequately explained as soft paternalism. 282 He calls his "strategy for dealing
with apparently reasonable paternalistic regulations from a liberal (anti284
paternalistic) point of view" 283 the "soft paternalistic strategy.
Feinberg's soft paternalistic strategy justifies restrictions of liberty
on the grounds that individual behavior is not substantially autonomous,
or in his own words, "voluntary enough. ' 285 He is careful to emphasize
that "eccentric, even 'unreasonable' judgments of the relative worthwhileness of that which is risked and that which is gained do not count
against voluntariness at all."'286 Feinberg makes the point "over and over
again: one can quite voluntarily be unreasonable. ' 28 7 For Feinberg, intervention is never justified simply because an action is risky or even extremely risky. He argues, "[T]here must be a right to err, to be mistaken,
282. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 19, 25 ("Often legitimate government intervention in
dangerous situations is not intended to prevent harm so much as to guarantee voluntariness."); id.
141-42; see also Bayles, supra note 141, at 109 ("The soft paternalist strategy against hard paternalism is to show that hard paternalism is implausible and not needed to handle any plausible legislation."); Kennedy, supra note 40, at 643 ("The plausibility of principled anti-patemalism is therefore
linked to the ability to dismiss or to explain away cases in which one wants to act paternalistically
but can't rationalize the action in terms of incapacity.").
283. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 141-42.
284. Id. at 26, 62, 98-99, 113, 141-42, 172-73, 175.
285. Id. at 118, 154, 158-60.
286. Id. at 159; see also id. at 12, 112, 119, 159, 360-61.
One cannot argue a priori that persons who do such things are acting nonvoluntarily .... Although there might be empirical evidence for the nonvoluntary character of many such actions, it is unlikely that all such acts will be nonvoluntary. I do not see how one can rule out
the possibility that hard paternalism may be the only position that can justify restrictions on
such actions.
DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 126; see also GERT Er AL., supra note 175, at 208 ("It is crucial not to
confuse irrational decisions with unusual or unpopular ones .... "); VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at
133, 245 ("It is clear that autonomous choices are not necessarily prudent choices."). Feinberg distinguishes "irrational" choices from ones that are merely unreasonable. Intervention with the former
are justified. However, it will be rare that the decision to smoke can be fairly characterized as irrational. See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking and Other Risky Behaviors, 28 J. DRUG ISSUEs
645, 659 (1998) ("Smokers, through their greater proclivity to bear risks of all kinds, clearly meet
[one] aspect of a rationality test.").
287. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 137; see also id. at 184, 321; cf. Application of President
& Dir. of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Burger, J., dissenting)
(denying rehearing en banc of an order issued by a single appellate judge authorizing a blood transfusion against a patient's wishes) ("Nothing in this utterance suggests that Justice Brandeis thought
that an individual possessed these rights [to privacy] only as to sensible beliefs, valid thoughts, reasonable emotions, or well-founded sensations. I suggest he intended to include a great many foolish,
unreasonable, and even absurd ideas.
...); KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 150 ("If reasonableness is
not distinct from voluntariness, then the criteria are subject to a type of 'Catch-22' application
whereby the subject will be determined to lack voluntariness in just those instances in which she rejects the values of the paternalistic agent."); VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 418.
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to decide falsely, to take big risks, if there is to be any meaningful selfrule. "288

Feinberg maintains that intervention is justified only when behavior
is not voluntary or autonomous enough. Explaining that "the state has
the right to prevent self-regarding harmful conduct when but only when it
is substantially non-voluntary, ' 28 9 he argues that "legitimate government
intervention in dangerous situations is not intended to prevent harms so
much as to guarantee voluntariness. ' ' 29° The central question, and the one
to which Feinberg devotes the bulk of Harm to Self, asks what conditions
make an action substantially voluntary.
In defining what is "voluntary enough," Feinberg argues that the
greater the risk or the gravity of the harm, the higher the level of volun292
tariness that should be required. 29' This is not an unfamiliar principle.
288. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 62; see also id. at 109.
289. Id. at 126 (emphasis added); see also id. at 110 ("[lit is a lack of voluntariness that justifies interference with a person's liberty for his own good, not lack of 'rationality.' "); id. at 119
("The defining purpose of soft paternalism is to prevent people from suffering harm that they have
not truly chosen to suffer ....");id. at 261, 351.
290. Id. at 142; see also BEAUCHAMP & MCCULLOUGH, supra note 173, at 92 ("[Ijntervention
in the lives of such individuals is justified by the weak paternalist's standard only ifthere is questionable autonomy, and not alone because their actions are dangerous or unreasonable."); HAYRY,
supra note 173, at 9 ("[T]he justification for the use of force is the agent's mental state, not the potential harm.").
[T]he concern in cases of so-called weak paternalism is not with the wisdom of whatever it is
that has elicited the imposition, but with whether whatever that is genuinely represents the
person's will. So, the focus of attention and ground for interference ... is not the danger involved, but the fact that it [was not voluntary].
KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 9; see also id. at 101-02 ("Whether it is bizarre depends on the reasons for
it, and not simply on its content."); Beauchamp, The Regulation of Hazards, supra note 27, at 246
("[Ijt is only because there is questionable voluntariness or definite nonvoluntariness that intervention in their lives is justified, not because of the dangerous or unreasonable character of their action."); Medical Paternalism, supra note 173, at 135; C.L. TEN, MILL ON LIBERTY 112 (1980)
("Weak paternalism ... is not a cloak for enforcing the values and preferences of the person interfering on society at large."); id. at 109 (distinguishing the "decision-aspect" and the "consequenceaspect" of a subject's conduct and arguing that soft paternalists must focus only on the former).
291. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 117, 118-24, 127. Richard Arneson describes this as
a "sliding scale" of autonomy rights because if the presumption varies with voluntariness and voluntariness varies with the risk, then transitively the presumption varies with the risk. See Arneson,
supra note 251, at 252.
292. See, e.g., CALLAHAN, supra note 7, at 194-95 (requiring serious and demonstrable harm
and only slight and transitory interventions); DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 127 (supporting intervention
when it poses only a "minimal risk of harm to them at the cost of a trivial interference with their
freedom"); KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 182 ("In a significant concession to common sense, Feinberg
asserts that the line will differ according to the kind of intervention."); JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 249 (1971) ("It is also rational for [smokers] to protect themselves against their own irrational inclinations by consenting to a scheme of penalties that may give them a sufficient motive to
avoid foolish actions and by accepting certain impositions designed to undo the unfortunate conse-
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Feinberg appeals to this intuitive approach and argues for a contextrelative means of determining the level of "voluntariness" required to
immunize a choice from paternalistic interference. 293 Thus, the line between soft and hard paternalism varies with the behavior at issue and the
risks it imposes.
Feinberg takes this approach one step further, arguing that sometimes when the risk and harm is very substantial, the state can safely presume that the act is not voluntary. 294 He writes, "a choice may be so extremely and unusually unreasonable that we might reasonably suspect
that it stems at least in part as the product of impairment."2 95 For example, if we saw someone about to chop off her hand, Feinberg believes we
would be justified in intervening not because chopping off one's hand is
a very bad idea but because it is so outrageous and uncommon that we
can presume with near certainty that the individual is not acting autono296
mously; she probably does not really want to chop off her hand. Simi-

quences of their imprudent behavior."); Unwin, supra note 21, at 43 (arguing that there should be
"balance between the degree of infringement of personal liberty and the amount of benefit to be
gained.").
293. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 117, 146, 261, 309, 335, 338; HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 20, at xviii ("I treat voluntariness as a 'variable concept,' determined by varying
standards depending on the nature of the circumstances .... ").
294. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 103. This presumption is in principle rebuttable. But
practical difficulties make this unlikely. See id. at 125, 127 n.23, 174-75; see also HARMLESS
WRONGDOING, supra note 20, at xviii, 331 ("Unreasonableness is not the same thing as involuntariness, of course, but extreme unreasonableness creates a strong presumption of nonvoluntariness that
would be difficult to rebut, and the state might even be justified in making the presumption conclusive for practical reasons."). Feinberg does not think smoking is so unreasonable as to raise the presumption of nonvoluntariness. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 134 (arguing it is sufficient to
"confront smokers with the ugly medical facts").
295. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 132-33; see also id. at 62, 79, 101-02, 120 (arguing that
some actions are "so bizarre that they raise the suspicion of general irrationality or insanity, which
of course annuls voluntariness"); id. at 124 ("[W]hen the act in question is of a type that is rarely
chosen voluntarily . . . [tihis statistical information may rightly make us suspicious of the voluntariness .... "); id.at 125-27, 160-62 (arguing that some conduct is "so unreasonable as to raise the
suspicion of impaired capacity"); id. at 266-67, 308; HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 116
("[W]hen the consented-to-behavior seems so patently harmful that no sane person could ever consent to it, we may properly assume that the consenter is not sane ...."); HARMLESS WRONGDOING,
supra note 20, at 215 (explaining that intervention is not paternalistic when the conduct is "flagrantly irrational"); cf. KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 188-89 (advocating a ban of those consumer goods
that almost nobody would voluntarily purchase but noting the costs involved in such an approach);
NIKKU, supra note 6, at 86-87, 145; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 268 (arguing that bizarre conduct
"may be evidence that the intender is incompetent"); id. at 270 ("[W]e may be justified in intervening to find out whether the person is competent.").
296. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 124-27. Intervention in such circumstances is
thought to be justified only as a temporary measure-i.e. just long enough to determine whether or
not the individual engaging in bizarre conduct is, in fact, doing so substantially voluntarily. This
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larly, the state, faced with an outrageous public health problem, might
297
presume that smokers do not autonomously decide to smoke.
Of course, some and perhaps many smokers do smoke autonomously; regulations based on the presumption that all smokers act without substantial voluntariness are therefore necessarily overinclusive. Feinberg is probably right to accept the overinclusive nature of these
presumptions as an unfortunate but practically unavoidable part of legislation, 298 for laws are necessarily general and their blanket application
will prohibit even autonomous behavior.2 99 "[G]iven the costs and other
practical difficulties . . . the state often will simply ban the . . . activity
in question, presuming non-voluntariness conclusively. ' ' 300 It would not
be feasible to make ad hoc determinations of autonomy. 30 1 But can Feinprinciple seems to underlie the waiting period requirement for very serious and controversial conduct
such as abortion or sterilization. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 883, 885 (1991); 42 C.F.R. § 50.201 (1999).
297. Feinberg provides only very extreme examples of when the presumption of nonvoluntariness is most plausible. See, e.g., HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 126. He admits, however,
that these "hardly fit the more usual examples of risky choice making." Feinberg, supra note 173, at
392. If the soft paternalistic strategy is limited to a few outrageous examples, then it is not useful for
the very purposes for which Feinberg devised it. Of course, as the social meaning of smoking
changes, it may someday automatically raise suspicion of lack of voluntariness. Cf. Garrison Keillor,
Where There's Smoke, There's Ire, AM. HEALTH, Dec. 1989, at 50 (comparing smoking to taking out
a dead rat and chewing on it).
298. But see VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 93 (criticizing Feinberg's approach as "overly permissive with regard to state intervention.").
299. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 128; cf. NIKKU, supra note 6, at 64-65; Hunt, supra
note 141, at 317 ("Clearly, however, prohibitions against self-inflicted harm in general will apply on
the presumption that the actions prohibited are substantially non-voluntary and thus may well apply
to actions which in fact are voluntary .... ") (emphasis added); id. at 318 ("[Soft paternalism] must
in practice impose constraints even on voluntary self-inflicted harms.").
300. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 174-75; see also HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 116
("[I]f our sole evidence of insanity or other invalidating nonresponsibility is the patently harmful
character of the agreed-to conduct itself ... then we cannot invalidate the consent without reasoning
in a circle."); id. at 79, 125 ("The presumption, however, should always be taken as rebuttable in
principle."); id. at 133 (requiring other evidence of nonvoluntariness to avoid circularity); id. at 188,
258, 326, 351, 354, 374, 391 n.23 (rebuttable in principle but not in reality); HUSAK, supra note 6, at
135. Some smokers might meet the higher threshold of voluntariness but the "law, necessarily expressed in general terms, should be responsive to the most common, typical reason why persons assume risks." HUSAK, supra note 6, at 132; see also Caplan, supra note 14, at 145; Hyry, supra note
27, at 296.
301. Although this limitation has much intuitive appeal, Feinberg has been rightly criticized
for espousing it. If, as Feinberg argues, autonomy is an un-trumpable principle, it should not be
overridden in the face of administrative costs. See, e.g., KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 183 ("Feinberg's
position is in danger of collapsing into [paternalism] where the sliding marker stops in determining
questions of utility for the beneficiary, not by his autonomy as a moral trump card."); VANDEVEER,
supra note 6, at 92-94 (arguing that "there is a moral presumption against the legitimacy of invasive
interference and no compelling reason why adult persons themselves should have to establish their
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berg presume a lack of substantial autonomy from the very nature of the
act itself?302 It seems he is smuggling in the very same evaluative judgments he expressly disavows.
What Feinberg overlooks is that the assessment of a risk as extreme
or unusual is not a wholly objective enterprise. 30 3 He does recognize that
assessments of unreasonableness necessarily involve imposing our own
value judgments of what is worthwhile and rational. 3°4 However, Feinberg ignores the fact that a presumption of non-voluntariness involves the
same evaluative elements.30 5
competence . . . . [T]he epistemological burden [should] not be placed on the shoulders of restricted
competent subjects .... "); YOUNG, supra note 231, at 75 (arguing that "we already find it needful
and possible to test voluntariness in other important legal matters"); Richard J. Arneson, Paternalisn, Utility, and Fairness, 43 REV. INT'L PHIL. 409, 426-27 (1989); Norman 0. Dahl, Against Legal
Paternalism, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 67, 75 (1988) (reviewing Joel Feinberg's HARM TO SELF (1984))
("[I]f the right to autonomy is as strong as Feinberg says that it is, then why shouldn't it be protected in spite of these additional costs? If such laws really are justified, then the right to autonomy
doesn't seem to be as strong as Feinberg says it is; and the door to legal paternalism is left open.");
Hunt, supra note 141, at 322; SCHONSHECK, supra note 25, at 160-74 (arguing against the feasibility
of a "voluntariness tribunal"). But cf. VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 327 & n.28 (allowing the costs
of protecting autonomy to justify restriction). There is one instance for which Feinberg seems to allow for ad hoc determinations. Feinberg suggests that requests for euthanasia can be honored with
adequate evidence. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 349; cf Dworkin, supra note 20, at 124;
KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 131. Such an evidentiary standard has been implemented in Oregon for
physician-assisted suicide. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (Supp. 11 1998); see also Arthur E.
Chin et al., Legalized Physician Assisted Suicide in Oregon-The First Year's Experience, 340 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 577 (1999).

302. It is a central tenet of soft paternalism that temporary restrictions are justifiable in order
to determine voluntariness. However, Feinberg's version of soft paternalism makes the restriction
presumptively and conclusively. This seems to underscore the importance of ensuring that the presumption is sound.
303. See generally MacLean, supra note 236; KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS (1991); KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETrE,
SCIENCE, POLICY, ETHICS AND ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY (1985); Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Values,
Scientific Objectivity and Risk Analysis: Five Dilenmas, in QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT: BIOMEDICAL ETHICS REVIEWS 159 (James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder eds., 1987); cf Bernard
Gert & Charles M. Culver, The Justification of Paternalism, 89 ETHICS 199, 207 n. I I (1979). Fein-

berg recognized with respect to the harm principle that after more precisely defining it with mediating maxims, it lost its "normative neutrality." HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at xii, 3; see also HARM
TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 25. He also recognizes that in determining risk, a legislature must consider not only a conduct's magnitude and probability of harm but also the "independent value of the
risk-creating conduct." HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 191; see also HARM TO SELF, supra note

8, at 101-02. Feinberg apparently fails to see that voluntariness, which is similarly malleable, cannot
be normatively neutral.
304. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 103 ("[Tlhe risk decision may defy objective assessment because of its component value judgments."); id. at 110-1l1, 119.
305. Admittedly, Feinberg does note that voluntariness will vary depending on what is taken
as the relevant background or perspective, the "norms of expectability," the "benchmark," the
"baseline." HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 128 (noting that "the term 'norm' can always mask an
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One cannot determine the voluntariness of a decision without considering the content of the decision itself. The enterprise of identifying
activities for which higher levels of voluntariness ought to be required is
implicitly based on judgments regarding the value or importance of those
activities.3°6 Decision scientist and risk expert Paul Slovik explains:
[R]isk is socially constructed. Risk assessment is inherently subjective and represents a blending of science and judgment with important psychological, social, cultural, and political factors. . . .If you define risk one way, then one option will
rise to the top .... If you define it another way ...

you will get a different order-

evaluative element").
306. See, e.g., GLOVER, supra note 233, at 180 (arguing that our intuitions regarding the
boundaries of paternalistic legislation are shaped by "social traditions"); KLEINIG, supra note 8, at
52 ("Judgments of competence cannot be detached completely from cultural expectations, and there
is a tendency to read any marked deviation from convention as evidence of incompetence."); id. at
101 ("[T]o call [conduct] bizarre [so to create a presumption of nonvoluntariness] is to go a long
way toward begging the question at issue."); KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 236, 241 (discussing
Smiley); NIKKU supra note 6, at 163; TEN, supra note 290, at 116-17; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at
317, 358-61 & n.11 (observing that the threshold of voluntary enough is a line set by changing social standards); YOUNG, supra note 231, at 67; Angell, supra note 262, at 1695 (explaining that risks
in the case of breast implants are not objective but have to do with "personal judgments about the
quality of life, which are subjective and unique to each woman."); Robert H. Bork, Government Efforts to Deal With Tobacco Betrays an Ultimate Ambition to Control Americans' Lives, NAT. REV.,
July 25, 1997, at 28 (noting that "[a]utomobiles kill tens of thousands of people every year and disable perhaps that many again. We could easily stop the slaughter. Cars could be made with a top
speed of ten miles an hour and with exteriors the consistency of marshmallows. Nobody would die,
nobody would be disabled, and nobody would bother with cars very much."); Dan W. Brock, A
Case for Limited Paternalism,4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 79, 87 (1985) (reviewing JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM (1984)) ("[Platernalistic balancing takes place as part of the determination of competence .... ); Dershowitz, supra note 18, at 151-53 (comparing how the self-imposed risk of an elderly widow was judged to be unacceptable but similar conduct by an elderly male Supreme Court
Justice was permitted); Dripps, supra note 117, at 10 (explaining that the line between those activities permitted and those not permitted is not drawn on the basis of harmfulness alone but also on the
basis of social value ascribed to activities); Kasachkoff, supra note 24, at 414-15 (arguing, at least
with respect to drugs, that "benevolence alone does not explain our willingness to legally restrict our
fellow citizens' behavior" and that morals and ideals also underlie the restriction); Paternalism and
Bio-Behavioral Control, supra note 173, at 72 ("The difficulty of disentangling judgments of unreasonableness and abnormality from judgments of moral attitude and evaluative outlook is notoriously
difficult."); Robert L. Schwartz, Lifestyle Health Status, and Distributive Justice, 3 HEALTH MATRIX
195, 211 (1993) ("High risk activities of the rich and famous-skiing, high stress life styles (sic),
flying private planes, scuba diving-seem acceptable. High risk activities of the poor-smoking,
overeating, drinking-seem to be morally unacceptable."); Smiley, supra note 162, at 303 ("Feinberg appears able to avoid a direct reference to assessment of an individual's ends only by assuming
. ..standards or normalcy."); id. at 307 ("He ends up smuggling the seriousness of harm into his
criteria for deciding whether or not an individual has chosen freely."); Robert D. Tollison & Richard
E. Wagner, Tobacco and Public Policy: A Constitutional Perspective, in SMOKING: WHO HAS THE
RIGHT? 292, 301 (Jeffrey A. Schaler & Magda E. Schaler eds., 1998) ("What about skiing, mountain
climbing, hang gliding, drinking alcohol, and working long hours? Are the risks 'too high'? By
whose standard?").
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Defining risk is thus an exercise in power.3° 7

The determination of risk is based on assumption-laden theoretical models. Evaluative assumptions underlie, for example, the way in which the
risk is measured-for example, by number of deaths or by number of
injuries.
The subjective nature of risk assessment does not necessarily mean
that we cannot justify the classification of some activities as more risky
(and thus requiring a higher level of autonomy). However, it does preclude such classification from being properly characterized as part of a
"soft paternalistic strategy."308 Such identification involves the surreptitious substitution of values and is therefore more appropriately character3°9
ized as hard paternalism.
Feinberg's explanation of hard paternalism as soft paternalism can
best be exposed as an ad hoc move by looking at a diagram 310 he uses to
explain his strategy:
More or Less Voluntary
Assumption of Risk to Oneself

Less Than Voluntary
Assumption of Risk to Oneself

Reasonable risk of harm

(1) E.g. most of daily activities
of life.

(2) E.g. drunk sandwich ordering

Unreasonable risk of harm

(3) E.g. cigarette smoking

(4) E.g. drunk driving on a private
road

307. Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment
Battlefield, 1997 U. CH. LEGAL F. 59, 95; see also Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Science, Values, and Risk, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. ScL. 116, 119-21 (1996).
308. Cf Shapiro, supra note 24, at 529 ("Surely the case for a claim of weak paternalism is
itself weakened, for instance, when the asserted incapacity exists on a question of basic values or assumptions .... ").
309. Commentators have observed that what is perceived as too risky (and thus for Feinberg
sufficient for raising requisite voluntariness) is based on social values. See, e.g., Doppelt, supra note
9, at 260 (arguing that what is considered to be harmful "is culture dependent and changes over
time"); Fitzgerald, supra note 124, at 197 ("[O]ur understanding of self abuse is subject to uncertainty and to arbitrary social fashion."); Schwartz, supra note 102, at 394-95; Wikler, supra note 64,
at 229 (arguing that the health educator must "transcend cultural biases and distinguish the foreign
and idiosyncratic from the involuntary"); id. at 230 ("[P]ractices typically singled out for condemnation . . . are being penalized merely for having values different from those of persons in power.");
Yoder, supra note 6, at 5 ("Which lifestyle interventions represent justified infringements on individual autonomy? ... Any answer will be pragmatic relative to our values, goals, and interests."). The
law of battery incorporates this limit, requiring not only that there be an application of force to another but also that it be offensive. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18, 19 (1965). On
the other hand, there is, as John Kleinig observes, at bottom "a distinction to be drawn" between
conduct that is and is not substantially voluntary. KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 63. "The difficulty is to
know how to draw it without importing distorting factors." Id.
310. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 105 (Diagram 20-3). This is not an exact reproduction of
Feinberg's diagram: I simplified the examples inside the grid.
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Categories (one) and (four) are uncontroversial. Liberals and nonliberals
alike will generally refrain from interfering with the substantially voluntary assumption of reasonable risks, such as the conduct in Category
One. Similarly, both liberals and nonliberals will almost always interfere
with the non-substantially voluntary assumption of unreasonable risks,
such as the conduct in Category Four. Category Two is also uncontroversial. Although not substantially voluntary, the conduct represented by this
category concerns activities and harms too trivial with which to be
concerned.3"'
The controversial category is the third. Of those risks worth regulating, the soft paternalism principle typically justifies only the regulation of
the behavior in Category Four. The hard paternalism principle, on the
other hand, typically justifies regulation of the conduct in both Categories
Three and Four. Feinberg's argument is that some of the behavior in Category Three is so unreasonable that it more properly belongs in Category
Four. He thereby avoids defending the regulation of conduct in Category
Four by re-describing it as Category Three conduct.
The behaviors represented in Categories Three and Four are both
harmful. What makes one so outrageous that it is presumptively nonautonomous is not, as Feinberg assumes, merely its objective aspects such
as the magnitude and the severity of the risks at stake. 312 The presumption of nonautonomy also involves a judgment as to the social worth of
the activities at stake.3 13 Feinberg admits that to override behavior in Category Three on the ground that it is unreasonable would be hard paternalism. Yet he implicitly appeals to a subjective notion of reasonableness
when he characterizes behavior in Category Three as "outrageous" and
311. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 123, at 450 ("[M]any routine acts of daily life are not
aptly described either as voluntary or as involuntary."); HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 118 ("Persons may act nonvoluntarily . . . provided no harm is caused thereby."); VANDEVEER, supra note 6,
at 11, 123-24, 353, 407. Therefore, the lack of substantial voluntariness is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for intervention. See id. at 125 ("Even substantially nonvoluntary choices deserve
protection unless there is good reason to judge them as dangerous."). Notwithstanding the intuitive
appeal of this point, it is an important area of research to discern which of aspects of daily life for
which voluntariness is more important and should be better assured. Cf Robert L. Arrington, Advertising, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHIcs 51 (Ruth Chadwick ed., 1998); James M. Ebejer &
Michael J. Morden, Paternalism in the Marketplace: Should a Salesman Be His Buyer's Keeper?, 7
J. Bus. ETHICS 337 (1988); Bailey F. Kuklin, The Asymmetrical Conditions of Legal Responsibility in
the Marketplace, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 893 (1990).
312. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 103 (explaining that conduct may be prohibited as
"manifestly unreasonable to the point of suggesting impaired rationality" only "in respect to its objectively assessable components"); cf id. at 119, 127, 158, 364.
313. See supra notes 303-12.
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thus defines it as Category Four behavior. 31 4 Feinberg's argument for intervention may be sound. 3 15 Feinberg errs, however, in failing to characterize this argument as hard paternalism. 316 He "smuggles" into his account of voluntariness the very evaluative judgments of reasonableness
317
that he denies are relevant when determining voluntariness.
As some commentators have described it, Feinberg's soft paternalistic strategy represents "ad hoc tinkering . ..to ensure that all justified
paternalism can be seen as restraining only involuntary actions." 3 18 In order to justify what he admits to be reasonable laws, he "masks" what is
clearly hard paternalism as a sort of soft paternalism. Feinberg is not
alone.3 19 The manipulation or "masking" of the soft paternalism princi314. Cf.KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 187 ("The Argument from Weak Paternalism is in principle
unobjectionable. The difficulty is in applying it fairly and economically."); KULTGEN, supra note 24,
at 90 (arguing that an approach like Feinberg's "puts phenomena into neat bins for analysis, but distorts them and confounds our intuitions"); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Introduction to MORALITY AND
THE LAW 9 (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 1971) ("[Tlhe characterization of laws (e.g. as cases of
[one liberty limiting principle or another]) is a more complicated and ambiguous undertaking than
has so far been supposed."); Weale, supra note 52, at 172 ("[Tjhe difficulty comes not so much
with stipulating what conditions paternalism has to satisfy before it is legitimate, but in knowing
when cases fall under the appropriate heading.") (emphasis added).
315. Such intervention might also be justified on the ground that smoking imposes "significant, preventable harm" which could be easily prevented by minimally intrusive intervention. See
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 283 (listing the conditions that justify hard paternalism);
see also Beauchamp, supra note 33, at 1917.
316. Indeed, Feinberg recognizes that his strategy may make out a "compromise with hard paternalism." HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 119; see also id. at 126 ("We are thus led to a liberal
doctrine which in its immediate effects can be confused with paternalism .... "); Gray, supra note
141, at 31, 32 (observing that "Feinberg's intellectual virtues of rigor and honesty compelled him to
abandon the Liberal Position with which he began . . .and 'allow[] that . . . legal paternalism states
reasons that are always relevant.' "); cf. Brock, supra note 22, at 565 (arguing that Feinberg's theory
"in fact require[s] a balancing of respecting an individual's autonomy against protecting his good.").
317. See Smiley, supra note 162, at 299 (arguing that Feinberg's soft paternalism principle
"ultimately embodies the same kind of communal standards that are, according to [his] own principles, illegitimate justifications for interference with individual liberty"); see also Stanley S. Kleinberg, Review of HARM TO SELF, I I PHIL. INVESTIGATION 177, 178 (1988) ("His object is to show
how there can be good non-paternalistic reasons for some laws which are often advocated on paternalistic grounds . .. [but i]n practice Feinberg does not carry off the trick with complete success.");
Edward Sankowski, Paternalism and Public Policy, 22 AM. PHIL. Q. 1,6 (1985) (arguing that Feinberg's use of voluntariness "seems susceptible of use to justify morally unacceptable interventions,
depending on how the self-avowedly artful term 'voluntary' is used."); Alan Soble, Paternalism,
Liberal Theory, and Suicide, 12 CAN. J. PHIL. 335, 343 (1982) ("Even though Feinberg is still applying a person-mediating maxim, it is a maxim whose application is made possible only by appealing,
for epistemological reasons, to an act-mediating maxim.").
318.

Goldman & Goldman, supra note 149, at 68.

319. Perhaps the other most notable soft paternalism "stretcher" is Cass R. Sunstein. See, e.g.,
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 40 (1990)
(arguing that individual preferences are social constructs, and therefore state interference with those
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ple, like that associated with the harm principle, is pervasive.32 0 As
Duncan Kennedy argues, "paternalism is a more pervasive issue . . .'than
people will generally admit."' 321 It is, Kennedy explains, "everywhere,
coming out of the woodwork. ' ' 322 Masking is not only widespread but it
is also dangerous because it frequently shields discriminatory and illfounded regulation from criticism. 323 Recognizing the true ethical basis
preferences "removes a kind of coercion"); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541 (1998) ("[B]ounded rationality pushes toward a sort of
anti-antipaternalism .... "); Cass R. Sunstein, How the Law Constructs Preferences, 86 GEo. L.J.
2637, 2639 (1998) ("Recent revisions in understanding human behavior ... support a form of antiantipaternalism.").
320. See, e.g., Volunteer Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 225 (6th Cir.
1991) (quoting New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 E2d 1339, 1360 (2d Cir. 1989))
("[A]mong that 'we are doing this for your own good' [is] a contention that usually shields one's
actual motive."); HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 4 ("[W]e would expect hardly anyone to confess
to paternalistic tendencies, much less boldly affirm the paternalistic principle and wave the paternalistic banner."); id. at 85 ("The more overt paternalistic language seems much less contrived and
more honest."); VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 213 ("[I]t is sometimes thought, and argued, that
there is little reason to worry over whether or not this or that paternalistically based defense of interference is justified, since such philosophical fastidiousness about paternalistic strategies of justification can be set aside-set aside because there is a legitimate, familiar, and nonpaternalistic ground
.
... ); id. at 7 ("One important ground for delimiting risks is paternalistic in nature ....
[Tihis
fact ... has not been sufficiently recognized in existing discussions."); Robert Clark, The Soundness
of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (1976) ("[Slince [paternalistic] theories strike many
persons as an insult to human dignity, inevitably there is pressure to disguise these theories when
they do underpin regulation."); Goldman & Goldman, supra note 149, at 68 (cautioning against "ad
hoc tinkering" by the soft paternalist to ensure that all justifiable paternalism can be seen as restricting only involuntary actions); id. at 72 ("One strategy for sidestepping the limitation that prohibits
paternalistic laws is to try to provide non-paternalistic justification for such laws."); Kennedy, supra
note 40, at 646 ("We decide these cases paternalistically, to our credit, but then bury them under
other rubrics .... "); id. at 590 ("The rhetoric of paternalism ... is never an acknowledged motive
. . ."); id. at 624 ("[B]ecause of its pariah status [paternalism] is usually mentioned last, if at all.");
Moffat, supra note 24, at 589 ("[Platernalism has been highly controversial, except among legislators."); Shapiro, supra note 24, at 530 ("[T]he question of paternalism is seldom raised quite so
starkly."); id. at 535 & n.64; id. at 536 (recognizing the "unwillingness to take an openly paternalistic stance"); id. at 545 ("We never rest easy, though, with choices that seem justified, if at all, primarily on paternalistic grounds."); Peter Suber, Paternalism,in 2 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 632, 635 (Christopher Berry Gray ed., 1999) ("Paternalism can be converted to nonpaternalism only when we modulate the notions of harm and consent sufficiently. While this is
sometimes distressingly easy, at least as often it is an exercise in sophistry, oversimplification, or
self-deception."); Zamir, supra note 244, at 281 ("[P]olicymakers in western liberal democracies
rarely resort to paternalistic justifications for their regulation in present times."). See also supra note
258.
321. Kennedy, supra note 40, at 645.
322. Id. at 646.
323. Cf Berger, supra note 23, at 26 ("Under a continuing rhetoric of individual autonomy
and rights, an insidious collectivism is becoming the new norm."); James Madison, Speech in the
Virginia Convention; reply to Patrick Henry (June 16, 1788), reprinted in 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 83 (Jonathan Elliot, 2d ed., Buffalo NY, William S. Hein & Co.
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for liberty-limiting regulations clarifies the issues at stake, allows us to
and
provide an obvious and natural explanation for current regulations,
24
development.
policy
future
for
better lays the groundwork
C.

Limitations of the Hard PaternalismLiberty-Limiting Principle

As with the harm and the soft paternalism principles, the hard paternalism liberty-limiting principle is subject to limitless expansion and the
slippery slope.32 5 Those opposed to hard paternalism argue that government intervention grounded in this doctrine would lead to "an ominous
32 6 and the "enforcement of prudence. 327
growth in big government"
They suggest that "if extended to its logical limits, [hard] paternalism
would support regulation of almost any activity. Mandatory seat belt and
helmet laws, laws limiting consumption of unhealthful foods, and laws
requiring regular medical examinations are just a few examples of laws
that [hard] paternalism could justify. ' 32 8 After all, "almost by definition
1996) ("[T]here are more instances of. the abridgment of the freedom of the people by gradual and
silent encroachments of those in power, than by violent and sudden usurpations."); ORWELL, supra
note 251 (illustrating the masking of totalitarianism with "Newspeak" and "Doublethink"); Zamir,
supra note 117, at 285 ("[T]he fear that paternalism will be used as a pretext for attaining extraneous, discriminatory goals is less significant than it is with regard to other alleged bases of regulation
324. See supra notes 41 & 120.
325. See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 24 ("The trick is stopping short . . . hard paternalism justifies too much."); see also id. at 77; Schauer, supra note 226, at 368-69. Opponents to hard
paternalism might also be making an argument distinct from the slippery slope, the argument "from
added authority." Id. at 367-68; see also Van der Burg, supra note 226, at 131. This argument.is not
based on anything particular to the decision to prohibit the substantially autonomous decision to
smoke. Rather, the concern is "jurisdictional," because merely allowing the government to regulate
substantially autonomous self-regarding behavior at all increases the risk that it will regulate other
such behavior. This argument has also been described as "statism." See Enrique Salgado, Paternalism and the Narcotics Industry, 40 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 944, 944 (1997). Of course, hard paternalism, like any liberty-limiting principle, provides only a morally relevant reason, and not necessarily a
decisive reason in support of state intervention. See supra note 26 and infra note 361.
326. Dan E. Beauchamp, Injury, Community, and the Republic, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE
42, 46 (1989); see also Gilbert, supra note 22, at 5 ("Some aspects of the current vogue to alter unacceptable lifestyles are pernicious and verge on the totalitarian.").
327. HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 25.
328. David B. Ezra, Smoker Battery: An Antidote to Second-Hand Smoke, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1061, 1072 (1990); see also City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J., dissenting) ("There is a 'slippery slope' problem here because, if governmental employers
can inquire too extensively into off-job-site behavior, a point eventually will be reached at which the
right of privacy . . . clearly will be breached."); State v. Cotton, 516 P.2d 709, 714 (Haw. 1973)
(Abe, J., dissenting from an opinion upholding the state motorcycle helmet law); HUSAK, supra note
6, at 141 ("1 hope it is clear just how strong and open-ended a hard paternalistic rationale would
have to be . . . . [Any such rationale, I suspect, would prove far too much and would justify a
wider range of paternalistic interferences over individual liberty than should be tolerated ..... ");
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29
everything that people do affects public health. 3
Smokers may ask "[w]hat's next . . . a ban on alcohol? Butter?
Bungee Jumping? How about mandatory jogging, yoga, or weight lifting?" 330 Indeed "[t]he next victims of such rulemaking may be whistlers,
gum chewers, bone crackers, dandruff scratchers, lint pickers, and popcorn eaters." 33 ' A poem published in the Philip Morris Magazine colorfully captures their concern:

Smoking is a civil right,
Those who don't should join the fight.
For if one right does disappear,
The loss of others may be near...
Too many calories can cause you to die,
So let's have a ban on apple pie.
Once a government restricts a right,
The end will never be near in sight.
There's a lesson here . . . this is no joke,

LEICHTER, supra note 12, at 133-34; SULLUM, supra note 1, at 269; Beauchamp, supra note 33, at

1918 ("Paternalism could in principle prohibit smoking, drinking, and hazardous recreational activities such as hang-gliding, mountain-climbing, and white-water rafting .... "); B.J. Boughton, Compulsory Health and Safety in a Free Society, 10 J. MED. ETHICS 186 (1984); Mark Cunningham, Got
a Light?, NAT'L. REV., Mar. 23, 1998, at 51, 52 (reviewing JACOB SULLUM, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD

(1998)) ("Beware, ye other merchants of premature, politically incorrect death-ye distillers, fattyfood distributors, gun-makers, auto-makers."); Dworkin, supra note 20, at 125 ("[The] difficulty is
that of drawing a line so that it is not the case that all ultra-hazardous activities are ruled out...");
Feinberg, supra note 173, at 319 ("[Pjaternalism justifies too much, the flat-out prohibition, for example, of whiskey, cigarettes, and fried foods .... "); Joseph Kadow, From Cigarettes to Perfume:
Movement to Limit Choice Attacks Personal Freedom, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Apr. 13, 1998,

at 40, 74; Lewis L. Maltby & Bernard J. Dushman, Whose Life Is It Anyway-Employer Control of
Off-Duty Behavior, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 645, 646 (1994); Stewart, supra note 114, at 140103; Ren6e M. Szobonya, City of North Miami v. Kurtz: Is Sacrificing Employee Privacy Rights the
Cost of Health Care Reform?, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 545-46 (1996).
329. Gostin et al., supra note 12, at 91.
330. David B. Ezra, Get Off Your Butts: The Employer's Right to Regulate Employee Smoking,
60 TENN. L. REV. 905, 937 (1993); see also Arthur L. Caplan, Sinners, Saints, and Health Care: Personal Responsibility and Health, NORTHWEST REP., Apr. 1994, at 20, 23 ("The problem with personal
responsibility at the policy level is that it may prove hard to draw a clear line between encouragement and coercion.").

331. GOODIN, supra note 5, at 124; see also Salgado, supra note 325, at 945 ("If the state intends to protect citizens' health from themselves, shouldn't it also regulate other health-related activities . . . . Policemen could go about making sure people do their obligatory push-ups and sit-ups.
People who harm their health by eating high cholesterol foods or by hurting their ankles while playing soccer . . . could be arrested and charged for 'crimes against health.' "); Tollison & Wagner,
supra note 165, at 301 ("If government has the power to protect people from making choices that
include relatively high risks, why stop at tobacco consumption?"); Cathy Young, Drug Fanaticism
Endangers Our Freedoms, DET. NEWS, Aug. 27, 1996, at A9 ("The War on Smoking may set an especially dangerous precedent in allowing the government to regulate unhealthy behavior. What next:

Sugar? High-fat foods? Red meat? Coffee?").
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332
I once had a right to smoke!

Indeed, there has been some "slipping" in what some have dubbed the
"daddy state. ' 333 One economist has remarked that "[i]t is somewhat
ironic that the government discourages smoking and drinking .. .yet
when it comes to the major cause of death-heart disease ... politicians

let us eat with impunity.

' 334

In response to this apparent irony, a Yale

psychologist has proposed a junk-food tax. 335 Others have proposed even

336
more direct regulation of fatty foods.
Surely, we must be cautious in using hard paternalism as a libertylimiting principle. 337 Justice Brandeis was right when he warned that
"[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent." 338 Milton Friedman is

332.
333.

Louis C. Mroz, Smoking Ban? What Next?, PHILIP MORRIS MAO., Summer 1987, at 29.
Ronald Brownstein, When Daddy is a Nag, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 1, 1998, at

30.
334. Jack Chambless & Sarah C. McAlister, Eating with Impunity, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec.
22, 1996, at Gl.
335. See Kelly D. Brownell, Get Slim With Higher Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1994, at A29;
see also Bill Reel, A Buck a Pack Is a Helluva Whack, NEWSDAY, Mar. 25, 1994, at A43; Rippel,
supra note 182, at 34.
336. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, FORWARD PLAN FOR HEALTH FY
1977-81, at 104 (1975) (proposing controls on high sugar and low nutrition foods); John Doyle, Why
Fattening Foods are Being Positioned as the Next Targets for Public Health Officials, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 10, 1998, at 42; Joyce Howard Price, New Battle About Evil Spirits, INSIGHT
ON NEWS, Feb. 1, 1999, at 40 (reporting that Michael F. Jacobson, the executive director of the
Center for Science in the Public Interest "argues that people can't be trusted to make wise and
healthful decisions on their own," and describing CSPI's attacks on Chinese food, movie popcorn,
Mexican food, and soft drinks); Cori Vanchieri, Lessons from the Tobacco Wars Edify Nutrition War
Tactics, 90 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 420 (1998).
337. See KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 74 ("Opponents of paternalism rightly worry about a steadily increasing use of paternalistic measures."). In order to emphasize our cautiousness we might
adopt John Kultgen's term "soft antipaternalism." This concept sanctions the same intervention as
hard paternalism but places the emphasis on the opposition to the practice. See KULTGEN, supra note
24, at 132, 136.
338. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 .(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding."); see also KULTGEN, supra note 24, at 56 ("Whenever anyone professes to act altruistically, we must suspect a desire to dominate.") (discussing Douglas, supra note 252, at 179-80);
ALAN JAY LERNER. My FAIR LADY, act I, scene ii (1956) ("[T]hey're always throwing goodness at
you. But with a little bit of luck, a man can duck.").
The preventive function of government, however, is far more likely to be abused, to the
prejudice of liberty, than the punitory function; for there is hardly any part of the legitimate
freedom of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented, and fairly
too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency.
THOMAS SZASZ, OUR RIGHT TO DRUGS: THE CASE FOR A FREE MARKET 73 (1992) (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY); see also HENRY DAVID THOREAU, LIFE IN THE WOODS 118 (Houghton Miflin

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:419

also right that once one accepts the principle that some shall decide for
others, "[t]here is no formula that can tell us where to stop." 339 We
ought to heed the warning to beware hard paternalistic regulation. Nevertheless, the dangers are not unavoidable. Although only a few writers
have made arguments defending hard paternalism, 34° there is no reason to
think that hard paternalism cannot ever serve as a legitimate basis for the
3 41
regulation of tobacco.
1906) (1854) ("If I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my house with the conscious design of doing me good, I should run for my life."); VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 443 ("The otherwise commendable aim of liberalism ... has sometimes led to a kind of aggressive benevolence and
related disregard for the conception of the good possessed by those whom liberals have been bent on
helping.") (emphasis added); Douglas, supra note 252, at 179-80 (discussing the nature of altrusic
intentions); Eugene Feingold, Public Health versus Civil Liberties, 113 PUB. HEALTH REP. 334, 335
(1998) ("[I1s public health's claim of benevolence suspect-a cloak for the imposition of the claimant's values on the supposed beneficiary?"); Alan Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 557 (1967) ("[T]he benevolent have a tendency to colonize, whether geographically or legally."); Pellegrino, Health Promotion, supra note 6, at 375
("Involuntary measures also assume a benign, wise, and responsive government-something history
finds singularly rare."); ORWELL, supra note 251 (illustrating the masking of totalitarianism with
"Newspeak" and "Doublethink"); Zamir, supra note 117, at 281 ("A common argument against paternalism is that the paternalist's benevolent rhetoric may disguise other, less legitimate motivations
.... History provides numerous examples of false paternalism, where whole sectors of society (women, minority groups) were oppressed 'for their own good.' ").
339. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPrrALISM AND FREEDOM 33-34 (1962) (emphasis added).
340. See, e.g., KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 67-73, 173 (defending hard paternalism); CARL E.
SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS 33 (1998)

(arguing for a shift away from the present emphasis on autonomy); Ronald Bailey, Warning:
Bioethics May Be Hazardous to Your Health, REASON, Aug.-Sept. 1999, at 24, 27 ("[Mlany
bioethicists are rediscovering the virtues of paternalism."); Beauchamp, supra note 33, at 1920 (observing that in the past decade "many voices began to be heard that were more sympathetic to various paternalistic appeals"); Daniel Callahan, Current Trends in Biomedical Ethics in the United
States, 24 BULLETIN OF PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORG. 530, 531 (1990) (observing that some commentators believe the "repudiation of medical paternalism .. . has gone much too far."); Michael L.
Gross, Autonomy and Paternalism in Communtarian Society: Patient Rights in Israel, HASTINGS
CENTER REP. Jul.-Aug. 1999, at 19 & n.25 (observing a "gradual slide toward .. .weaker formulations of autonomy .. .and a growing realization that a little paternalism might be a good thing");
Mead, supra note 40, at 104 (reporting that people are more open to paternalism for others, particularly those on welfare); Regan, supra note 42, at 192 ("I have a lingering feeling that it may be permissible to prevent cigarette smoking even by a smoker who has no family, who is clear headed and
as free of neuroses as a person can be, who is well informed about his chances of getting cancer and
the general diminution of his life expectancy, and who just doesn't give a damn."); Starobin, supra
note 249, at 2012 ("Daddy state paternalism is aimed largely at social behavior and its principal
targets are relatively powerless people."); Weale, supra note 52, at 166.
341. Cf Beauchamp, supra note 33, at 1918 ("Careful defenses of paternalism would disallow
these extreme interventions ....");James Curran, The Libertarian Non-Smoker's Defence of Smoking, 352 LANCET 745, 747 (1998) ("Rather than all-powerful paternalistic tyrants, we are simply
'redefining the unacceptable' and working to protect the health of individuals and society.").
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As Frederic Schauer has explained, a slippery slope argument "depends for its persuasiveness upon temporally and spatially contingent empirical facts. '3 42 Such an argument "needs to be justified and not merely
intoned. ' 343 In the context of smoking, the empirical foundation of the
slippery slope argument is weak. 344 It ignores the unique nature of the
risks from smoking, risks that are easily distinguished from the risks accompanying self-affecting behaviors further down the (not so slippery)
345
slope.
No one has shown that the risks from tobacco cannot be distinguished from those of other risky behaviors. In fact, Professor Robert
342. Schauer, supra note 226, at 381; see also HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 346-47; Van
der Burg, supra note 226, at 137-38. There are non-empirical forms of the slippery slope argument.
For example, the form attaching to the harm and soft paternalism principles is a "logical version" in
which the slide is not due to psychological and social forces but to the vague conceptual scope of
the principles themselves. See supra note 226.
343. KLEINIo, supra note 8, at 94; see also Van der Burg, supra note 226, at 141 ("Slippery
slope arguments are often not so much rational arguments as expressions of an underlying feeling of
concern about general trends in society ....
IT]hey are rarely valid and plausible .... ").
344. See HUSAK, supra note 6, at 87 ("But surely [hard paternalism] would not endorse a
sweeping condemnation of every dangerous recreational pastime. Clearly, distinctions would have to
be drawn on the basis of empirical evidence .... ").
345. Another empirical counter-argument to the slippery slope is that it ignores political and
social reality. There is no foundation for fear that permitting limits to the personal risks involved in
tobacco use exposes the individual to unlimited and unchecked public health activism. Because legislatures and state judges are politically accountable to the voters, they cannot become totalitarian institutions without at least the consent of those whom they rule. Dan Beauchamp explains:
Beyond limits on alcohol, and tobacco through increased taxes and controls on availability,
handgun controls, helmets 1for motorcyclists, and seatbelts and airbags for cars, there are few
remaining measures on the horizon available to democratic government. Imaginative philosophers might still envision a time when American legislatures would dictate that American citizens run three miles every day (or at least take long walks), eat more bran, eschew bacon,
and so forth, but I see no prospect that we are slouching, even slowly, toward a vast paternal
power exercised by our elected officials.
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 21, at 97; see also KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 191 ("The slippery slope looks

slippery only because we consider one factor in isolation from others that are also important if government interference is to be justified."); Perez-Rivas, supra note 276 (reporting that Friendship
Heights' hard paternalistic ordinance was killed due to opposition based in large part on the issue of
personal liberty); Teret & Gaare, supra note 60, at 46 ("[l~t is questionable whether any measure so
extreme would be enacted by a legislature because of our strong political and moral bias toward personal liberty and autonomy .... "). But see, e.g., VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 337 ("[Tihe claim
that whatever policies are decided by elected representatives in a majoritarian, constitutional democracy are all right fails to address our basic questions ..
"); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme
Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 79-80 (1989) (observing that "social choice theorists have demonstrated reasons why multi-member bodies cannot
.. . reflect majority wishes"); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121,
2124 (1990); Wikler, supra note 47, at 226.
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Rabin argues that such a clear and categorical distinction can be made.
Rabin argues that smoking can be distinguished from other voluntarily
assumed risks by the very nature of the harm it imposes.346 Smoking
stands alone in the magnitude of abuse it creates, the magnitude of risk it
imposes, and the magnitude of difficulty one encounters when trying to
347
break the habit.
First, all smokers are at risk of serious physiological consequences.
The magnitude of the harm is well established and hardly worth reciting.
According to the latest Surgeon General's Report, smoking is highly associated with various cancers, including cancers of the lung, cervix,
esophagus, mouth, stomach, and bladder. 48 Other adverse health consequences include chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, coronary heart
disease, and cerebrovascular disease. 349 .
Second, the probability of harm to the user is higher than that of
other harmful activities. Skydiving, for example, certainly increases the
risks of injury or death, but most participants enjoy the sport without in" ' Smoking, on the other
cident. 35
hand, not only increases the risk of
harm, it is intrinsically-and always harmful.3 5 2 Research clearly illus'
trates that "tobacco is harmful whenever it is smoked." 353
It is the only
product that, even when used as intended, is still harmful to your
health.35 4 Not only has no safe level been determined, but smokers de346.

See RABIN & SUGARMAN, supra note 21, at 10-11; see also Rabin, supra note 5, at 483-

347.

See supra note 346.

348.

See, e.g., OmCE U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ToQACCO USE AMONG U.S. RA-

84.

CIAL/ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 137, 152, 153, 155, 155-56

(1998).
349. See id. at 158, 160, 164. Smoking also causes smokers to have poor teeth, sore throats,
stained fingers, and ruined skin. But these cosmetic "harms" are not significant enough to warrant
restriction of individual liberty. Cf supra notes 136-48.
350. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 286, at 645 (estimating that the "overall lifetime mortality risk" to smokers in 1993 ranged from one-sixth to one-third); SMOKING, supra note 190, at 80;
cf. Graham E. Kelden, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective Control of
the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63, 64 & nn.3-13 (1997) (reviewing the
probabilities of smoking-related death due to particular diseases).
351.

See DAN POYNTER, PARACHUTING: A SKYDIVER's HANDBOOK (6th ed. 1991), reprinted at

<http://www.afn.org/skydive/sta/stats.html> (reporting a fatality rate of 29 deaths per year); PARACHUTIST (U.S. Hang Gliding Ass'n), Apr. 1990, at 13 (table), reprinted at <http://www.afn.org/
skydive/sta/stats.html> (reporting a 1988 fatality rate of 25 per 100,000 participants).
352.

See HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 101.

353.

GOODIN, supra note 5, at 127.

354. See Tyler, supra note 146, at 794 ("Tobacco is unlike any other legal product; it is the
only available consumer product that is hazardous to health when used as intended ...alcohol and
fatty foods can be used in moderation.").
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velop tolerances that keep them well above whatever level that might
be.

3 55

Third, smoking pervades life activities." 6 Smokers use cigarettes to
deal with "an exceedingly wide range of everyday social activities . . .
coping with bad news, enjoying a good meal, beginning a difficult work
assignment." 35 7 Smoking affects "attention, arousal, mood, and under
certain conditions, cognition. ' 358 Other risky activities, like skydiving, are
more compartmentalized. Caffeine is used in much the same manner as
cigarettes, but the risk and magnitude of harm from caffeine consumption
is insignificant when compared to the risks of tobacco use. 359 Few products match tobacco on all three of these dimensions of harmfulness.
Thus, justifying tobacco regulation on the basis of hard paternalism will
not necessarily lead to the regulation of other activities.316 The slippery
slope is by no means a certainty.
CONCLUSION

In this Article I have provided the conceptual "tools" with which
policymakers can forge ethically honest and justifiable anti-smoking laws.
355. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,726-27 & 44,737-38.
356. See Corrine G. Husten et at., Intermittent Smokers: A Descriptive Analysis of Persons
Who Have Never Smoked Daily, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 86, 88 (1998) (reporting that more than
90% of smokers smoke every day).
357.

Rabin, supra note 5, at 484; see also RICHARD KLUGER. ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S

HUNDRED YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MOR-

Xiii-XVi (Vintage Books 1997) (1996) (describing the ways in which smoking functions as an
"all-purpose psychological crutch"); SULLUM, supra note 1, at 244 ("A smoker might depend on
cigarettes to control stress, to stay slim, to keep focused at work, to fill idle time, to mingle at parties, even to define an identity."); id. at 257 (observing that most smokers smoke every day, averaging at least once per waking hour); TATE, supra note 27, at 148 ("[Cligarettes serve a number of important psychosocial functions-as self-medication for either depression or excitability, as emblems
of solidarity with peers, as expressions of identity."); Christopher Hitchens, Smoke and Mirrors,
VANITY FAIR, Oct. 1994, at 88 ("Cigarettes improve my short-term memory and my digestion, make
me a finer writer and a better dinner companion.
358. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,740 (1990).
359. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,728-29; see also J.W. Daly & B.B. Fredholm, Caffeine-An Atypical
RIS

Drug of Dependence, 51 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 199, 206 (1998). Gwendolyn Prothro, The

Caffeine Conundrum: Caffeine Regulation in the United States, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 65, 68-75 (1996/
97).
360. I have sketched some of the considerations and distinctions that support the hard paternalistic regulation of tobacco smoking. See also Pope, supra note 240. A complete and cogent argument will have to confront formidable counterarguments. For example, while I present evidence regarding the importance of smoking to smokers in order to substantiate an argument for the hard
paternalistic regulation of smoking, philosopher John Kleinig, on the other hand, argues that just because smoking is a "concern[] of real importance to the individual" the degree of liberty limited by
regulation is greater and, therefore, the regulation is less justifiable. KLEINIG, supra note 8, at 110.
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In short, policymakers considering the public health regulation of tobacco
should follow this simple three-step formula: (1) begin with a presumption of liberty; (2) identify and articulate the normative justification or
liberty-limiting principle for the regulation; and (3) choose particular policy options that are no broader than the normative justification. Of
course, this formula cannot by itself determine the development of public
policy. 361 However, if policymakers follow this formula as they determine
the scope and manner of tobacco regulation, that regulation will have a
firm normative foundation by which the regulation can be justified and
future policy can better develop.

361. See Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others-A Rejoinder, 5 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 16, 16-17 (1986)
(explaining that a liberty limiting principle is only a "relevant reason" and not a "decisive reason"
for legislation: "[A] proposed law can be morally permissible to enact and yet be ineffective, impolitic, or unwise."); see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 10 ("[W]e cannot move with
assurance from a judgment that act 'x' is morally right (or wrong) to a judgment that a law or policy
'y' is morally right (or wrong) because it mandates or encourages (or prohibits) act 'x'. . . . Factors
such as the symbolic value of law, the costs of a program and its enforcement, and the demands of
competing programs must also be considered."); BEAUCHAMP & STEINBOCK, supra note 6, at 7
("[P]ublic health is a species of public policy. Public policy certainly includes ethical considerations,
but it must also consider nonethical factors, such as politics."); CALLAHAN, supra note 7, at 197 (arguing that although "a theoretical case might, therefore, be made for forceful interventions ... , it is
by no means easy to see how to develop the public policy"); HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 9, at 16,
232; HARM TO SELF, supra note 8, at 141-42, 374; PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS, supra note 6, at 421
("The making of law and policy is more complex than determining what is morally wrongful.");
RILEY, supra note 42, at 114-15, 191; SCHONSHECK, supra note 25, at 70-79 (explaining that in order
to be morally justified, a liberty-limiting law must pass not only the (moral) "principles" and "presumptions" "filters," but also a "pragmatics filter" in which the costs and benefits of the law are
assessed); Wikler, supra note 47, at 240.

